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Credit models are essential to control credit risk and accurately predicting 
bankruptcy and financial distress is even more necessary after the recent global 
financial crisis. Although accounting and financial information have been the main 
variables in corporate credit models for decades, academics continue searching for 
new attributes to model the probability of default. This thesis investigates the use of 
corporate efficiency and corporate governance measures in standard statistical credit 
models using cross-sectional and hazard models.  
Relative efficiency as calculated by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can be used 
in prediction but most previous literature that has used such variables has failed to 
follow the assumptions of Variable Returns to Scale and sample homogeneity and 
hence the efficiency may not be correctly measured. This research has built industry 
specific models to successfully incorporate DEA efficiency scores for different 
industries and it is the first to decompose overall Technical Efficiency into Pure 
Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency in the context of modelling financial 
distress. It has been found that efficiency measures can improve the predictive 
accuracy and Scale Efficiency is a more important measure of efficiency than others. 
Furthermore, as no literature has attempted a panel analysis of DEA scores to predict 
distress, this research has extended the cross sectional analysis to a survival analysis 
by using Malmquist DEA and discrete hazard models. Results show that dynamic 
efficiency scores calculated with reference to the global efficiency frontier have the 
best discriminant power to classify distressed and non-distressed companies.  
Four groups of corporate governance measures, board composition, ownership 
structure, management compensation and director and manager characteristics, are 
incorporated in the hazard models to predict financial distress. It has been found that 
state control, institutional ownership, salaries to independent directors, the Chair’s 
age, the CEO’s education, the work location of independent directors and the 
concurrent position of the CEO have significant associations with the risk of 
financial distress. The best predictive accuracy is made from the model of 
governance measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic variables. Policy 
implications are advised to the regulatory commission.  
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The recent financial crisis highlighted the importance of credit risk management and 
the necessity of recognising early indicators of corporate financial distress in order to 
prevent potential losses. Credit scoring models used to generate early signals of 
corporate bankruptcy have received academic attention since at least the 1950s, and 
are still widely used. 
 
One of the main problems in failure prediction models is variable selection. Financial 
ratios which are the quotient of two items taken from financial statements are the 
most popular variables that have been considered in the literature. Beaver (1966) was 
the first author to introduce financial ratios into bankruptcy prediction. In recent 
decades there have been a large number of bankruptcy prediction studies based on 
financial ratios using various statistical and machine-learning techniques. They were 
reviewed by Altman (1993), Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), Kumar and Ravi (2007), 
Bahrammirzaee (2010) and Verikas et al (2010). Recent papers (e.g. Sun and Li, 
2013) also demonstrated that financial ratios are still dominating the variable 
selection.  
 
At the same time, changes in financial ratios often become visible after the causes of 
failure have begun. Market-based information can produce a more timely prediction 
under the assumption of efficient markets (Merton, 1974; Bharath and Shumway, 
2008) but recently this has also been criticised for a lack of adequate statistical power 
(Campbell et al, 2008).  
 
Therefore besides financial variables, researchers are constantly looking for other 
information to improve the predictive accuracy of corporate credit models or to 
explain the causes of business failure. Those efforts include incorporation of 
macroeconomic factors (Duffie et al, 2007; Hernandez Tinoco and Wilson, 2013), 
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external resource factors (Hu and Ansell, 2007), legal actions from creditors, audit 
opinions, board characteristics for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
(Altman et al, 2010; Wilson and Altanlar, 2014). 
 
In recent years, academics have paid attention to the role of corporate efficiency 
(Paradi et al, 2004) and corporate governance (Platt and Platt, 2012) and have begun 
to study their relationships to financial distress. Corporate efficiency is the 
productivity to turn resources into preferable outputs and is the outcome of 
management and exogenous factors, whilst corporate governance is the system of 
management by which companies are directed and controlled, which can be argued  
to be one of the underlying reasons why a company will fail or succeed (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Therefore, measures of both corporate efficiency and corporate governance 
are of importance in the assessment of credit risk. 
 
Corporate credit risk, more specifically, is present in every company and is borne by 
all creditors in the activities of lending and trading. By credit default, we generally 
refer to failure, bankruptcy, financial distress, etc. – though strictly speaking they 
have their own definitions practically, legally, or financially. Our interest is in the 
credit risk behind them (see discussions in Section 2.2).  
 
In summary, the aim of this research is to use corporate efficiency and governance 
measures in association with conventional financial ratios to create corporate credit 
risk prediction models, and to analyse predictive accuracy improvements when those 




Previous studies have tried to investigate the relationship between corporate 
efficiency measures, corporate governance measures and credit risk. For example, 
relative efficiency calculated by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used as either 
a classifier (Cielen et al, 2004) of failed and non-failed companies or as a variable in 
other analysing methods (Premachandra et al, 2009). Some researchers find 
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corporate efficiency can successfully classify the good from the bad or explain a part 
of the risk of default. Information about corporate governance such as directors on 
the board and shareholding has also been found to be associated with corporate credit 
risk (Chaganti et al, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1994a).  
 
Most applications of DEA efficiency measures in corporate default prediction 
models  do not observe some important assumptions of this approach. Firstly, few of 
them has considered Variable Returns to Scale (term defined in Section 4.3.1) but 
instead assume Constant Returns to Scale, which is not reflected in reality. Secondly, 
using the mathematical programming method DEA to calculate relative efficiency 
requires samples to be homogeneous in terms of their industry. Otherwise, relative 
efficiency scores computed in comparison to a company’s peers become meaningless. 
Most studies using mixed industry samples ignore this important assumption in DEA 
methodology, or studies using a single industry have only a limited sample size, 
which potentially suffers statistical criticism. No study has ever tried to decompose 
Technical Efficiency into Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency in this 
context, which can provide more information for analysis. Also, no study has ever 
conducted analysis of an efficiency score on dynamic prediction models.   
 
In the applications of corporate governance measures, most studies are from the 
perspective of corporate governance and its relationship with corporate performance. 
They either lack the specification of prediction models – model training and 
validation – and instead stop at hypothesis testing, or they do not cover many aspects 
of corporate governance, if they are in the form of credit risk prediction. Also, few 
studies has tried a dynamic analysis on governance measures in this field.  
 
Inspired by previous literature, it is necessary to bridge these gaps, investigate the 
DEA application whilst following its assumptions and build a stable and robust 
model to predict the probability of financial distress using these additional 







By understanding the gaps in the literature above, this thesis has three major aims 
and objectives to achieve. These are: 
 
1) To estimate cross-sectional models that incorporate corporate efficiency 
measures and its components to predict financial distress 
 
The objective is to use relative efficiency calculated by Data Envelopment Analysis 
in prediction models. Three different efficiency measures and an indicator of the 
level of Returns to Scale are incorporated into logistic regression models, to predict 
financial distress alone or with financial ratios.  
 
2) To estimate panel survival models that incorporate dynamic efficiency to 
predict financial distress 
 
The objective is to find an appropriate DEA model to calculate dynamic efficiency 
scores to conduct panel analysis on the risk of financial distress. Dynamic efficiency 
scores are used as a classifier directly and as variables in a second stage of regression 
analysis. Both out-of-sample and out-of-time validations are employed to ensure the 
robustness of predictions.  
 
3) To estimate panel survival models that incorporate corporate governance 
measures to predict financial distress 
 
The objective is to employ a large selection of corporate governance measures in 
survival models to predict the probability of financial distress in a chosen time period. 
The available variables cover four aspects of corporate governance: board 
composition, ownership structure, management compensation and characteristics of 
the CEO and the Chair. Unlike cross sectional models, panel models given more 
reliable estimates of parameters and allow one to track changes over time in 






This thesis makes several contributions to knowledge. First, it presents the first 
model to use the components of overall efficiency into Pure Technical Efficiency and 
Scale Efficiency. Pure Technical Efficiency indicates the ability to improve 
efficiency by wisely allocating resources and applying new technology. Scale 
Efficiency measures the ability to achieve better efficiency by adjusting the 
organisation to its optimal scale into a prediction model. Second, in contrast to most 
applications of DEA in financial distress prediction which assume Constant Returns 
to Scale and ignore the issue of homogeneity, our industry-specific modified models 
allow for Variable Returns to Scale and use relatively homogenous industry samples 
and so this work is the first to be methodologically correct in the context of mixed-
industry bankruptcy prediction. Third, the results in this thesis are the first time that 
DEA efficiency scores have been calculated dynamically and analysed in survival 
models to make a robust prediction of financial distress. Fourth, the model including 
corporate governance measures is the most comprehensive and thorough study to 
date to use such variables in a panel data structure to predict the probability of 
financial distress in China. Fifth, the analysis relates to large Chinese corporations  
and is the first to address the influences of both scale and government ownership on 
the probability of financial distress in the largest emerging market in the world. Sixth, 
the data covers the period of the recent global financial crisis and by incorporating 
macroeconomic variables we believe we have established statistical relationships that 




This research is important to the following stakeholders.  
 
Creditors 
Prediction models are important credit risk management tools for creditors. Accurate 
prediction models can provide early signals to prevent possible future losses. Banks 
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and other financial institutions can benefit by properly implementing risk 
management tools and efficiently allocating their funds to low risk customers.  
 
Owners and managers 
Companies are owned by directors and shareholders, not creditors, and as such 
should care more their companies’ thrive. They want their companies to grow and 
succeed, not fail. This growth and success is the role of the companies’ managers. 
Information given by explanatory variables is helpful for them to identify problems 
and implement changes in management.  
 
Policy makers and regulators 
Governments obviously do not want to see any scale of financial crisis damage the 
country’s economy. Corporate governance is particularly closely linked to 
government policies and legal enforcement. Our models can clearly give insights into 
the influences of policies and regulations on corporate governance of individual 
companies. Sound governance mechanism can prevent unnecessary risks in their 
decisions.   
 
Researchers 
Other researchers who are in the field of credit scoring and corporate credit risk 
management can consider the methods and results of this research and possibly 
extend it in various directions. 
 
1.6 Main findings 
 
The empirical results of the cross sectional models show that lower efficiency is 
associated with higher probability of financial distress. Either the overall Technical 
Efficiency or its components Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency have 
similar effects on the probability of financial distress. We also find that among these 
types of efficiency Scale Efficiency is more important than Pure Technical 
Efficiency so if a firm wants to reduce the probability of financial distress, it needs to 
optimise its scale of business rather than optimising resources or applying new 
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technology. However, decomposition of efficiency is of little help to improve the 
predictive accuracy, neither is the allowance for levels of Returns to Scale. To gain 
greatest predictive accuracy, financial ratios and efficiency variables should both be 
included. The proposed industry specific logistic regression is capable of modelling 
DEA efficiency for different industries.  
 
In the panel analysis of corporate efficiency, dynamic efficiency scores are 
calculated by Malmquist DEA models with fixed reference, global reference, super 
efficiency and mixed efficiency. Firstly, the Malmquist DEA efficiency over ten 
years compared to the first year was directly used to classify distressed and non-
distressed companies. Its classification accuracy is generally better than when DEA 
efficiency is used to predict financial distress alone in the cross sectional models. But 
their discriminant power is lower than that in the cross sectional models. Secondly, 
various efficiency scores were combined with financial ratios to make predictions in 
hazard models. It is found that dynamic efficiency with global reference gives the 
best discriminant power in terms of AUC and Gini measures in both out-of-time and 
out-of-sample validations.  
 
In the panel analysis of corporate governance measures, each of the predefined 
groups of corporate governance has been found to be useful in detecting financial 
distress. More specifically, the significant variables include the size of the board, the 
number of senior managers and supervisors, the work location of independent 
director, the state ownership and institutional ownership, the salary paid to 
independent directors, the Chair’s age, the CEO’s education and the CEO’s 
concurrent position in other organisation. The best predictive model comes from the 
combination of corporate governance measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic 
variables.     
 
1.7 Outline of structure 
 
This chapter is an evaluative chapter giving an overview of this thesis and the 
contributions it makes. This thesis is generally made up of three separate projects 
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which each employs different data samples. These are discussed in details in Chapter 
Four, Five and Six. The remaining parts are outlined below.  
 
Chapter Two is a general literature review on corporate credit models. It begins with 
a brief discussion of the definitions of default. Methods and algorithms in corporate 
credit models are introduced. They include two main streams - statistical methods 
and artificial intelligence methods and in addition operational research methods and 
hybrid models which have become particularly popular in recent years. An 
understanding of credit prediction techniques can inform the establishment of a new 
and accurate model which can take advantage of previous studies and eliminate their 
limitations. Chapter Two also discusses the variables and information used as 
predictions in those models. We find that although financial ratios still dominate, and 
in recent times academics pay more attention to non-financial information. Other 
studies of SMEs as special cases of corporations and development in consumer credit 
scoring techniques are briefly introduced.  
 
Chapter Three describes the data used in this research. As this research focuses on 
Chinese listed companies, the data source, variables, general description and 
software packages are introduced. Each research project has its own observation 
windows, therefore, their samples are different and are described in each chapter. 
The measurement of model performance is also introduced. 
 
Chapter Four presents the cross-sectional models on corporate efficiency measures. It 
starts by reviewing the findings of previous studies using DEA efficiency scores in 
financial distress prediction and identifies some of their limitations. A new model is 
then proposed, which is a two-stage industry-specific model, where in the first stage, 
DEA scores are calculated under Variable Returns to Scale and in the second stage, 
overall Technical Efficiency and its decomposed elements serve as inputs into 
logistic regression. Comparisons of results are made across thirteen different models. 
Data comes from three industries and the training sample consists of the years 2001-




Chapter Five presents a survival analysis of time to financial distress using corporate 
efficiency measures as covariates. Firstly, it discusses the advantages of dynamic 
models compared to traditional static models. We also review many dynamic models 
to capture the time effect in prediction, including dynamic discrete and continuous 
time models. Dynamic DEA models are the focus of the second project. The 
methodology of Malmquist DEA models, global reference DEA models and super 
efficiency models are given and justified. The estimation of the simple hazard model 
is specified. Dynamic DEA scores are used as the classifier directly and as variables 
in the second stage, similar to the cross-sectional model. Data also comes from three 
industries and the observation window is the period of 2001 to 2010, ten years in 
total. Results of six models are compared and discussed.  
 
Chapter Six presents a survival analysis of corporate governance measures. It starts 
by evaluating findings from previous empirical studies by summarising various 
variables into four groups: board composition, ownership structure, management 
compensation and director characteristics. A background of corporate governance in 
China is then introduced because some features are different from those found in 
Western countries. The methodology chosen is the discrete time hazard model. Due 
to data availability, the observation window is restricted to be the period of 2003-
2010. Four groups of governance measures are selected and tested separately. 
Macroeconomic variables are also added in.  
 
Chapter Seven is the concluding part of this thesis. The objectives of the whole thesis 
are reviewed and the findings summarised. Some conclusions are given with policy 






Chapter Two  




This chapter will comprehensively review the literature covering the development of 
corporate credit models. It includes the definition of default, the evolution of 
algorithms, and the information used to make predictions. It briefly discusses other 
studies on SMEs and consumer credit scoring which is another important field of 
credit models.  
 
2.2 Definition of default in credit risk models 
 
The first thing in studying credit risk is to get a clear understanding of what exactly 
is meant by ‘default’ as it is the object about which we try to make predictions. Most 
generally, as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) stated, default in 
credit risk refers to a bank borrower or counterparty failing to ‘meet its obligations in 
accordance with agreed terms’ (BCBS, 2000, p.1). In corporate credit, these 
obligations include fixed term corporate bonds, trade invoices, employee’s salaries, 
stock dividends and loans from lenders when they become due. Hence Beaver (1966) 
used bankruptcy, bond defaults, overdrawn bank accounts and non-payments as 
events of business failure. But such an occurrence does not necessarily imply the end 
of a business: only in a serious situation does credit default lead to the failure of a 
business. So we find that in most studies on credit risk, bankruptcy is the most direct 
indictor of business failure. Various examples can be found in Altman (1968), 
Wilcox (1973), Ohlson (1980), Wilson and Sharda (1994), Shumway (2001), 
Hillegeist et al (2004), Aziz and Dar (2006) and Olson et al (2012). In the US, 
bankruptcy of a business is commonly filed under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code while in the UK, because there is no singular law of bankruptcy, it 
is usually liquidation, administration or receivership that is often used when 
predicting business failure (Altman et al, 2010; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Wilson 




However, as bankruptcy only occurs rarely in normal times and thus presents 
difficulties in collecting data, in order to study business failure and credit default, 
researchers sometimes relax the definition and use various proxies for bankruptcy 
default in prediction. For example, Campbell et al (2008) added financial driven 
delisting and credit rating of D to increase the sample of bankrupt firms.  
 
More often, other than US studies focusing on bankruptcy prediction, scholars have 
tried to predict financial distress because distressed companies are more likely to 
violate financial obligations. Obviously definitions of financial distress are more 
flexible due to their background of studies and availability of data. For instance, 
Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) defined financial distress as negative earnings per share 
for listed companies. Bhattacharjee and Han (2010) regarded financial distress as 
occurring when a company’s interest cover is less than 0.7 and there is a decline in 
fixed assets or a decrease in share capital. Chen (2008) defined it as when the net 
worth of a company falls below half of its share capital. Lee and Yen (2004) even 
took renegotiations with repayment schedules and discount in interest into account. 
For financial distress in SMEs, Lin et al (2012) specifically used stock-based 
insolvency and flow-based insolvency as in Altman (1983) and Ross et al (1999) 
when interest coverage is less than one and the insolvency ratio is negative. They 
furthermore compared their differences in model parameters. More specifically, 
Pindado et al (2008) discussed the finance-based definition of financial distress and 
argued that its definition should be consistent with an ex ante prediction method, i.e. 
independent of its outcome. So they defined financial distress to be that EBITDA are 
lower than the financial expenses or a decline in its market value for two consecutive 
years.  
 
A broader definition of corporate default or financial distress makes modelling easier 
by increasing the sample size of the Bad, but at the same time it brings difficulties in 
interpreting the results of different dependent variables. A more formal and universal 
concept of financial distress is preferred. Therefore in this research, the definition of 
financial distress is chosen to be the official one, ‘Special Treatment’ (details of the 
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definition given in Section 3.4.1) in Chinese securities markets. This is in line with 
other Chinese studies: Wang and Deng (2006), Li et al (2008), Sun and Li (2008) 
and Altman et al (2007), which used ST as the indicator of default.  
 
2.3 Review of algorithms in corporate credit models 
2.3.1 Statistical methods 
 
The essential goal of bankruptcy or financial distress prediction is to separate those 
companies that do not have the ability to fulfil their financial obligations in future 
from those companies that can fulfil their obligations. In other words, it is to 
distinguish bad companies from good companies. As obviously no model can 
perfectly separate the Good from the Bad or one hundred per cent accurately predict 
how a company will behave in the future, researchers have made great efforts to try 
various algorithms to improve the predictive accuracy of the models. Since the 
pioneering work of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), the techniques of credit risk 
modelling have evolved over 40 years.  
 
Beaver’s (1966) dichotomous classification test was actually a simplified univariate 
discriminant analysis which directly applied a cut-off to a financial ratio. More 
generally, Altman (1968) employed a Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA or DA 
for short) model which is referred to as the famous Z-score model because the 
dependent variable is letter ‘Z’ in the discriminant function. The five explanatory 
financial ratios are Working Capital to Total Assets, Retained Earnings to Total 
Assets, EBIT to Total Assets, Market Value Equity to Book Value of Total Debts 
and Total Sales to Total Assets. The success of Altman’s Z-score model sheds light 
on the development of corporate credit models. Many people have followed his lead, 
(Deakin, 1972; Abidali and Harris, 1995; Grice and Ingram, 2001), including Altman 
himself who extended it to a quadratic discriminant analysis (Altman and Loris, 1976) 
and a more accurate ZETA model with seven ratios (Altman et al, 1977). Also, in 
recent decades, the Z-score model is often used as the base model in comparison with 




However, in practice, MDA has some big weaknesses. These include the violation of 
the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution of the variables, unequal 
dispersion matrices in linear equations and difficulties in interpreting the role of 
independent variables (Eisenbeis, 1977). More importantly, MDA does not give a 
prediction on the probability of default of a company but only a dichotomous 
classification whether it is good or bad (Dimitras et al, 1996). After the 1980s, MDA 
has become less used in predicting bankruptcy or business failure and conditional 
probability models which are conditional on a vector of predictive variables to 
explain bankruptcy have become popular instead. 
 
At first, Linear Probability Models (LPM) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression were introduced to predict bankruptcy by Meyer and Pifer (1970) but this 
method is methodologically flawed because its predicted probabilities can go beyond 
the range of 0 to 1. Later Logistic Regression (LR) or logit analysis was used by 
Martin (1977) to give earning warnings for bank failure. In 1980, Ohlson introduced 
his LR model (called O-score model) for predicting bankruptcy and because of its 
less requirement concerning variables than MDA, it soon dominates the corporate 
credit models. LR is inherently advantageous because its predicted probabilities are 
bounded between 0 and 1. After that LR was widely examined by Zavgren (1985), 
Tennyson et al (1990) and Gilbert et al (1990). It has been discussed in comparison 
with other algorithms by BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990), Mossman et al (1998), Lin 
and McClean (2001) and Kim (2011). It has also been used as a benchmark model as 
alongside the Z-score model (Ting et al, 2008). Similarly with LR, probit regression 
introduced by Zmijewski (1984) is much less used but it still is occasionally seen in 
some literature (Gentry et al, 1985; Lennox, 1999; Grunert et al, 2005).  
 
These classical statistical algorithms (MDA, LR, probit etc.) have been used widely 
but at the same time they have been criticised. For example, they may have problems 
in defining a dichotomous dependent variable, non-stationarity and instability of data, 
sensitivity to selection of samples, variables and optimisation criteria (Balcaen and 
Ooghe, 2006), but these are generally true for all prediction models. More 
importantly, these classical statistical methods neglect the time dimension and 
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sometimes even pool together data from different years (e.g. Altman, 1968; 
Zmijewski, 1984). Thus there is a bias in selecting the sample (Shumway, 2001). 
More details of the time effect will be discussed in Chapter Five. They may also 
suffer from multicollinearity, which possibly makes explanatory variables 
uninterpretable or misleading in the results (Edmister, 1972; Joy and Tollefson, 1975; 
1978). Assuming an equal cost of misclassification (e.g. Zavgren, 1985) is unrealistic 
in real business but Koh (1992) argued that it is not a big problem and the optimal 
cut-off is robust to different misclassification costs. Taffler (1982) is one of the few 
studies that considered different misclassification costs.  
 
To overcome the difficulty of dichotomy of the dependent variable in predicting 
financial distress, Lau (1987) used multinomial logit (MNL) to model five states of 
bankruptcy and Johnsen and Melicher (1994) followed it by claiming that 
multinomial outcomes add more information in modelling. However, Jones and 
Hensher (2004) found Lau’s (1987) definition of dependent variables violated the 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) assumption. Therefore they used an 
ordered LR to consider different degrees of financial distress. They applied it on 
three levels of states: healthy, insolvent and bankrupt companies and concluded that 
the ordinal logit is consistently superior to the binary or rudimentary MNL approach. 
Jones and Hensher (2007) later introduced a more advanced LR called nested logit in 
corporate failure prediction and they have listed a group of strengths and weaknesses 
of it compared to standard logit analysis.  
 
Survival analysis is another statistical method which was initially used in medical 
science to study the time to death in biological organisms. By adding the time 
dimension into the regression model, parameters, covariates and predicted 
probabilities are all made dynamically so it is more suitable for prediction. The Cox 
proportional hazard model proposed by Cox (1972) and Cox and Oakes (1984) is a 
continuous time hazard model and Lane et al (1986) used it to predict bank failure. 
The discrete time hazard model proposed by Shumway (2001) has advantages in 
computation and the nature of covariates because most financial ratios and 
macroeconomic variables are only observed periodically. The discrete hazard model 
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was followed by Chava and Jarrow (2004) and many others and is discussed in 
details in Section 5.2.2 of Chapter Five.  
 
A further sample splitting algorithm in credit scoring is a named classification tree or 
Recursive Partitioning Algorithm (RPA). This applies a group of rules on the 
characteristics and splits the answers into different sets. Based on the actual 
classification, the prior probability and the misclassification costs, a binary 
classification tree is built and the risk of the final nodes and the entire tree is 
calculated (Breiman, 1993). Marais et al (1984) used RPA with bootstrapping to 
classify bank loans. Frydman et al (1985) was the first to introduce the classification 
tree into bankruptcy prediction and compared it with DA in their sample of 200 firms. 
However Dimitras et al (1996) commented that RPA does not review the 
classification rules once the tree is set up and can suffer the problem of overfitting. 
 
2.3.2 Operational Research  
 
Beside statistical methods, mathematical programming (MP) can also be used in 
classification problems (Mangasarian, 1965). The optimising target can be set to 
minimise the sum of the absolute deviations (Freed and Glover, 1981a), the 
maximum deviation (Freed and Glover, 1981b) or the number of misclassifications 
(Bajgier and Hill, 1982) rather like a discriminant analysis. Mahmood and Lawrence 
(1987) used MP in a bankruptcy prediction model but their results show linear 
programming models were more successful in classifying non-bankrupt firms than in 
classifying bankrupt firms. MP is a type of nonparametric approach because it does 
not specify the structure of parameters but only focuses on the goal.  
 
Similarly Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is also a nonparametric approach with 
mathematical programming features, though its optimising target is totally different. 
DEA can be used directly to predict bankruptcy or financial distress (e.g. Paradi et al, 




Sueyoshi (1999) combined the characteristics of DA, DEA and MP and proposed a 
new method called DEA-DA which can be used in bankruptcy assessments. Because 
DEA models are some of the major aims in this research, a comprehensive collection 
of literature of DEA, including Sueyoshi’s DEA-DA model, will be discussed in 
Section 4.2.1, Chapter Four.  
 
2.3.3 Artificial Intelligence Expert Systems (AIES) methods 
 
Since the 1970s, the development of computer science has made it possible for 
computer programmes to mimic human attributes and learn skills in dealing new 
information (Thomas et al, 2002). Therefore they are also called machine learning 
algorithms. Ever increasing learning capabilities have resulted in much more 
efficient processing in many different streams. Here a selection of successful 
applications to corporate credit models are reviewed.  
 
An Expert System (ES) is a process of imitating the decision-making behaviour of an 
expert. When an expert decides whether or not to give credit to an applicant, he relies 
on his knowledge which consists of a series of rules. This makes the approach of 
expert systems very similar to RPA, except that expert systems can update their 
knowledge from the results (Thomas et al, 2002). A typical expert system tries to 
describe two classes (bankrupt/non-bankrupt) by a set of characteristics (financial 
ratios) and generate a system using variables and cut-off scores to classify all firms 
(Dimitras et al, 1996). When the best classification is formed, a decision tree (DT) 
can be extracted from the system. Messier and Hansen (1988) used ES to predict 
business failure based on Quinlan’s (1983) data-driven method. The expert’s opinion 
is helpful with the setting of initial rules. Kattan et al (1993) added human judgment 
into the machine learning process and compared recursive partitioning, Quilan’s ID3 
and a neural network. They found strategies with human judgement are more 
accurate but large decision trees were no better than smaller ones. Based on Frydman 
et al (1985), Gepp et al (2010) included decision trees in comparison and also found 
less complex and smaller trees were better than more complex ones. Decision trees 
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were recently developed into a survival model called survival trees and forest by 
Bou-Hamad et al (2009) and  Bou-Hamad et al (2011). 
 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN or NN) were developed to model the 
communication and information processing mechanism in the human brain. In the 
structure of NN, there are a number of inputs (variables) to be multiplied by weights 
(dendrites), and the sum of them are transformed in neurons and become an input for 
another neuron (Thomas et al, 2002). There are several types of NN in terms of the 
topology employed: Back Propagation NN (BPNN), Self-organising feature map 
(SOM), Probabilistic NN (PNN), Auto Associative NN (AANN) and Cascade 
Correlation NN (CCNN). There are some examples where NN is used in predicting 
corporate credit risks. Tam (1991) was one of the earliest to use BPNN to predict the 
failure of banks in Texas and concluded it was more accurate than other methods DA 
and K-Nearest Neighbour (K-NN). Lacher et al (1995) assessed future corporate 
health by CCNN. Kaski et al (2001) used SOM in predicting bankruptcy where the 
local displacement in the primary data space was measured using the Fisher 
information matrix. Yang et al (1999) compared PNN with and without pattern 
normalisation in bankruptcy problems. More examples of the applications of NN 
come from Wilson and Sharda (1994), Leshno and Spector (1996), Salchenberger et 
al (1992) and Tsai and Wu (2008) and a more detailed review of NN in bankruptcy 
prediction can be found in Atiya (2001). 
 
The Genetic Algorithm (GA) is ‘a procedure for systematically searching through a 
population of potential solutions to a problem so that candidate solutions that come 
closer to solving the problem have a greater chance of being retained in the candidate 
solution than others’ (Thomas et al, 2002, p. 29). By this global search procedure and 
the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics, Back et al (1996) made an 
attempt to use GA to predict the failure of 37 Finnish companies based on 31 
financial ratios. They claimed that the best results were achieved by GA compared to 
DA and logit analysis. Following them, Shin and Lee (2002) also applied GA in 
predicting bankruptcy and they commented that compared to NN, which gives the 
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final rules of classification that are exceptionally difficult to identify the results, GA 
are easier to understand.  
 
Rough Sets Theory was proposed by Pawlak (1982) to use the lower and the upper 
approximations to replace the original set in which its information and objects are 
indistinguishable or indiscernible. Rough sets integrated with decision trees can be 
applied in the prediction of business failure where a group of attributes linked to 
financial distress can be discovered (Dimitras et al, 1999). In a set of 80 Greek firms, 
Dimitras et al (1999) trained rough sets and found it was generally better than DA 
and logit analysis. They also commented that rough sets models can only reflect the 
experience of a certain set of samples. When it is applied to other sets, the procedure 
of identifying the decision rule should be repeated. Additionally, Tay and Shen (2002) 
discussed some issues of the rough sets theory in indicator selection, discretisation 
and validation and thought it was a good alternative in economic and financial 
prediction.   
 
Case-based reasoning (CBR) follows the idea that when people solve a problem, they 
search in their past experiences for similar cases and reuse or modify these 
experiences to generate a possible answer for the current problem. So when a 
company is identified as failing, CBR can provide additional cases of companies that 
failed in the past with similar characteristics as a justification for this prediction 
(Kumar and Ravi, 2007). Bryant (1997) designed a CBR model and applied it to a 
sample of 85 bankrupt and 2,000 non-bankrupt firms. However his CBR model was 
outperformed by LR. Most CBR algorithms use the methodology of k-NN in 
matching similar cases, so Park and Han (2002) have tested the analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) weighted k-NN algorithm in CBR in bankruptcy prediction. Their 
model can handle both quantitative (financial ratios) and qualitative variables (non-
financial variables) at the same time. Furthermore, Li and Sun (2009a) used multiple 
CBR by majority voting (Multi-CBR-MV) in a Chinese case and compared it with 
standard CBR and statistical models, and they found their Multi-CBR-MV to be 
superior to the other in making prediction. They further attempted forward ranking-
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order CBR (Li and Sun, 2011) and random similarity functions (RSF) based CBR (Li 
and Sun, 2013) .  
 
The last artificial intelligence model we want to discuss is Support Vector Machines 
(SVM) introduced by Vanpnik (1998), who used a linear model to create a 
hyperplane in a multi-dimensional space by taking input vectors nonlinearly and 
predicting their class. The hyperplane is formed when the maximum margin between 
two classes is found and those samples that are closest to the hyperplane are called 
support vectors. Min and Lee (2005) used the kernel function in SVM to find the 
optimal parameters and classify a paired sample of 1,888 Korean firms. They 
concluded that their SVM model outperformed MDA, logit and three-layer BPNN in 
predictive accuracy. Similarly, Shin et al (2005) also found SVM to be better than 
BPNN in corporate bankruptcy prediction.   
 
There are also some other artificial intelligence methods such as Bayesian Networks 
(BN) (Sarkar and Sriram, 2001; Sun and Shenoy, 2007), Multinorm analysis (De 
Andrés et al, 2012) and Automatic clustering and feature selection (Wu, 2010). 
Examples of some other comparative studies of intelligent methods with statistical 
methods are by Tseng and Hu (2010) and Zhou et al (2012). Artificial intelligence 
expert systems due to their various modifications have many derivatives in those 
main streams discussed above. A detailed discussion on intelligent techniques comes 
from Kumar and Ravi (2007) and Aziz and Dar (2004). Their methodologies are not 
as ‘standard’ as statistical methods so sometimes it may be difficult interpreting and 
comparing results with each other, but their self-learning skills are particularly 
helpful in improving the model itself. Therefore, in recent years, these are usually 
combined together to take advantage of both. The next section will review some 
hybrid models in corporate credit modelling.  
 
2.3.4 Hybrid models 
 
As we discussed previously, some machine learning techniques such as decision 
trees and rough sets can develop an explanatory structure identifying a number of 
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attributes or variables which contribute to the risk of financial distress. Therefore, in 
recent years as new methods are proposed by scholars, many others try to build 
hybrid models to combine different AI models with others or with other classical 
statistical models. They also achieve great success in prediction. Thus hybrid models 
are also reviewed in this section.  
 
MaKee and Lensberg (2002) argued that researchers often look for a causal basis for 
bankruptcy prediction but functional methods or statistical selection methods require 
an a priori structure. They therefore proposed a two-stage model: rough sets to 
identify subsets of important explanatory variables in stage one and a genetic 
algorithm to develop a structural model in stage two. Their model produced efficient 
and robust prediction results and offered insightful information. Li and Sun (2009b) 
combine ELECTRE, a chief outranking relation (OR) developed by Roy and Vincke 
(1984) and Roy and Slowinski (2008) and case-based reasoning to create a 
ELECTRE -CBR model, which is similar to the OR-CBR model (Li et al 2009). Li 
and Sun (2010) also combined CBR with case representation. Ahn et al (2000) 
integrated rough set theory into a neural network for business failure prediction. 
Much earlier, Back et al (1994) tried using the combination of NN and GA. Lin et al 
(2009) even combined three expert systems RST, Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) 
and CBR together and made a more accurate model. Kiviluoto (1998) compared 
three different SOM-based classifiers which are hybrid with linear DA, K-NN and 
learning vector quantisation (LVQ). More examples can be found in GA and SVM 
(Min et al, 2006; Wu et al, 2007) and Bayesian inference SVM (Gestel et al, 2006). 
 
In the practice of integration of machine learning techniques and statistical methods, 
Hua et al (2007) modified the outputs of the SVM classifiers according to the result 
of logistic regression and improved the accuracy of SVM in financial distress 
prediction. Jo and Han (1996) in an early case integrated CBR, NN into DA for 
bankruptcy prediction. More recently, Cao (2012) put the fuzzy measure of choquet 
integral into MDA, logit and decision trees. More innovatively, De Andrés et al 
(2011) proposed a hybrid approach using Fuzzy c-means clustering and Multivariate 
Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) and found it to be not only more accurate in 
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terms of correct classification but also more effective in terms profit generation by 
wise lending decisions. MARS is an extension of the linear model but is a 
nonparametric regression proposed by Friedman (1991). Sánchez-Lasheras (2012) 
used SOM-NN and MARS together to predict bankruptcy. Yang et al (2011) used 
partial least squares and SVM in bankruptcy prediction, and Cho et al (2009) used 
subject weight to integrate MDA, logit, NN and decision trees together.  
 
In the applications of DEA efficiency scores in financial distress prediction, one 
popular method is a two-stage procedure which uses DEA models to calculate 
relative efficiency scores in the first stage and input them into other classifying 
methods as a variable in the second stage (e.g. Xu and Wang, 2009; Yeh et al, 2010; 
Psillaki et al, 2010). Because this research on DEA efficiency measures is to take 
them into a logistic regression, it is actually a hybrid model and in line with the trend 
in recent corporate credit models.  
 
2.4 Review of variables in corporate credit models 
2.4.1 Accounting information 
 
From the 1930s, many formal studies began to use financial ratios to detect company 
distress and financial difficulties. It was believed there should be some significant 
ratios which could reveal advance signs of default.  
 
Beaver (1966) was the first to introduce financial ratios into bankruptcy prediction. 
His univariate DA included six groups of ratios: cash flow, net income, liability, 
liquid assets to total assets, liquid assets to liabilities and turnover. Since then, 
various financial ratios have been used in corporate credit models in many studies 
(Altman, 1968; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Edmister, 1972; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 
1984; Wilson and Sharda, 1994; Shumway, 2001; Jones and Hensher, 2004; 
Campbell et al, 2008; Gepp et al, 2010). As a matter of fact, financial ratios so 
dominate corporate credit models that nearly all studies using statistical methods or 
artificial intelligence models have to take more or less ratios into their prediction 
(except a very few, e.g. Wilson and Altanlar, 2014). Financial ratios are calculated 
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using items in a company’s accounting reports. There are many items available in the 
report, as financial ratios can cover many aspects of the condition of a company. 
Although there is no clear classification of financial ratios, generally they can be 
grouped in to profitability, liability, liquidity, leverage, operational efficiency, and 
others ratios. As Beaver (1966) commented at the end of his paper, he rather 
preferred that it is ‘accounting data’ but not ‘financial ratios’ to be the predictors of 
failure. Therefore, Beaver’s (1966) successors in various studies can be called 
accounting-based models in terms of the type of information they used.   
 
The overwhelming position of financial ratios in corporate credit models sometimes 
calls on the introspection of scholars to rethink their values. Whilst Barnes (1987) 
gave two reasons for the use of financial ratios: to control for the effect of size and to 
control industry-wide factors, he also commented that in using ratios in bankruptcy 
prediction, there was the matter of ratio selections. The decision model would either 
‘contain repetitive-redundant data’ or lose the information content of the semi-
independent ratios and therefore ‘to identify those ratios which contain complete 
information about a firm whilst minimising duplication cannot be achieved purely by 
logic’ (Barnes, 1987, p.456). A group of financial ratios calculated by each other can  
easily suffer the problem of multicollinearity (Mensah, 1984). More critically, 
Argenti (1976) commented that the use of financial ratios only as symptoms of 
business failure cannot provide insights into the causes of business failure. 
Dambolena and Khoury (1980) questioned the stability of financial ratios over time. 
Gilbert et al (1990) argued financial ratio-based bankruptcy models perform poorly 
and nonfinancial factors are needed.  
 
Despite the questions raised historically, forty years after Beaver (1966) brought 
financial ratios into corporate credit models, he revisited their predictive power in a 
simple hazard model (Beaver et al, 2005) and concluded their performance remains 
strong in prediction though with slight changes, but more accuracy can be added by 
market-based variables. In fact, market-based variables have also received academic 




2.4.2 Market-related information 
 
The Merton-typed model proposed by Merton (1974) was a pure market-driven 
model which was an extension of the Black-Scholes option price theory (Black and 
Scholes, 1973). Default happens when the market value of a company’s assets falls 
below a certain level relative to its total liabilities. Thus, if a shareholder has an 
option to default on the firm’s liabilities, he will exercise it when its assets are not 
worth as much as the amount to cover its total liabilities. In an efficient market where 
all information is reflected on the option price, Merton-typed models can give timely 
predictions on the probability of default, which is called the Distance to Default 
(DD). Merton-typed models are also structural models because they evolve directly 
from an economic model of an optimising equation. Merton-typed models are 
incorporated into Moody’s KMV model later.  
 
While Duffie et al (2007) and Hillegeist et al (2004) found Merton DD models can 
produce acceptable predictions on business default, Campbell et al (2007) and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) argue Merton’s DD is not statistically significant as a 
variable in the default prediction model. More interestingly, Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) found accounting-based models and Merton-typed market-based models are 
equally good in their predictive ability and they just capture different aspects of 
bankruptcy risk.  
 
Nevertheless, market variables are still occasionally tested in other forms. For 
example, Shumway (2001) has three similar market-driven variables as in Beaver et 
al (2005), regarding market capitalisation, excess return from the previous year, and 
standard deviation of the return. The variance of return has also been used in an early 
study from Aharony et al (1980) who found the deterioration of return of bankrupt 
companies occurred faster and earlier than for healthy companies. Distinguin et al 
(2006) tried various market indicators including cumulative market excess return and 
the change in Beta. Hernandez Tinoco and Wilson (2013) included four market 
variables which are share price, lagged cumulative return, the company size relative 
to the total size of the FTSE index and the ratio market capitalisation to total debts 
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along with accounting and macroeconomic variables in their panel logit model. They 
found those market variables are all related to the probability of financial distress.  
 
2.4.3 Nonfinancial information 
 
Beside accounting and financial variables and market related variables, researchers 
also look for other information which can either explain corporate credit risk or 
improve the accuracy of prediction of the probability of financial distress. Sometimes, 
accounting information or financial ratios are difficult to obtain, especially for SMEs 
(Edmister, 1972). It therefore becomes more necessary to employ alternative or extra 
information to assist prediction. Keasey and Watson (1987) tested a series of 
nonfinancial variables including the age of the company, information regarding the 
directors and auditors. Both Altman et al (2008) and Altman et al (2010) found 
nonfinancial information such as legal action by creditors, company filing histories 
and audit opinions can improve the predictive power in SME credit risk models. 
More specifically, before newly incorporated SMEs disclose their first accounting 
reports (for example in the first year) and considering that the initial period is more 
critical to their survival, Wilson and Altanlar (2014) used no financial information 
but only legal actions and some board characteristics (corporate, female, local, or 
family directors, etc.) as well as macroeconomic variables to capture the risk of 
failure.  
 
Whitaker (1999) investigated the chances of distressed companies going bankrupt 
and found management actions are essential for them to avoid bankruptcy but can do 
little to avoid distress caused by macroeconomic conditions. Aziz and Dar (2006) 
also suggested corporate governance structures and management practices help with 
the understanding of corporate failure.  
 
Hu and Ansell (2007) investigated the retail industry from view of the Resource-
Advantage theory of competition and included political, economic, technological and 
social-cultural factors in the model. Nwogugu (2007) suggested bankruptcy 
prediction models should use a mix of situation-specific dynamic, quantitative and 
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qualitative factors and take into account psychological, legal, liquidity, knowledge 
and price factors in the capital market.  
 
Grunert et al (2005) highlighted the relationship between nonfinancial factors and 
default risk. They identified two nonfinancial factors: management quality and 
market position, which were directly sourced from credit files. However they failed 
to provide methods to measure these two factors and only management quality was 
significant in their probit regression.  
 
Additional management-related variables can be found in Sun and Cui (2013), Bryan 
et al (2013) and Perry (2001) who looked for relationships between corporate social 
responsibility, business strategy and written business plans and default risk 
respectively.  
 
This research also follows this trend and mainly use nonfinancial information to 
predict the probability of financial distress. Corporate efficiency and corporate 
governance measures provide soft information in looking into the causes of distress.  
 
2.5 Other relevant literature 
2.5.1 Studies on SME 
 
Considering the fact that SMEs contribute a large part to the economy in many 
countries in terms of number, employment and GDP they produce, SMEs are more 
important than large companies in the credit loan market and they are more sensitive 
in response to changes of economic conditions (Altman and Sabato, 2007). Therefore 
in recent years, SMEs have received much attention from academics in terms of their 
credit worthiness. 
 
One of the early studies came from Edmister (1971) who used MDA and 19 financial 
ratios to predict small business defaults from 1954 to 1969. Since the Basel II Accord 
stressed the importance of SMEs in bank capital adequacy, many researchers started 
to investigate the SME segment. Jacobson et al (2005) found that SME loans are 
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more like retail credit and they are riskier than credit for large corporations. But 
Altman and Sabato (2007) argued that loans for SMEs are actually more profitable 
for banks and banks should build special credit models for SMEs. Their logistic 
model applied on 120 defaults and 1,890 non-default over the period 1994 to 2002 
performed much better than generic corporate models. After that, Altman et al (2008) 
considered qualitative information and Altman et al (2010) considered nonfinancial 
information in SME risk models. Kim and Sohn (2010) investigated SMEs in Korea 
using an SVM model. They focused on technology SEMs so in their model they 
include five measures to measure the level of technology in a company. Chen et al 
(2010) employed KMV Merton models on Chinese SMEs. However, considering the 
much larger scale of Chinese corporations, the threshold for Chinese SMEs is that 
the number of employees is less than 2,000 (compared to 250 in the EU), turnover 
less than 37 million EUR and total assets less than 50 million EUR. Besides, there 
are a Russian case using DA (Lugovskaya, 2010), a Turkish case using data mining 
application (Koyuncugil and Ozgulbas, 2012), a Slovakian case using a probit model 
(Fidrmuc and Hainz, 2010) and a UK case using a logit model (Lin et al, 2012) and 
so on. 
 
2.5.2 Credit scoring in consumer credit 
 
Consumer credit models are implementing credit scoring techniques rather than 
simply correctly classifying the Good and Bad in corporate credit, because the credits 
consumers may get largely depend on the score they obtained. Credit scoring is ‘the 
set of decision models and their underlying techniques that aid lenders in the granting 
of consumer credit’ (Thomas et al, 2002, p.1). But essentially they share the same 
techniques, i.e. most of prediction models we discussed in Section 2.3 are applicable 
to consumer credit scoring, or in many cases, these models are developed by scholars 
in both fields. For their applications on consumer credit, see reviews in Rosenberg 
and Gleit (1994), Hand and Henley (1997) and Crook et al (2007). There are also 
other applications of consumer credit models, such as behaviour and profit scoring, 
reviewed in Thomas (2000). And for a more systematic and complete introduction, 
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the books by Thomas, Edelman and Crook (2002) and Thomas (2009) are 
comprehensive.  
 
More recently, development in consumer credit scoring is led by research such as a 
survival model incorporating macroeconomic variables (Bellotti and Crook, 2008), 
an SVM model (Bellotti and Crook, 2009) and a dynamic model (Crook and Bellotti, 
2010) and an ensemble model of multiple classifiers (Finlay, 2011) .  
 
Consumer credit and corporate credit are generally applied in different areas, 
although sometimes they are linked together. It is argued that credits for SMEs and 
consumers share some common features in terms of the small amount of credits, 
credit information and the correlation of personal (the owner's) and business success 
(Berger et al 2007; Berger et al 2011). Therefore the fundamentals of default in 
SMEs and consumers may be the same.  
 
From the perspective of this research, as we are looking at corporate governance 
measures, some of the important variables come from the characteristics of the Chair 
and the CEO. It is expected that, their personality and demographic information may 





This chapter has reviewed the definitions of corporate default, algorithms in 
corporate credit models, variables of explanatory information to make predictions. It 
has found that various definitions of financial distress have been used in previous 
studies but not the legal term – bankruptcy which is a more formal form of corporate 
default. However in China, there is an official definition of financial distress for 
listed companies – ‘Special Treatment’ which brings convenience to research.  
 
Generally corporate credit models originated from statistical methods such as MDA 
and logit, but in recent decades, various AI algorithms have been developed. They 
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are of machine learning and nonparametric features but still statistical and dynamic 
models such as hazard models are also popular in this field. An even more powerful 
solution is to build hybrid models which combine the advantages of different 
algorithms and make more accurate predictions than when they perform separately. 
In this research, two-stage models with DEA and logistic regression also follow this 
trend.  
 
Accounting information and market-related information has generally dominated all 
corporate credit models but researchers always keep looking for other information to 
bring additional predictive power to the models. In all kinds of non-financial 
information that has been tried, the information about the management of a company, 
its corporate governance and the board of directors attracted some attention from 
modellers. However their attempts were rather limited to a small range of measures. 
This research mainly incorporates two groups of important measures, corporate 
efficiency and corporate governance into the model and expect they can improve the 
predictive accuracy and provide insightful information as to why a company 
becomes financially distressed.  
 
Other studies on SMEs and consumer credits are also reviewed and their concurrence 
with this research is that the characteristics of the owner is of great impact on the 
performance of the company, which is exactly what consumer credit scoring models 








This chapter will introduce the data and variables for the research. Methods and 
samples for each project are different so they are introduced in corresponding 
sections in Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six. The common methods to 
calculate multicollinearity and predictive accuracy are followed. Finally the 
analytical software packages used for estimation and calculation are also presented. 
 
3.2 Data source 
 
The data used in this research originates from two Chinese security markets, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock exchange. Until recently a total of 
2,550 companies have listed on these Stock Exchanges. Delisting is rare for Chinese 
securities markets. Until the end of 2012, only 74 companies delisted from the 
markets. Thus the size of the two exchanges has grown very fast, increasing at a  rate 
of about 30% annually.  
 




Figure 3.2.1 displays the number of active listed companies in the two markets for 
the period 1990-2012. Indeed in the last three years (2010-2012), when the influence 
of the financial crisis was mitigated, there was a wave of new Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs). 
 
We focus on Chinese listed companies because normally only listed companies are 
obligated to disclose their financial reports to the public under the supervision of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (thereafter CSRC) and only listed 
companies are required to disclose corporate governance information (the variables 
in Chapter Six) in their reports. So the active listed companies in Figure 3.2.1 
compose the population for this research.  
 
However certain facts have reduced the size of the sample. Firstly, Cash Flow 
statements only began to be published after the Disclosure of Information of Listed 
Companies (CSRC, 2007) in 1998. The cash flow theory of Aziz et al (1988) implies 
that cash flow is an important variable in corporate credit models and cash flow 
related ratios should be included. Secondly, the indicator of financial distress 
(introduced in Section 3.4.1) only became available after 1998. Therefore we can 
only focus on the sample from 1998 afterwards. The actual data collection stops at 
the year 2010. The observation period in this research is therefore 1998 to 2010.  
 
All data is sourced from the Wind database1. The database provides information for 
those companies listed in both markets (note that no cross listing is allowed) and 
covers the historic records from 1991. For panel analysis, companies are observed 
periodically but it has been found that only data on the annual reports of Chinese 
listed companies are reliable and complete enough for analysis, though a 




1 Wind Database is one of the leading integrated service providers of financial data, information, and 
software in China. The Credit Research Centre, UEBS subscribed to it for the purpose of this research.  
For more information, please refer to website: http://www.wind.com.cn/En/Default.aspx 
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3.3 Sampling 
 
In the early days, particularly when DA was popular in corporate credit models, the 
aim of models was to correctly classify failed and non-failed companies. A pairing 
method of sampling was suggested by Beaver (1966) and after that most literature 
has followed this (Altman et al, 1977; Takahashi et al, 1984). Failed ones are usually 
paired with non-failed ones according to their size, industry or time period on the 
basis of a 1:1 or 1:2 ratio. This pairing method can also be found in studies of 
corporate governance in credit risk too. For example, Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992), 
Donoher (2004), Polsiri and Sookhanaphibarn, (2009) all have an equal number of 
Goods and Bads in their samples. In the samples of Chen (2008), Lee and Yeh 
(2004), the good/bad ratios are 2:1.  
 
This pairing method could be called “matched sampling” or “choice-based sampling”. 
Cram et al (2009) particularly studied the sampling method in accounting research 
and found three possible errors in matched samples. The first is the use of 
unconditional analysis for matched samples. The second is the failure to emplace 
control for effects of imperfectly matched variables. The third is the failure to 
reweight observations according to different sampling rates.  
 
Obviously, matched sampling disobeys the nature of business bankruptcy which 
happens rarely. Non-random samples are not recommended (Cram et al, 2009). In 
our cross-sectional analysis (Chapter Four), excluding the unusable cases, all cases 
left in the population were selected to be in the sample (introduced in Section 4.4.1) 
so it is out-of-time prediction. Industries are controlled by three dummies in the 
model (referring to equation (4.20)). The distressed rates in the training and test 
samples are similar so there is no bias in sampling.  
 
In the panel analysis in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, out-of-sample validation is 
employed. Stratified sampling is used. Stratification has advantages when 
subpopulations are independent. In our study, the healthy group and the distressed 
group, and industries sectors are independent. Random sampling is applied on each 
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company separately within each subgroup. For example, if there are six subgroups in 
three industries for both healthy and distressed groups given in Table 3.3.1, six 
random numbers are applied to six subgroups to split the sample into the training set 
and the test set proportionally at a 2:1 ratio. The results of sampling in three projects 
are given in the corresponding sections. 
 
Table 3.3.1 Sampling method 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 












3.4.1 Dependent variable 
 
In China, the latest bankruptcy law was implemented in 2007. Between 2007 and the 
end of 2011, there were about only 30 listed companies that had applied for 
bankruptcy. These are too few to be used as the dependent variable for credit 
modelling. Therefore the dependent variable – the indicator of financial distress is 
chosen to be ‘Special Treatment’ (ST). 
 
‘Special Treatment’ is the status imposed by the government since 1998 to give 
notice of bad performance to investors and so it is an indicator of financial distress. 
A company is ascribed ST status if any of the following conditions holds (Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, 2008): 
 
• negative net profit in the most recent two consecutive years or if the 
correction of errors yields this result; 
• failure to disclose its annual interim report; 
• likelihood of being dissolved; 
• reorganisation, settlement or bankruptcy liquidation; 




Our data shows that the majority of companies (85.9%) received ST because of 
losses in two successive fiscal years. When a company received ‘Special Treatment’, 
its stock symbol is marked with ST and the daily up and down limit of its stock is 
restricted within 5% of its stock price. Apart from these conditions, such a stock is 
traded similarly to other stocks. Therefore ST is a status of listed companies. An ST 
company can recover from ST to normality if its financial condition improves and a 
company can experience ST status multiple times. It is noted that there are around 50 
companies which have multiple ST experiences. In this research, the event of interest 
was only their first time ST.  
 
Historically, from 1998 to the end of 2013, there were 569 case years of ST. The 
annual frequency of ST occurrences is displayed in Figure 3.4.1. 
 
To set up the out-of-time prediction in Chapter Five and Six, additional two years of 
ST are recorded though the observation window for the sample is 2001-2010.  
 
Figure 3.4.1 Number of distressed companies over 1998-2010 
 
 
3.4.2 Independent variables 
 
The independent variables differ between the research projects because it is 
obviously subject to the model specification, the sample, the observation period and 
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the data availability. In Chapter Four and Chapter Five with corporate efficiency 
measures, there are DEA inputs and outputs and financial ratios. In Chapter Six with 
corporate governance measures, there are various governance information and 
financial ratios, as well as macroeconomic variables. The relevant variables will be 
introduced in detail in each chapter.  
 
The common independent variables to predict bankruptcy, widely used in the past 
literature, are financial ratios. The initial list of financial ratios as independent 
variables were selected in the following way. Referring to financial ratio analysis, 
only classical and informative ones were kept and grouped into six categories: 
profitability, liabilities and liquidity, capital and asset composition, cash flow, 
operation and growth rate. Some ratios with too many missing values (>10%) were 
left out. In fact, most ratios have valid values for over 98% of company years as they 
are standard items. For those variables where only a small portion (<5% or 10% for 
important ones) of values were missing, the missing values were replaced by the 
arithmetic means for that year (Carling et al, 2007). 
 
Financial ratios in the same group are often correlated, which may cause problems in 
estimation. The VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) is a measure to describe the severity 
of multicollinearity in a linear regression. If there are k  variables 1 2, , , kx x x  and 
we want to determine the collinearity of ix with other variables, linear regression can 
be conducted: 
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1i i i i i k kx x x x x xα β β β β β ε− − + += + + + + + + + +   
2








                                                  (3.1) 
Tolerance also is defined as 21 iR− . There is no universally accepted rule on the VIF 
and collinearity but usually when 5VIF >  , it indicates a problem of collinearity 




Collinearity diagnostics were regularly conducted in the variable selection process 
not only between financial ratios but also between ratios and other interested 
variables because correlated variables may present unstable or reversed coefficient 
signs. The diagnostics for major variables in each chapter is attached in Appendix C.  
 
A list of ratios and their definitions are given in Table 3.4.1. 
 
Table 3.4.1 List of financial ratios 
Group Ratio Definition 
Profitability 
Operating Revenue per Share Operating Revenue / Average Common Share 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net Income / Shareholder Equity 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net Income / Total Assets 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) (Net Income – Adjusted Tax) / Invested Capital 
Gross Margin / Total Sales (Total Sales – Cost Of Goods Sold) / Total Sales 
Operating Profit / Total Sales Net Income / Total Sales 
Operating Expenses / Total Sales Operating Expenses / Total Sales 
Financial Expenses / Total Sales Financial Expenses / Total Sales 
Undistributed Profits per Share Undistributed Profits / Average Common Share 
EBIT per Share (EBITPS) EBIT / Average Common Share 
Liquidity and 
liability 
Current Liabilities / Total 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities / Total Liabilities 
Current Ratio Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
Quick Ratio (Current Assets – Inventory) / Current Liabilities 
Cash Ratio Cash and Cash Equivalents / Current Liabilities 
EBITDA / Total Liabilities EBITDA / Total Liabilities 
Surplus Capital per Share Capital Surplus / Average Common Share 
Surplus Reserve per Share Reserve Surplus / Average Common Share 
Capital 
composition 
Book Value per Share (BPS) Shareholder Equity / Average Common Share 
Equity Multiplier Total Assets / Shareholder Equity 
Current Assets / Total Assets Current Assets / Total Assets 
Tangible Assets / Total Assets Tangible Assets / Total Assets 






Net Cash Flow From Operating per 
Share 
Net Cash Flow From Operating / Average Common 
Share 
Net Cash Flow per Share Net Cash Flow per Share / Average Common Share 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / 
Operating Revenue 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / Operating Revenue 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / 
Total Liabilities 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / Total Liabilities 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / 
Interest Bearing Liabilities 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / Interest Bearing 
Liabilities 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / 
Current Liabilities 
Net Cash Flow from Operating / Current Liabilities 
Operation 
capacity 
Inventory Turnover Operating Costs / Average Inventory 
Receivables Turnover Operating Revenue / Average Receivables 
Current Assets Turnover Operating Revenue / Average Current Assets 
Total Assets Turnover Operating Revenue / Average Total Assets 
Growth rates 
Operating Revenue Growth 
Operating Revenue (current year) / Operating Revenue 
(last year) - 1 
Total Profit Growth Total Profit (current year) / Total Profit (last year) - 1 
Net Profit Growth Net Profit (current year) / Net Profit (last year) - 1 
Total Assets Growth Total Assets (current year) / Total Assets (last year) - 1 
 
3.5 Measurement of model performance 
 
The performance of a model can be interpreted in many ways, but generally we can 
evaluate a model by its classification accuracy and discriminant power.  
 
In terms of classification accuracy, when a probability of default is predicted by a 
model, usually a cut-off is assigned to the series of probabilities. Companies with 
probabilities above the cut-off point are classified as ‘bad’ and those with 
probabilities below the cut-off point as ‘good’ ones with lower chance of default. 
Then the cut-off point becomes critical for the assessor to decide on an acceptable 
default rate, which would absolutely determine the profitability of the loan business 
and credibility of the underlying portfolio. In modelling, however, it is assumed that 




As one may focus on the good classification and one may care about whether all 
defaults are detected, Type I and Type II errors were calculated based on the 
classification of Goods and Bads. The Type I error occurs when the null hypothesis 
( 0H ) is true but is rejected and the Type II error occurs when the null hypothesis 
( 0H ) is accepted when it is actually false (Sheskin, 2003). Therefore Type I and 
Type II errors are usually called false positive and false negative respectively. In this 
study, the Type I error occurs when a distressed company is wrongly classified as a 
non-distressed company and the Type II error occurs when a non-distressed is 
wrongly classified as a distressed company. Their relationship can be described in 
Table 3.5.1.  
 
Table 3.5.1 A confusion matrix 







Reject null hypothesis (1) 
Correct Goods 
True positive 
Type I error 
False positive 
Bads predicted  
Fail to reject null hypothesis (0) 





 Total Bads in sample Goods in sample  Sample size 
 





More clearly, in Figure 3.5.1, if curves G  and B  denote the distributions of Goods 
and Bads and the x  axis is the predicted score, the areas under the curve overlap in 
the middle. When the cut-off is given, the classification of Goods and Bads can be 
determined, as GC  and BC . Furthermore the cut-off line divides the areas into four 
parts: true Goods ( GG ), false Goods ( GB ), true Bads ( BB ) and false Bads ( BG ). Then, 
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                         (3.3) 
And 
Overall accuracy rate 100%
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G B G B
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            (3.4) 
We would prefer a low Type I error rate and Type II error rate and a high overall 
accuracy rate for good predictive performance.  
 
Type I error and Type II errors are only measures for a single cut-off point. More 
specifically, measuring the discriminant power of a model does not only distinguish 
the groups of cases but also describe the distance of how good a non-default case is 
and how bad a default case is. Some other measures are needed. The Receiver 
Operation Curve (ROC) could give a good measure for the overall performance of all 
possible cut-offs (Crook et al, 2007). The ROC curve is a graph of the true positive 
rate against the false positive rate at all values of cut-offs. The true positive rate is 
also called sensitivity and the false positive rate is called 1-specificity, where 
specificity is the true negative rate. A typical ROC curve is described by curve ODB 
in Figure 3.5.2. 
 
If two groups of cases can be totally separated by a model, the ROC curve would go 
along the edges of the square, OAB. If a model performs just as well as a random 
guess, the curve would be the diagonal line OEB (Crook et al, 2007). The measure of 
the overall performance in the ROC graph is the Area Under ROC (AUC), which is 
the area of ODBC. By an integral on the standardised x  value, the area of ODBC 
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could be found within the range of 0 to 1. Considering the curve below OEB could 
be used in the opposite way, the absolute value of AUC is between 0.5 and 1. 
 
Figure 3.5.2 ROC, Gini and KS 
 
 
Another popular measure of performance is the Gini coefficient introduced by Gini 
in 1909. It is defined on the Lorenz curve diagram ODB ( L ). The Gini coefficient is 
defined as the proportion of the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line 
in the half square, then 
0.5 0.5 (1 ) 0.5Gini 2 1
0.5 0.5 0.5
ODB OABD ODBC ODBC
ODBC
OAB
A A A A A
A
− − − −




( )ODBCA L x dx= ∫  
Then we can have the relationship between AUC and Gini that 
Gini 2AUC 1= −                                                (3.6) 
 
Another related measure in Figure 3.5.2 is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, 
which is the maximum difference between the bad and good cumulative score 
distribution. It takes all values from 0 to 1, where the value 0 indicates it is a random 
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model and the value 1 indicates it is a perfect model. If we use ( | )F s G  to denote the 
probability that a good has a score less than s  and correspondingly for a Bad, it is 
( | )F s B . Then if two groups of cases can be totally separated by a model, the ROC 
curve would go along the edges of the square, OAB. If a model performs just as well 
as a random guess, the curve would be the diagonal line OEB (Crook et al, 2007). 
The measure of the overall performance in the ROC graph is the Area Under ROC 
(AUC), which is the area of ODBC. By an integral on the standardised value, the 
area of ODBC could be found within the range of 0 to 1. Considering the curve 
below OEB could be used in the opposite way, the absolute value of AUC is between 
0.5 and 1.  
 
Figure 3.5.2 is the plot of ( | )F s B ( x  axis) against ( | )F s G ( y  axis). The KS is the 
maximum distance between ( | )F s B  and ( | )F s G : 
max ( | ) ( | )
s
KS F s B F s G= −  
Because on the plot OF EF=  , then 
















                                     (3.7) 
KS becomes the largest vertical distance from the curve to the diagonal.  
 
In practice, the lender has different views on the classification of Goods and Bads, 
especially when considering the cost of misclassification. A misclassification of a 
Good to be a Bad only means a little loss in profit but a misclassification of a Bad to 
a Good may bring a default and large losses to the lender. Hand (2005) argues that 
the common limitation of AUC, Gini and KS is that they only take the number of 
cases into account but not the cost of misclassification. He also added that the AUC 
uses different misclassification cost distributions for different classifiers, which 
brings misleading results in algorithm comparison. He suggests the H measure 
named after him be reported if cost distributions are known (Hand, 2009). If they are 
unknown, it is still preferred to compare H measures of models because it is assumed 
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the cost weight function is the same in its estimation which makes them comparable. 
Similar to other performance measures, the discriminative power is better when the 
H value is larger.  
 
Therefore, in this research, AUC, Gini, KS and H measures are all used at the same 




The raw data was stored in and processed by Microsoft Office Excel 20102 and 
preliminary analysis including frequency distribution, missing data and basic graphs 
are assisted by IBM SPSS Statistics 203.  
 
The DEA programming models were calculated using MaxDEA Pro 6.14.  
 
The regression models were estimated and predicted using integrated statistical 
software package Stata 12 MP 64bit5.  
 
The four measures of predictive accuracy were calculated using R code provided by 
Hand and Anagnostopoulos (2013) in R environment version 3.0.26. The R codes for 
the H measure as well as AUC, Gini, KS were integrated together7 (See Appendix A). 
 
 
2 Microsoft Office Excel 2010 is licenced to the University of Edinburgh. For more information, 
please refer to webpage: http://office.microsoft.com/en-gb/excel/ 
3 IBM SPSS Statistics 20 is licenced to the University of Edinburgh Business School. For more 
information, please refer to webpage: http://www-01.ibm.com/software/uk/analytics/spss/ 
4 MaxDEA Pro is permanently licenced to the author. It offers most powerful and professional DEA 
solutions without limitation on the number of DMUs. It includes twenty-two groups of DEA models 
such as Malmquist models, Dynamic models and Cluster models and all their possible combinations. 
The programmers are Dr CHENG Gang and Dr QIAN Zhenhua. For more information, please refer to 
the webpage: http://www.maxdea.cn/ 
5 Stata 12 MP 64bit is licenced to the University of Edinburgh Business School. For more information, 
please refer to webpage: http://www.stata.com/  
6 R is a free software environment for statistical computing and graphics. For more information, 
please refer to webpage: http://www.r-project.org/ 
7 David Hand and Christoforos Anagnostopoulos are the authors of the codes. For more information, 
please refer to webpage: http://www.hmeasure.net/ 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given introduction to the data, dependent and independent variables, 
sampling methods and software used in this research. We used Chinese listed 
companies from two stock exchanges as the sample to study. After the year 2000, 
there were constantly over 1000 companies in the sample. Data prior to 1998 was 
censored due to availability and policy implementation. The indicator of financial 
distress was chosen to be ‘Special Treatment’ and there are 504 ST observed 
between 1998 and 2010. The VIF is the indictor to measure the level of 
multicollinearity which possibly existed between covariates. Type I, Type II errors, 
overall accuracy, AUC, Gini, KS and H were used to evaluate the performance of 






Chapter Four  




One way to assess the efficiency of an organisation relative to the most efficient one 
is to use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). A number of papers have used DEA 
efficiencies in corporate bankruptcy modelling (see next section). In this chapter we 
use DEA to compute various measures of corporate efficiency that we then input as a 
variables in a standard classifier to see how well this enables one to predict financial 
distress.  
 
This research makes a number of contributions. Firstly, unlike previous papers on 
corporate failure modelling that simply use a single efficiency measure, we 
decompose this measure, Technical Efficiency (TE), into Pure Technical Efficiency 
(PTE) which indicates the ability to improve efficiency by wisely allocating 
resources and applying new technology, and Scale Efficiency (SE) which measures 
the ability to achieve better efficiency by adjusting the organisation to its optimal 
scale. We examine how each of these separately contributes to predicting financial 
distress. Secondly, in contrast to most applications of DEA in financial distress 
prediction, we assume variable rather than Constant Returns to Scale (RTS). Thirdly, 
DEA can only meaningfully be carried out for a sample of firms that use the same or 
similar technology (Dyson et al, 2001) and our study is the first to meet this 
requirement in the context of mixed-industry bankruptcy prediction. Whilst this 
reduces our sample size, by modifying the second stage logistic regression we are 
able to determine the effects of variables that are common across industries. Fourthly, 
we add corroboratory evidence to the very few studies that, regardless of country, 
have explored corporate efficiency as a predictive variable in a financial distress 
model.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a comprehensive 
review of the application of DEA in corporate distress prediction models. In the third 
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section the methodology adopted in this research is presented. This is followed by a 
description of the data used in the empirical analysis and the subsequent section 
reports the results. This chapter finishes with conclusions and recommendations. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 DEA in bankruptcy prediction 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis is an optimising technique which measures the relative 
efficiencies of a group of companies or Decision Making Units (DMUs) that use 
multiple inputs and produce multiple outputs. An efficient company uses less inputs 
to produce more outputs. Such efficiency is evaluated by the distance of a particular 
DMU to the efficient frontier (ideal position) which is based on its peers (other 
DMUs in the sample). The main idea and notation will be introduced in the next 
section; for more comprehensive explanation of DEA see Cooper et al (2000). 
 
DEA has been incorporated into the prediction of corporate distress (or bankruptcy) 
in two different ways. Firstly, DEA has been used to derive a classification algorithm 
to separate distressed firms from non-distressed firms (Paradi et al, 2004; Cielen et al, 
2004; Emel et al, 2003). Secondly, the relative efficiency of firms has been 
computed using DEA and this relative efficiency has been used as a feature of each 
firm in a subsequently developed classification rule (Xu and Wang, 2009; Yeh et al, 
2010; Psillaki et al, 2010). We consider the former first. 
 
As a classifier DEA has a number of advantages compared with statistical methods. 
For example, it is non-parametric and so does not require any distributional 
assumptions about error terms or covariance matrices. Yeh (1996) states the idea of 
standard classifiers such as discriminant analysis, logistic regression and probit 
regression is to develop meaningful peer group analysis between two or more groups, 
such as failed and non-failed, problematic and non-problematic cases. Thus DEA can 
properly fulfil the task as a natural peer comparison algorithm. Yeh (1996) also 
added that DEA requires no a priori information about input and output variables, 
which is very helpful in the estimation procedure. DEA is like a ‘black box’, where 
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variables are entered, it generate results comparing the relatively more efficient ones 
to the others.  
 
However, this also could be an inherent disadvantage of DEA. Whilst it requires no a 
priori information about inputs and outputs, it does not give an evaluation of their 
importance either, which is unlike other statistical methods that report variable 
significance or standard errors. Other shortcomings of DEA are sensitivity to the 
selection of inputs and outputs and issues when dealing with negative values. When 
the number of variables is close to or larger than the number of companies, efficiency 
scores tend to be 1, so discriminative power is lost.  
 
It is logical to assume that corporate efficiency is associated with the probability of 
failure as Psillaki et al (2010) argued that in a competitive environment, efficient 
firms can generate more cash flows to repay their debts. Barr et al (1993) found there 
were significant differences in the scores in a sample of banks between those 
surviving and those failing and the difference increases as the date of failure 
approaches. Paradi et al (2004) used an additive DEA model to compute a worst 
performance boundary. Output variables were those that reflected poor financial 
performance such as bad debt, warranty claims etc. and input variables represent the 
opposite, for example profits, sales etc. For each DMU, an inefficiency score was 
computed. Paradi et al (2004) then used the layer technique (or tiered DEA, Barr et 
al, 2000) of removing inefficient companies to find a new boundary, each lower 
boundary indicating a lower chance of bankruptcy. A similar method was followed 
by Cielen et al (2004) who applied a cut-off to the estimated efficiency of each DMU 
(rather than the layer technique). They found, in a comparison of classification 
accuracy, that the DEA method outperformed decision trees and a linear 
programming method (Freed and Glover, 1981a). However they used the ratio form 
of the DEA model which is problematic when negative financial ratios are 
incorporated. Min and Lee (2008) estimated a Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) 
model (defined in the next section) with Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and 
applied a cut-off to the efficiency score for each firm. The DEA score method 
performed less well than a linear discriminant function. Premachandra et al (2009) 
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estimated an additive DEA, which is invariant to data translation (and so can deal 
with negative data) with varying RTS. In the training sample, DEA had an inferior 
predictive performance whereas out of sample it was superior compared with logistic 
regression. Unfortunately they could not compare the performance of the two 
techniques using the same test dataset. More recently Premachandra et al (2011) 
estimated an additive DEA model to produce efficiency and a bankruptcy frontier 
and derived a prediction index for each firm from these two. They found the use of a 
two frontier method improved predictive performance compared to a single 
bankruptcy frontier.  
 
As the second method of incorporating DEA into distress prediction, many 
researchers have carried out experiments to incorporate a DEA efficiency score (or 
Technical Efficiency - TE) as a predictor into other classification models. Xu and 
Wang (2009) put efficiency scores obtained by DEA into Support Vector Machines 
(SVMs), logistic regression and linear discriminant analysis (MDA). Yeh et al (2010) 
also used efficiency scores into SVMs and neural networks. Both studies found that 
the inclusion of efficiency scores increased the predictive performance of failed 
companies.  
 
Sueyoshi (1999) proposed a two stage method labelled ‘DEA-DA’ (Data 
Envelopment Analysis – Discriminant Analysis). He contributes to both DEA and 
DA in the application of distinguishing two groups of units. However his DEA-DA 
methodology is not the combination of two algorithms but is inspired by the non-
parametric advantages of DEA. Because generally a DA model would either be a 
statistical model or goal programming which aims to minimise the number of 
misclassifications or the sum of deviations. To reach an optimal goal, a hyperplane 
needs to be built by a linear function. However, in order to make the cut-off more 
precise, a nonlinear piecewise hyperplane is preferred, though in practice it is 
difficult to fit it to real data. For a VRS DEA model, the frontier is such a piecewise 
hyperplane. So Sueyoshi’s (1999) DEA-DA model has two stages in its computation. 
In the first stage linear programing is used to predict class membership of each case 
and to identify cases where the predicted class is ambiguous by two discriminating 
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functions which are class A, class B or class unclear. In the second stage a model that 
classifies cases that could fit into either group is estimated. Subsequent work has 
compared the performance of the two stage classifier with that of other standard 
methods. For example, Sueyoshi (2001) applied it to a dataset of 100 Japanese banks 
and compared it to linear and nonlinear DA. Sueyoshi (2006) compared DEA-DA 
with another eight algorithms. Later, Sueyoshi and Goto (2009) used it in bankruptcy 
assessment. They concluded that DEA-DA performs at least as well as other 
techniques in corporate bankruptcy prediction. Tsai et al (2009) followed their work 
and extended it to loan default prediction and found it was better in the case of 
consumer loans.  
 
4.2.2 DEA assumptions and limitations in previous application 
 
Though as a non-parametric method, DEA has many inherent advantages, it still has 
its shortcomings especially when applied in practice. Dyson et al (2001) summarised 
some of these issues which limit the applications of DEA most in practice: the 
requirement for homogeneity of units, the selection of inputs and outputs, the 
measurement of variables and weights attributed to variables. One of the most crucial 
assumptions of DEA is the homogeneity across all DMUs in the comparison of their 
relative efficiency. Dyson et al (2001) explain it in three ways. Firstly, all DMUs 
should be engaged in similar activities and produce similar outputs - similar products 
and services in businesses. It is not wise to calculate the relative efficiencies between 
a group of supermarkets and banks because the retailers sell consumable goods and 
banks provide financial services with different technologies. Secondly, all DMUs 
shall employ a range of similar resources in production. There is a difference 
between labour intensive industries and capital intensive industries. Thirdly, as 
sometimes neglected in many studies, all DMUs are supposed to act in a similar 
market environment. This is particularly important in international comparative 
studies where external environments such as political, social and legal factors are 
different. The assumption of homogeneity requires to be carefully considered 




A limitation of many studies that have used DEA efficiency in bankruptcy prediction 
is that they have estimated TE across a range of industries that use heterogeneous 
technologies (e.g. Cielen et al, 2004; Premachandra et al, 2009; Premachandra et al, 
2011). Basically they simply randomly sampled a list of companies from a database 
but did not take their industries into account. If the technology used by the DMUs in 
the sample is different, then the weights on the inputs and outputs will be different 
and the concept of relative efficiency will be miscalculated. Otherwise, studies which 
use a single industry obviously limit the sample size (e.g. Paradi et al, 2004; Shetty 
et al, 2012). A possible solution was also suggested by Dyson et al (2001) that 
clustering units into homogeneous subsets would be helpful. In this research we use 
industrial clusters to realise this assumption.  
 
The use of a DEA classifier or an efficiency score computes the relative efficiency of 
firms in a sample and can be used for in-sample prediction. However, if we wish to 
predict the failure probability for a case out of the sample, difficulties arise because 
the addition of a new case may alter the relative efficiencies of all of the firms 
currently included in the model, possibly changing the optimal weights on the inputs 
and the outputs and so altering the efficiency frontier. In principle the addition of a 
new case would necessitate the re-estimation of the DEA model. Both Emel et al 
(2003) and Min and Lee (2008) estimated a statistical model to predict DEA 
efficiency using the input and output financial ratios that could be used to classify 
out-of-sample cases. Arguably efficiency scores are not generated by a DEA model. 
They cannot be called efficiency and lose their peer comparable discrimination.  
 
Inspired by Emel et al (2003), Bruni et al (2014) integrated DEA and Stochastic 
Processes together and built a new stochastic DEA model. They took the uncertainty 
of outputs into account and generated scenarios to run DEA programmes repeatedly. 
They thought that, in this way, the average credit scores could be more reliable. 
However the application of their stochastic DEA model was rather limited because 
they only considered the uncertainty of outputs of the next year but not the 
uncertainty of inputs which they believed to be certain at the point of time of making 
decision and budgets (one year in advance). In practice, it is preferable to gain a 
48 
 
warning of credit risk as early as possible, of course with an acceptable level of 
accuracy. When the time of decision making is two years or more in advance, both 
inputs and outputs are uncertain and therefore their stochastic DEA model would 
become extremely complicated.  
 
Stiglitz (1972) emphasised that RTS impacted on the probability of bankruptcy. In 
practice RTS are typically increasing or decreasing so it is surprising to see that most 
applications of DEA in corporate failure prediction have an assumption of CRS. 
Examples of papers that assume CRS are Xu and Wang (2009) and Yeh et al (2010). 
The paper of Psillaki et al (2010) is one of the few cases which assumed VRS to 
evaluate credit risk. They used the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) model named 
by Banker et al (1984) but with only one output and two inputs.  
 
In this research, we firstly assume a VRS technology rather than CRS which is not 
common in reality, and secondly, under the assumption of VRS, include four 
additional variables in a model to predict financial distress. These variables are the 
Technical Efficiency (CRS efficiency), Pure Technical Efficiency (VRS efficiency), 
Scale Efficiency and a RTS parameter (defined in the next section). By incorporating 
these four variables, our prediction models include variables that are economically 
directly related to the probability of distress. Unlike most European companies which 
are relatively small in size, Chinese companies are often much larger and their 
employees can exceed 100,000 and total revenue exceed £20 billion. Therefore, 
cases of decreasing  are often observed and it is expected to have some causality for 
financial difficulty. 
 
Whilst a large number of papers have estimated models to predict financial distress 
for Chinese listed companies using financial ratios (for example see Ding et al, 2008; 
Sun et al, 2011 and Xiao et al, 2012),  as far as we are aware only one paper (Xu and 







4.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
DEA is an optimising technique which measures the relative efficiencies of a group 
of DMUs that use multiple inputs and produce multiple outputs. Performance is 
evaluated by the distance of a DMU to the efficiency frontier which is formed by a 
group of efficient DMUs. In traditional DEA, models can be divided into input-
oriented and output-oriented models, where in the former, one aims to minimise 
inputs when satisfying at least the given output levels while output-oriented tries to 
maximise output given a certain level of inputs. There could be no orientation in the 
model but here input-oriented is used for illustration. 
 
Consider a set of DMUs, each denoted as DMUj ( 1, ,j n=  ), each producing several 
outputs ( 1, , )ry r s=   by using several inputs ( 1, , )ix i m=  . ( 1, , )iv i m=   is the 
weight for input ix and ( 1, , )ru r s=  is the weight for output ry . They are denoted 
in a matrix (4.1).  
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Efficiency or productivity is defined as weighted outputs over weighted inputs. So 
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                              (4.2) 
For any DMU0 being the unit to be evaluated, we wish to find the weights on each 
output and on each input that maximises efficiency defined as the ratio of weighted 
outputs to weighted inputs, subject to the ratio being not greater than 1 for any DMU. 
We have the Fractional Programming (FP) problem (equation (4.3)) to solve the 
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This Fractional Programming problem can be converted into a Linear Program (LP) 
(equation (4.4)) (Cooper et al, 2000) and for convenience the Dual Program (DLP) 
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The production technology may be characterised by either CRS or VRS. Simply 
speaking, RTS is the term used to describe the proportional change in output as the 
scale of production increases when all inputs and outputs increase by the same 
proportion. When the relative change in output equals the relative change in input, 
we have Constant RTS. If the proportional increase in outputs is larger than the 
proportional increase in inputs, increasing RTS exist and if the proportional increase 
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in outputs is smaller than the proportional increase in inputs, we have decreasing 
RTS.  
 
Whilst many DEA models have been proposed, the CCR model proposed by Charnes 
et al (1978) is a typical CRS model. Define X to be an m × n data matrix of inputs 
and Y to be an s × n data matrix of outputs, e  to be a column vector of ones, λ to be 
a 1n×  column vector of variables, and +s and −s to be a 1m× column vector of s+ 
values and a 1s×  column vector of s- values, respectively. The term ,0 , >εε  is a 
non-Archimedean infinitesimal, which is a number smaller than any positive real 
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The elements in the +s and −s vectors are slack variables that convert the two 
constraints from inequalities to equalities. The solution is found in two stages: the 
first stage objective is to minimise Cθ  without the slack terms and with equations in 
(4.6) as inequalities to give *Cθ , and the second stage objective is to minimise 
)( +− +− sseT  given *C Cθ θ=  and the constraints of equations (4.6). A DMU is said to 
be CCR efficient when * 1Cθ =  and the slack values are all zero. If 1
* =Cθ  the DMU is 
globally technically efficient. If 1* <Cθ  then all of the inputs could be reduced 
without reducing output.  
 
An example of a VRS DEA model is that by Banker et al (1984) labelled the BCC 
model and is the model consisting of equations (4.6) above with the additional 
constraint  
 




and Cθ  replaced by Bθ . Again the solution is found in the same two stages as for the 
CCR model. In a one input one output context, non-constant RTS are represented by 
a line joining two points each representing a DMU on the efficiency frontier that 
does not project through the origin.  
 
If we take the dual of the first stage model represented by equations (4.6) and (4.7) 
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where u and v are column vectors of weights to be estimated.  
 
If * * *0, ,U V u is the optimal solution to (4.8),  and 0 0( , )X Y is the reference point on the 
efficiency frontier, then * * *0 0 0 1U Y u V X− = = . Further if ( , )X Y is another point on 
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0 <=> uuu implies and is implied by increasing, constant 
and decreasing RTS respectively (Banker and Thrall, 1992). In Figure 4.3.1, they are 
marked as hyperplanes BC, OB and AB respectively. In a one input one output 
context the 0u  term would be the intercept for the line referred to above. 
 
Furthermore, if **  and BC θθ  denote CCR and BCC efficiency scores of a particular 
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Intuitively, the BCC model finds the optimal efficiency for a DMU when RTS are 
not necessarily constant. Dividing the efficiency of a DMU when estimated with 
CRS by the efficiency when VRS are assumed isolates the Scale Efficiency of the 
DMU. Thus we can write: 
 
Technical efficiency (TE) = Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) × Scale Efficiency (SE) 
 
Figure 4.3.1 A two dimension DEA problem 
 
 
More clearly, in a two dimension DEA problem (Figure 4.3.1), the Productivity 
Possibility Set (PPS) consists of a group of DMUs and there are four units lying on 
the efficiency frontier, A, B, C and D. Unit E is the point to be evaluated. Point F is 
the technically efficient reference point with the same Scale Efficiency. Unit B is the 
reference point with the most productive scale size. Then the relative efficiency for 
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4.3.2 Selecting inputs and outputs 
 
Choosing the most appropriate inputs and outputs is of crucial importance when 
conducting all DEA studies, but so far, there is no generally agreed method for 
selection. Different DEA studies have used different inputs and outputs, which is a 
shortcoming of DEA (Premachandra et al, 2009). First of all, inputs and outputs have 
to be meaningful within the framework of the competitive environment (Oral and 
Yolalan, 1990). One disadvantage of DEA is that it computes relative efficiency with 
more discrimination between DMUs when the number of variables is significantly 
smaller than the number of DMUs (Parkan, 1987). This is normally the case in recent 
research. It is desirable that the number of input variables is larger than or equal to 
the number of output variables (Yeh, 1996). Dyson et al (2001) list four criteria for 
input and output selection: full coverage of resources, full measurement of activities 
and performance, common factors for all units, and environmental factors if relevant. 
They also suggest a ‘rule of thumb’ that the number of units is more than double the 
number of inputs and outputs, which can then keep the discrimination of efficiency 
score at an acceptable level. In this research, the sample size is much larger than the 
number of inputs and outputs and there are more inputs than outputs selected. 
 
In the few studies that use DEA to model default risk, input variables are selected 
from, for example, Capital, Liability, Human Resources, Technology and Real Estate 
etc. and the output variables are profits and sales. Psillaki et al (2010) used one 
output (Value Added) and two inputs: Capital Shares and Number of Fulltime 
Employees. Similarly, Yeh et al (2010) selected R&D expenses, R&D designers and 
the number of patents and trademarks as input variables and the output variables 




When empirically modelling bankruptcy, to eliminate scale or size and unit effects in 
the values, it is common to use financial ratios rather than physical or monetary items. 
Min and Lee (2008) included three input ratios (Financial Expenses to Sales, Current 
Liabilities Ratio, Bonds Payable to Total Assets), an ordinal variable (Total 
Borrowings) and three output ratios: Capital Adequacy Ratio, Current Ratio and 
Interest Coverage Ratio. Cielen et al (2004) argued that financial ratios with a 
positive correlation can be used as inputs while those with a negative correlation are 
outputs. Premachandra et al (2009) proposed that the smaller (inferior) values in the 
financial ratios, which could possibly cause financial distress, are considered to be 
inputs, whereas the larger (superior) values in those ratios, which could cause 
financial distress, are considered as outputs. This is also called ‘isotonic’ which 
means increased input reduces efficiency and increased output reduces efficiency 
(Dyson et al, 2001). Xu and Wang (2009) in a Chinese case study went back to the 
original definition of efficiency for variable selection. They used Total Assets, Total 
Liabilities and Costs of Sales as the inputs, with Income from Sales as the sole output.  
 
Furthermore Banker et al (1984) indicated for all inputs and outputs, a meaningful 
zero shall be assigned. Then no index variable should be used. Our choice of 
variables has been influenced by the following considerations: since financial ratios 
are going to be used in a second stage logistic regression we do not employ them in 
the first stage so as to reduce possible collinearity. We follow the original idea of 
DEA that inputs and outputs are measured as absolute amounts rather than as ratios. 
Thus we have chosen five inputs (Number of Employees, Share Capital, Total Cost, 
Total Assets and Total Liabilities) and three outputs (Total Sales, Total Profit and 
Cash Accrued) which are main items in all financial reports.  
 
One may argue that in the selection of inputs and outputs, it is obvious that Total 
Sales - Total Costs = Total Profits. And that would bring correlation into DEA. 
However having correlated variables in DEA does not lead to a problem because 
their weights can automatically adjust without a significant impact on the efficiency 
score (Dyson et al, 2001). On the contrary, ‘omission of a highly correlated variable 
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can on occasion lead to significant changes in efficiencies’ (Dyson et al, 2001, 
p.249). Therefore in the basic understanding, companies pay for labour and raw 
materials in operation (measured by Total Costs), turn them into products and 
services, and sell for revenue (measured by total sales) and aim for a large earning 
(measured by total profit). The reason for keeping both Total Sales and Total Profits 
is that a large revenue does not definitely imply a large profit.   
 
A key issue regarding DEA is how to deal with negative values in inputs and outputs. 
In the early days, DEA models could only process non-negative values. As 
applications develop, negative values such as growth or profits sometimes exist, and 
negative values cannot be used before transformation. Inputs and outputs with pure 
negative values are the easiest to be tackled by simply switching their positions of 
inputs or outputs. For mixed value inputs and outputs, traditional methods of value 
transformation (such as adding a large number to the variable) is problematic since 
their relative efficiency is changed. It is preferred that in the solution to negative 
values, translation invariant (the same optimal efficiency frontier) and unit invariant 
(independent of scale of measurement of the variables) should be kept (Lovell and 
Pastor, 1995). The model of Portela et al (2004) is the first to keep both translation 
invariant and unit invariant at the same time without any transformation, by using 
range values, which is the distance between the original value and the best observed 
value. This is called the Range Directional Measure (RDM). But Cheng et al (2013) 
argued the efficiency calculation process was different from the radial model and so 
results were different. Later Sharp et al (2006) on the basis of RDM, developed it 
into the Modified Slack-Based Measure (MSBM) which gave a more precise 
evaluation of efficiency. Then Emrouznejad et al (2010) proposed the Semi-Oriented 
Radial Measure (SORM), which used two other variables for one mixed value 
variable, one to represent negative values and the other to represent positive values. 
Cheng et al (2013) pointed out that this introduces more artificial inputs and outputs 
and therefore a new method, the Variant of Radial Measure (VRM)  was introduced 
by them. VRM replaces the original values by the absolute values of the proportion 
of improvements to reach the frontier and it gives the exact same results as the 




Our data output matrix, Y has negative values and we wish to assume VRS, which is 
both unit invariant and translation invariant and can handle positive and negative 
mixed data. A suitable model is the slacks based efficiency model where input 
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MaxDEA Pro is used to solve the programs for each industry separately. 
 
4.3.3 Logistic regression 
 
In credit scoring, Logistic Regression is a very classic model which is inherently 
capable of dealing binary outcomes such as Goods and Bads, default and non-default. 
Compared to linear regression where the value of the dependent variable can go from 
−∞  to +∞ , the dependent variable is limited in the range of (0,1) . A standard 






 which has a sigmoid shape on the 
coordinate (Figure 4.3.2).  




A binary logistic regression does not require independent variables to be normally 
distributed and they could be continuous or categorical variables. In credit scoring, 
the probability of default depends on a group of explanatory variables and it can be 
expressed as 
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Where ( 1)p D =  is the probability of event of interest, i.e. default. 
If using ip  to denote the probability of default for individual i  (company i  in this 
study) , equation (4.13) could be transformed to  
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Then take logarithm for both sides, we have  
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 and vectors β, x to denote 
0 1 2, , , , kβ β β β and 1 2, , ,i i ikx x x , we have 
logit( )= Tip βx                                                 (4.16) 





take values from 0 to ∞  and logit( )ip  
values from −∞  to +∞ , as linear regression. 
 
However the estimation of parameters in equation (4.16) is not Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) for linear regression but a Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. The 
maximum likelihood method finds a set of values, called the maximum likelihood 
estimates, at which the log-likelihood function attains its local maximum.  
 
For each training data-point, we have a vector of characteristics ix  and an observed 
class iy . The probability of the class is either p , if 1iy = or 1 p− , if 0iy = the 
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where β is the vector of parameters. 
Then the log-likelihood function is  
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If we put equations (4.13) and (4.15) in (4.18), we can get, 
1 1
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The estimators are the fixed-effects parameters, the variance components, and the 
residual variance. The maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by an iterative 
procedure that uses the Newton-Raphson method.  
 
We deduce a score for each DMU for each type of efficiency and relate these to the 
probability of distress using logistic regression. However, DEA scores assume a 
common technology across the DMUs, which is the assumption of homogeneity 
discussed in the literature review. When we include the four types of efficiency 
variables we ensure that only DMUs within the same industry sector are accorded the 
same parameters whilst the financial ratios are assumed to have the same parameters 
across all sectors. In this way, it is assured that efficiency scores calculated in a 
sector are specific to this sector only. They are named as ‘industry specific’ models 
(details of them are introduced in Table 4.5.4). Therefore the specification of the 
logistic regression is amended to be 
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where ip denotes the probability of suffering distress for company i; 
           irse denotes efficiency score type r for sector s for company i; 
    1iw denotes financial variable 1 for company i and so on; 
           1sD =  if company i is a member of sector s, 0 otherwise; 
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           rsδ  denotes a parameter for efficiency score type r for sector s to be 
estimated; 
     1β  denotes a parameter for covariate 1 to be estimated; 
                K  denotes the number of covariates. 
 
We compared three alternative specifications of equation (4.20): with only efficiency 
variables, with only financial variables and with combinations of both. 
 
4.4 Sample 
4.4.1 Training and test samples 
 
The sample contains the annual data of 2,104 listed companies in China between 
1998 and 2010. Since one of the important input variables in the DEA models is 
Number of Employees and it was not until 2001 that the companies started to report 
this information in their statements, the reports prior to 2001 are excluded from the 
sample. A few companies with extreme outlying values of input or output variables 
(mainly caused by unusual or abnormal value changes and rare events) were also 
excluded because the efficiency frontier is very sensitive to outlying values and so 
their inclusion may have resulted in inaccurate estimates of relative efficiencies. 
Besides, all companies that experienced ST prior to 2003 are excluded because 
companies being distressed cannot be distressed again. 
 
Since DEA models are estimated for homogeneous production processes (Dyson et 
al, 2001), we solve DEA programs to compute efficiency scores for separate industry 
sectors and within the same year to ensure that the companies in the sample share the 
same productivity process and a similar business environment. To keep as many 
distressed companies as possible in the sample for modelling, all industries were 
examined and the second level industrial sectors Raw Materials (code 1510 in Wind 
database), Industrial Equipment (code 2010) and Real Estate (code 4040) were found 
to have the highest frequency of ST cases. In 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2007, there were 
more ST cases than in other years (Figure 3.4.1). Therefore, the STs in 2002 or 2003 
are grouped together as the training sample and the STs in 2006 or 2007 are grouped 
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into the hold-out sample to test the predictive performance of the logistic regression. 
Thus efficiency scores and financial covariate data for 2001 with ST/non-ST status 
taken from 2002 and 2003 were used to train the model, which then was then applied 
to the data in 2005 to predict the probability of  becoming ST in 2006 and 2007.  
 
The numbers of ST and non-ST companies are displayed in Table 4.4.1. Some 
companies were delisted and some new companies entered the sample during the 
study period. There are 429 cases common to both samples. The predictive accuracy 
is tested by an out-of-time rather than an out-of-sample validation, which is in line 
with the literature (e.g. Shumway, 2001).  
 
Table 4.4.1 Sample 1 
 Training sample (2001 to 2003) Test sample (2005 to 2007) 
Sector Code 1510 2010 4040 Total 1510 2010 4040 Total 
non-ST 181 144 95 420 218 185 92 495 
ST 17 14 19 50 18 20 22 60 
Total 198 158 114 470 236 205 114 555 
ST/Non-ST 9.40% 9.70% 20.00% 11.90% 8.30% 10.80% 23.90% 12.10% 
ST rate 8.59% 8.86% 16.67% 10.64% 7.63% 9.76% 19.30% 10.81% 
 
4.4.2 DEA variables 
 
Descriptive statistics for financial variables used in the DEA analysis are shown in 
Table 4.4.2. The occasional negative values for profits and cash flows are apparent 





Table 4.4.2 Statistics of DEA variables 
       2001  2005 
    Sector  N Mean SD Min Max  N Mean SD Min Max 
Inputs 
Employees 
1510  198 3925 5388.8 104 45943  236 4240.6 5622.1 140 44421 
2010  158 2498.2 2353 102 15000  205 2281.4 2312.9 129 19676 
4040  114 1252.9 1594.5 56 13319  114 1038.9 1742.2 34 12568 
Capitals 
(mCNY) 
1510  198 524.5 1182.4 51 12512  236 604.1 1434.3 60.4 17512 
2010  158 291.7 224.7 80.2 1884.4  205 323.7 296.7 57.6 2689.6 
4040  114 298.3 234.3 66 1867.7  114 369.7 410.9 53.5 3722.7 
Costs  
(mCNY) 
1510  198 1410.6 2935 37.6 25497.9  236 3620.3 9098.1 49.3 108422.4 
2010  158 995.1 1820.5 50 19358.6  205 1656.7 2563.9 110.4 19459.7 
4040  114 506.5 607.9 48 4157.4  114 774.4 964.3 12.2 8528.6 
Assets   
(mCNY) 
1510  198 2478.9 4881.2 154.6 58042.1  236 4269.4 10471.3 164.4 142024.2 
2010  158 1671.7 1436.8 198.1 9907.9  205 2273.6 2330.4 172.9 18033.6 
4040  114 1659.2 1507 287 9690.3  114 2428.5 2747.5 27.3 21992.4 
Debts  
(mCNY) 
1510  198 1120.2 2561.6 43 31752  236 2248.9 4926 22.6 63097.3 
2010  158 805.8 810.5 45.9 4810  205 1318 1491.5 55.6 9517.7 
4040  114 834.4 978.2 6.5 7380.5  114 1459.5 1675.6 7 13411.2 
Outputs 
Profits   
(mCNY) 
1510  198 88.5 355.4 -1797.4 3709.6  236 281.4 1334.9 -997.2 18310.8 
2010  158 54.9 160.9 -1009.8 1011.8  205 60.4 238.2 -696 2057.1 
4040  114 44.1 126.1 -537.6 501.9  114 40.9 293.6 -1142.2 1976.2 
Cash     
(mCNY) 
1510  198 16.7 336.9 -3686.2 872.5  236 -6.6 334.4 -2664.6 1784.3 
2010  158 50.1 208.1 -686.4 882.7  205 -15.6 160.9 -953.8 661.3 
4040  114 45.9 150.8 -329.9 585.2  114 -22.9 216.3 -1100.2 597.9 
Sales     
(mCNY) 
1510  198 1499.3 3142.1 20.1 29170.8  236 3895.2 10297.5 17.9 126608.4 
2010  158 1037.8 1858.1 51.6 19565.1  205 1706.5 2657.2 0.9 19474.2 
4040  114 536.1 663.6 12.2 4455.1  114 825.4 1154.4 3.5 10558.9 
 
The list of financial ratios selected for inclusion in the logistic regression and 





There are four types of efficiency scores of importance to this paper: Technical 
Efficiency, Pure Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency and RTS levels. The first 
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three are all continuous scores, whereas  is a categorical ordinal variable with three 
levels: decreasing, constant and increasing.  
 
Table 4.5.1 Means and standard deviations of efficiency scores 
    Training Sample Test Sample 
      TE PTE SE  TE PTE SE 
Sector 
code 
ST N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1510 0 181 .557 .209 .628 .214 .886 .117 218 .493 .219 .597 .214 .824 .163 
 1 17 .323 .180 .533 .277 .647 .247 18 .237 .086 .439 .199 .614 .233 
 All 198 .537 .216 .620 .221 .866 .148 236 .474 .222 .585 .216 .808 .178 
2010 0 144 .556 .239 .694 .214 .792 .171 185 .493 .242 .615 .227 .796 .198 
 1 14 .231 .082 .473 .243 .545 .188 20 .201 .084 .439 .182 .497 .194 
 All 158 .527 .248 .675 .225 .770 .186 205 .465 .247 .598 .229 .767 .216 
4040 0 95 .632 .251 .728 .232 .864 .154 92 .578 .285 .706 .269 .824 .221 
 1 19 .368 .271 .574 .264 .665 .300 22 .207 .092 .394 .218 .610 .278 
 All 114 .588 .272 .702 .244 .831 .199 114 .506 .298 .646 .287 .782 .247 
Total 0 420 .574 .231 .673 .222 .849 .151 495 .509 .243 .624 .233 .813 .188 
 1 50 .314 .206 .532 .261 .625 .255 60 .214 .087 .422 .199 .574 .241 
 All 470 .546 .242 .658 .230 .825 .179 555 .477 .249 .602 .238 .788 .208 
 
First, we consider aggregate results. One of the objectives of this research is to test 
whether the probability of distress is associated with low efficiency. We consider 
various efficiency measures where following previous literature (Xu and Wang, 2009) 
we do not treat each sector separately. Secondly when we treat each sector separately 
by assumption. Descriptive statistics of efficiency scores are shown in Table 4.5.1. 
As a preliminary analysis we computed two-way ANOVA (Table 4.5.2) and found 
that for each of the three types of efficiency score, there is a significant difference 
between the mean score for the ST group and the mean score for the non-ST group. 
But there is a significant difference in the mean efficiency scores between the 
industry sectors in 2001 only in terms of Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency, 




Table 4.5.2 Two-way ANOVA for TE, PTE and SE 
  Training Sample Test Sample 
  TE PTE SE TE PTE SE 
Source F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
Sector 3.18 .042 1.95 .143 6.67 .001 0.69 .502 0.36 .698 3.20 .041 
ST 63.84 .000 21.67 .000 88.72 .000 93.04 .000 47.21 .000 80.70 .000 
Interaction 0.56 .569 1.11 .331 0.39 .679 1.12 .326 2.42 .090 1.19 .305 
 
Table 4.5.3 Levels of RTS 
 RTS 2001 RTS 2005 
 Decreasing Constant Increasing Total Decreasing Constant Increasing Total 
ST 69 69 282 420 58 66 371 495 
Non-ST 5 0 45 50 0 0 60 60 
Total 74 69 327 470 58 66 431 55 
 
As the level of RTS is a categorical variable, we can only pursue a cross table on it. 
From Table 4.5.3 we can see that both in 2001 and 2005 there are relatively low 
numbers of companies with decreasing or constant RTS. We therefore classified the 
RTS values into two values: decreasing or constant on the one hand and increasing 
(IRS) on the other and included a dummy variable to represent the existence of IRS 
in the logistic regressions. 
 
4.5.2 Logistic regression 
 
We have two objectives. Firstly, to investigate the statistical significance of 
efficiency measures in explaining the probability of suffering financial distress and 
secondly, to evaluate the predictive performance of including efficiency variables in 
such posterior probability models. 
 
Pre-analysis showed that if efficiency variables and financial ratios are entered 
together into a stepwise logistic regression, nearly all of the efficiency variables are 
excluded. However, we are interested in the role specifically of efficiency variables 
and so we adopted the following procedure. Since values of the efficiency variables 
were derived from a DEA model where the objective function consisted of financial 
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variables, collinearity is possible between some financial ratios and some efficiency 
scores. Conscious of this potential collinearity we considered three model 
specifications. Firstly we have models with only efficiency variables (Models 1-6). 
Models 1-4 contain only industry specific efficiency variables to try to reduce the 
heterogeneity in technologies that would otherwise be present. Models 5 and 6 are 
included simply to show the parameter estimates if, as in previous literature, in the 
DEA analysis all industrial sectors were assumed to be homogeneous.  
 
Secondly, we estimated models that included combinations of the industry specific 
efficiency variables and subsequently uncorrelated financial ratios were entered 
using a stepwise routine (Models 7-9). Thirdly, we estimated models that included 
significant financial variables selected from all those available using a forward 
stepwise routine together with combinations of efficiency scores. Thus the efficiency 
score was ‘force’ entered in each model, except Model 10. All of the models were 
parameterised across all industries with industry specific dummies interacted with 
each efficiency variable to yield industry specific parameters and the efficiency 
scores. We therefore assume the marginal effects of the efficiency variables are 
specific to each industry sector but the marginal effects are the same for each 
financial variable for all industries. The models are specified in Table 4.5.4.   
66 
 
Table 4.5.4 Model comparison 1 
A Efficiency Variables Only 
Model 1 Industry specific TE only 
Model 2 Industry specific PTE and SE 
Model 3 Industry specific TE and RTS 
Model 4 Industry specific PTE, SE and RTS 
Model 5 Pooled TE 
Model 6 Pooled PTE and SE 
  
B Efficiency Variables forced entry, financial ratio variables selected by stepwise 
routine 
Model 7 
Industry specific TE forced entry, financial ratios selected by forward 
stepwise routine. 
Model 8 
Industry specific PTE and SE forced entry, financial ratios selected by 
forward stepwise routine 
Model 9 
Industry specific PTE, SE and RTS forced entry, financial ratios 
selected by forward stepwise routine 
  
C Financial variables selected by stepwise and then forced entry with efficiency 
variables 
Model 10 Financial variables selected by forward stepwise routine. 
Model 11 Industry specific TE, financial ratios from Model 10 
Model 12  Industry specific PTE and SE, financial ratios from Model 10 
Model 13 Industry specific PTE, SE and RTS, financial ratios from Model 10 
 
 
DEA allows one to compute the efficiency of an organisation relative to the most 
efficient organisations in the dataset. To compute the relative efficiency scores for a 
new case requires us to solve the program for a different set of DMUs and so could 
alter the efficiency boundary and thus the efficiencies of the original cases relative to 
the new efficiency boundary. To assess the discriminatory power of including 
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efficiency variables we computed the relative efficiency for each member of the 
holdout sample in 2005. We assume that the marginal effects of relative TE, PTE and 
SE, and so the logistic regression parameters that were estimated for 2001-3, 
remained constant over time. We argue that in competitive markets it is relative 
efficiency rather than absolute efficiency that determines the chance of financial 
success or, as in our case, financial distress. This is consistent with the approach used 
in the literature (see Xu and Wang, 2009). We then predicted the probability of a new 
case becoming distressed in 2006-7 using the 2005 efficiencies and 2001-3 
parameters. 
 
4.5.3 Parameters and significance levels 
 
Table 4.5.5 shows that when included alone, each of the efficiency variables had the 
expected sign: an increase in efficiency is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of distress. This is true when we consider TE alone or PTE and SE 
together. The effect of a marginal change in relative TE score for Real Estate has a 
smaller effect on the probability of distress than in the Industrial Equipment industry. 
Generally, an increase in relative PTE has a smaller marginal effect on distress 
likelihood that does an increase in relative SE. RTS (either constant-decreasing or 
increasing) have no detectable effect of the probability of distress. A failure to 
compute relative efficiency for each industry sector separately and so to assume 
homogeneity of technology across all three sectors not only yields incorrect 
efficiency scores but also masks considerable differences in the effects of each type 
of efficiency between industry sectors if such scores are used. 
 
Table 4.5.6 shows that when we force the efficiency scores into each logistic 
regression, and then select financial variables in a stepwise fashion, the Scale 
Efficiency variables remain significant with the expected signs, whilst the RTS 
variables are never significant. In all sectors, improving relative PTE has a smaller 




The parameters of most of the financial ratios have the expected signs. For example, 
higher net cash flow per share or higher return on equity or return on assets is 
associated with a lower chance of distress. In Table 4.5.7 we see that if we include 
the efficiency variables and the financial ratios that would be included if the 
efficiency variables were not, then only the Scale Efficiency scores remain 
significant. Again their parameters have the expected signs. 
 
Table 4.5.5 Coefficient estimates from efficiency only logistic regressions A 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
TE Score     -10.52**  
 Raw materials -11.89**  -12.34**    
 Industrial Equipment -14.23**  -24.41**    
 Real Estate -9.40**  -8.56**    
PTE Score      -4.95** 
 Raw materials  -3.82**  -4.39**   
 Industrial Equipment  -6.93**  -9.53**   
 Real Estate  -5.89**  -5.77**   
SE Score      -7.33** 
 Raw materials  -9.79**  -10.16**   
 Industrial Equipment  -9.02**  -12.27**   
 Real Estate  -7.26**  -6.90**   
RTS indicator       
 Raw materials   -0.97 -5.77   
 Industrial Equipment   2.08 3.32   
 Real Estate   1.39 -1.54   
Constant 2.58** 7.56** 3.47** 8.59** 2.13** 6.20** 








Table 4.5.6 Coefficient estimates from logistic regressions B 
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Technical Efficiency Score    
 Raw materials -8.35**   
 Industrial Equipment -10.67**   
 Real Estate -7.12**   
Pure Technical Efficiency Score    
 Raw materials  -2.81 -1.82 
 Industrial Equipment  -6.19** -9.75 
 Real Estate  -6.24** -5.25*   
Scale Efficiency Score    
 Raw materials  -10.82** -11.08** 
 Industrial Equipment  -9.66** -16.17** 
 Real Estate  -8.21** -7.93** 
RTS indicator    
 Raw materials   -1.68 
 Industrial Equipment   5.24 
 Real Estate   -2.09 
Net cash flow from operating per share  -5.43** -6.12** -4.82** 
Return on equity -0.09*   -0.20** -0.25** 
Return on assets -0.18**   
Undistributed profit per share    
Gross margin / total sales -0.07**   
Operating profit / total sales 0.03*     
Financial expenses / total sales 0.13*   0.12*   0.15*   
Tangible assets / total assets -0.04*   -0.05** -0.06** 
Current ratio  3.22**  
Quick ratio   3.31** 
Cash ratio  -6.37** -7.77** 
Net cash flow / current liabilities   -5.53*   
Inventory turnover 0.36** 0.66** 0.72** 
Total profit growth    
Total assets growth -0.08** -0.09** -0.09** 
Constant 3.47** 10.16** 11.74** 
Models 7, 8 and 9: Efficiency variables forced entry, financial variables selected by forward 
stepwise routine. 






Table 4.5.7 Coefficient estimates from logistic regressions C 
Variable Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Technical Efficiency Score     
 Raw materials  -3.39*   
 Industrial Equipment  -4.43   
 Real Estate  -2.26   
Pure Technical Efficiency Score     
 Raw materials   -1.12 -1.85 
 Industrial Equipment   -1.16 -2.74 
 Real Estate   -1.72 -2.45 
Scale Efficiency Score     
 Raw materials    -4.28** -4.56*   
 Industrial Equipment   -4.89** -6.89*   
 Real Estate   -2.9*   -3.59*   
RTS indicator     
 Raw materials    -1.52 
 Industrial Equipment    0.4 
 Real Estate    -0.95 
Net cash flow from operating per share  -4.32** -4.03** -3.85** -4.32** 
Return on equity -0.11** -0.11** -0.12** -0.12** 
Return on assets     
Undistributed profit per share -1.58** -1.41** -1.17** -1.19** 
Gross margin / total sales -0.06** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** 
Operating profit / total sales     
Financial expenses / total sales 0.12** 0.09** 0.11** 0.12** 
Tangible assets / total assets     
Current ratio -0.71* -0.54** -0.75* -0.81* 
Quick ratio     
Cash ratio     
Net cash flow / current liabilities     
Inventory turnover     
Total profit growth -0.006** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* 
Total assets growth -0.05** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
Constant 0.07 1.39 4.11* 5.84** 
Model 10: All variables selected by forward stepwise routine. 
Model 11, 12 and 13: Efficiency variables forced entry, financial variables from Model 10. 





4.5.4 Predictive performance 
 
The statistical significance of a covariate does not necessarily imply that predictive 
performance is increased if the variable is included in a model. We now examine the 
predictive performance of all of our models. Firstly we compare the predictive 
performance of using overall efficiency (TE) versus decomposed efficiency (PTE 
and SE); secondly we compare models with RTS levels versus models without RTS 
levels, and thirdly we compare models with and without financial ratios. The 
classification accuracy is presented in Table 4.5.8. For Error Rate calculation the 
proportion of STs that are predicted to be STs is the proportion of the observed STs 
in the training sample. The AUC, Gini coefficient, KS and H measure are presented 
in Table 4.5.9.  
 
Table 4.5.8 Classification accuracy 
 
Training sample   Test sample 












Model 1 40.00% 4.80% 91.50%  41.70% 4.80% 91.20% 
Model 2 52.00% 6.20% 88.90%  46.70% 5.50% 90.10% 
Model 3 42.00% 5.00% 91.10%  46.70% 5.50% 90.10% 
Model 4 52.00% 6.20% 88.90%  45.00% 5.30% 90.50% 
Model 5 42.00% 5.00% 91.10%  43.30% 5.10% 90.80% 
Model 6 50.00% 6.00% 89.40%  46.70% 5.50% 90.10% 
        
Model 7 20.00% 2.40% 95.70%  36.70% 4.20% 92.30% 
Model 8 30.00% 3.60% 93.60%  40.00% 4.60% 91.50% 
Model 9 24.00% 2.90% 94.90%  40.00% 4.60% 91.50% 
        
Model 10 22.00% 2.70% 95.40%  30.60% 3.90% 93.40% 
Model 11 22.00% 2.70% 95.40%  30.60% 3.90% 93.40% 
Model 12 22.00% 2.70% 95.40%  32.30% 4.10% 93.00% 







Table 4.5.9 Discriminative power 
 Training sample  Test sample 
 AUROC GINI KS H  AUROC GINI KS H 
Model 1 0.869 0.738 0.612 0.382  0.921 0.841 0.737 0.369 
Model 2 0.881 0.761 0.590 0.356  0.898 0.797 0.670 0.293 
Model 3 0.882 0.765 0.660 0.404  0.915 0.829 0.746 0.357 
Model 4 0.887 0.775 0.616 0.348  0.895 0.791 0.665 0.303 
Model 5 0.844 0.687 0.616 0.387  0.917 0.833 0.691 0.347 
Model 6 0.843 0.686 0.548 0.313  0.891 0.781 0.613 0.313 
          
Model 7 0.970 0.940 0.850 0.683  0.952 0.904 0.796 0.451 
Model 8 0.979 0.957 0.887 0.650  0.935 0.869 0.765 0.384 
Model 9 0.983 0.965 0.881 0.695  0.935 0.870 0.798 0.382 
          
Model 10 0.964 0.927 0.856 0.627  0.952 0.903 0.804 0.518 
Model 11 0.967 0.933 0.849 0.626  0.955 0.909 0.803 0.520 
Model 12 0.968 0.936 0.832 0.632  0.955 0.909 0.801 0.502 
Model 13 0.971 0.941 0.837 0.637   0.955 0.909 0.788 0.497 
 
In the first comparison (Model 1 vs 2 and Model 5 vs 6) both pairs show that 
decomposition of efficiency scores reduces the classification accuracy in the test 
samples by a noticeable amount. The Gini decreases from 0.841 to 0.797 and from 
0.833 to 0.781 if TE is decomposed into PTE and SE. In the second comparison 
(Models 1 vs 3 and Model 2 vs 4) we see that inclusion of RTS decreases predictive 
performance slightly. For example, without RTS, Model 1 has a Gini of 0.841 whilst 
with RTS this is 0.829 in the test set and the corresponding figures for Models 2 and 
4 are 0.797 and 0.791 respectively.  
 
One might notice that for Models 1-6 (with only efficiency variables) the Gini for the 
test set exceeds that for the training set. We explain this unusual observation with 
reference to a particular model. Consider Table 4.5.1 and industry 4040 (Real Estate). 
Model 1 consists only of the TE variable. Notice that the difference in the mean TE 
between the ST and not-ST groups in the training set (0.632 - 0.368 = 0.264) is less 
than that in the test set (0.578 - 0.207 = 0.371). In a Kolmogorov-Smirnov diagram 
(Figure 4.5.1) the increase in the difference in the mean TE between the two groups 
will move the Pnon-ST (s) line further from the PST (s) line in the test set than in the 
training set, where Pnon-ST (s) and PST (s) denote the cumulative proportions at and 
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below each score, s, of non-STs and STs respectively. Therefore plotting Pnon-ST (s) 
against PST (s) in a ROC curve graph will result in a more accentuated curve and so 
the greater difference in the means will result in a larger Gini (see Thomas et al, 
2002).  
 
Figure 4.5.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov plot for Model 1 Sector 4040 
 
 
Figure 4.5.3 also shows the KS plots for other models. For Model 1 to 6, they have 
larger maximum distance between the cumulative Goods score and the Bads score, 
so they lead to larger Gini coefficients in the test sample than the training sample 









Figure 4.5.2 Gini plots for all models 
 
 
Figure 4.5.3 KS plots for all models 
 
 





But if looking at the H plots (Figure 4.5.4), when assuming the same H cost 
distribution, the performance of the test sample is consistently worse than that of the 
training sample, which would be expected. In terms of H measure, once again, 
decomposition of efficiency scores reduces the discriminative power (Model 1 vs 2 
and Model 5 vs 6). But the effect of RTS is mixed (Models 1 vs 3 and Model 2 vs 4). 
Model 1, which incorporates the technical efficiency score only, is the best one in 
testing (0.369).  
 
Turning to the inclusion of financial ratios, we see that they outperform the first six 
models that contain only efficiency variables. In Table 4.5.8 and Table 4.5.9, for 
each performance measure we highlight the model with the greatest predictive power. 
By observing Figure 4.5.2, Figure 4.5.3 and Figure 4.5.4, it can be seen that 
generally, in the training sample the models of efficiency variables assisted by ratios 
(Models 7, 8 and 9) are better in predictive accuracy than the models of ratios 
assisted by efficiency variables (Models 10, 11, 12 and 13). But in the test sample, it 
is the other way round. In the test sample the highest classification accuracy and the 
highest discriminatory power based on AUC, Gini and H is gained by Model 11, 
which includes industry specific TE together with the most significant of all financial 
ratios. The KS values of Model 10 and Model 11 are very close. However, the 
difference between the performance of this model and models 12 and 13 that have 
the same financial ratios but decompose TE and include RTS (Model 13), is 
inconsequential by AUC and Gini but decreases in H measures. 
 
Figure 4.5.5 shows the ROC curves across three groups of regression: Models 1-6, 
Models 7-9 and Models 10-13. It can be observed that in regression A, curves of six 
models are dispersed though they cross each other in places. But when financial 
ratios are added to the model (Models 7 to 9, and Models 11 to 13), they become 
closer particularly in the last four models. When the best predictive variables are 
selected from a range of financial ratios, the influence of efficiency scores becomes 






Figure 4.5.5 ROC curves 
Model 1 to 6  Training Set 
 






Model 7 to 9 Training Set 
 






Model 10 to 13 Training Set 
 








Data Envelopment Analysis is a useful method to measure relative corporate 
efficiency and corporate efficiency is found to be helpful in credit scoring in previous 
literature and in this research as well. Rather than assuming Constant Returns to 
Scale, this research adopts a more realistic assumption, Variable Returns to Scale. It 
allows the model to decompose overall technical efficiency into Pure Technical 
Efficiency and Scale Efficiency which actually provides more information for 
analysis. Practically, these measures indicate that an inefficient company should 
improve its efficiency of use of inputs or adjust its operating scale to the optimum 
level to achieve better performance. The results show that not only are those less 
technically efficient firms at greater risk of becoming financially distressed than 
more technically efficient firms but that improvements in both pure technical and 
Scale Efficiency would reduce the risk. Of these two what really matters is how 
relatively scale efficient, rather than how pure technically efficient, firms are. This 
indicates that a firm which wants to perform better, in practice, should pay more 
attention to optimising its scale of business rather than optimising resources or 
applying new technology. Increasing scale of operation is likely to have a great effect 
on reducing risk of distress than moving on an efficiency frontier.  
    
These results are consistent with those of Psillaki et al (2010) who found that 
technical efficiency was significantly negatively related to the probability of business 
failure for a sample of French firms in each of three industries. But because no study 
that models financial distress has decomposed technical efficiency no further 
comparison can be made. 
 
However, in the prediction of financial distress, decomposition of efficiency 
variables is of little help for predictive accuracy. A simpler model using Technical 
Efficiency only to assist financial ratios in logistic regression is just as effective as 
including Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency as separate variables as 
found in the out-of-time validation. We also found that the inclusion of RTS levels 




In terms of using efficiency as the only predictor, these results show that a group of 
financial ratios does outperform efficiency scores as they can cover many aspects of 
business, while a DEA score is only based on a limited number on inputs and outputs. 
That is also the reason why financial ratios have dominated corporate credit models 
for decades. However, to gain greatest predictive accuracy, financial ratios and 
efficiency variables should both be included. This is consistent with the findings of 
Yeh et al (2010) and Xu and Wang (2009). 
 
Nevertheless, although predictive accuracy is the main concern in credit risk 
management, there is also the necessity to understand risk drivers that may give early 
indications of potential problems. In this respect decomposed efficiency measures, in 
particular Scale Efficiency, can provide useful information to a credit analyst 
interested in relative performance of companies in a credit portfolio.  
 
This research has also introduced a modified logistic regression model, particularly 
for DEA variables. This is the first application of DEA in credit scoring to use the 
dummy variables for different industries to overcome the dilemma that a large 
sample size and homogeneity of DMUs cannot be achieved at the same time. 
Industry specification slightly improves prediction accuracy and remarkably 
increases discriminative power. More importantly, the proposed logistic regression 
properly handles the assumption of DEA methodology which should be kept all the 
time when applying it. Such methodology allows employing a large dataset with a 
mixture of industries, but it needs to be noted that as more industries are included, 
more dummy variables are required, and the number of companies in each category 
should still be sufficiently large.  
 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the data analysed in this chapter covers two time 
periods. It would be beneficial if more years of data are found to be supportive with 
the above conclusion in the cross sectional analysis. Moreover, recent developments 
of DEA actually can give estimation of time serial efficiency scores which allow 
panel analysis across a period of time. Then as an extension of these cross-sectional 
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models developed in this chapter, the next chapter will build panel regression models 
to incorporate both dynamic DEA scores and financial ratios on a large panel dataset 















Chapter Five  




The preceding chapter carried out a cross-sectional analysis including efficiency 
measures to predict financial distress. Cross-sectional models are estimated for single 
periods and make forecasts for single periods as well. In practice, cross-sectional 
models are trained using information from the past and applied to data of the present 
to make predictions into the future. This would necessarily assume that the 
influences of variables and parameters of the model remain unchanged from time to 
time. Because of this assumption of stability of the underlying relationships and 
parameters, Shumway (2001) preferred to call them ‘static’ models. Alternatively 
Altman and Eisenbeis (1978) argued that cross-sectional models are only valid for 
the sample period and so can only make within time out-of-sample predictions. The 
inference for a subsequent period (out-of-time prediction) is that it may not be valid. 
For example, Dombolena and Khoury (1980) investigated the stability of financial 
ratios in predicting business failures and found inconsistency in their performance 
over time. Shumway (2001) even claimed that half of financial ratios that were found 
to be successful in the predictive models of Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984) 
turned out to be unrelated to bankruptcy probability in later periods. Grice and 
Dugan (2001) also found that Zmijewski’s ratios had worse predictive power when 
transferred to another period. Nevertheless, in practice, Altman and Eisenbeis (1978) 
indicated that the bias decreases with the increase of the sample size. They agreed 
that inferences should be made based on the expected error rates, the predictive 
content and the role of individual variables.  
 
‘Dynamic’ models, in contrast to ‘static’ models, are preferred because of the nature 
of business failure (Shumway, 2001). Bankruptcy or corporate default takes a longer 
time to observe and it is rarer in term of incidence compared to consumer credit 
default, which is commonly defined as payment three months late. The internal and 
external conditions of companies change over time. Static models can only forecast 
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the probability of default at a given time (usually during the year before failure) but 
ignore the fact that at this given time, some ‘healthy’ companies will eventually fail. 
To overcome some of these problems, hazard models such as proposed by Shumway 
(2001) have become popular in the field of credit risk prediction. This chapter, and 
also the next chapter, on corporate governance measures, will use panel datasets and 
follow Shumway’s (2001) simple hazard model to present more robust results.  
 
This chapter will continue assessing corporate efficiency measures. Literature on 
both dynamic models of corporate credit risk modelling and DEA is discussed. The 
algorithms of the discrete hazard model and Malmquist DEA are presented in the 
methodology section. A sample of 742 companies over 10 years, in total 5,490 
company years, is employed in the analysis. Results and discussions follow.  
 
The proposed models combining both dynamic DEA and survival analysis are the 
first to incorporate corporate efficiency in financial distress prediction. The DEA 
models assuming VRS and homogeneity in samples calculate various efficiency 
measures according to different options.  
 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Advantages of hazard models 
 
There are mainly three advantages of hazard models as described by Shumway 
(2001). Firstly, hazard models can adjust for periods at risk automatically using a 
function of time of being financially healthy. That time, sometimes referring to the 
age of a company, is called survival time or duration time. A company, just like a 
human being or other creature, has its own life cycle where at each stage of life, there 
are different natural risks of death. A hazard model can capture that risk by 
incorporating duration dependence.   
 
Secondly, hazard models can also naturally incorporate Time-Varying Covariates 
(TVCs) which are defined as explanatory variables changing over time. The financial 
ratios and certain other predictive variables in static models, are typically TVCs. 
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Macroeconomic variables are another group of TVCs which have been found to be 
associated with business failure (e.g. Wilson and Altanlar, 2014). The Basel II 
Accord from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) has addressed the influence 
of the macroeconomy on financial risks since 2004. Major macroeconomic indicators 
are reported regularly (quarterly or annually), and discrete hazard models (DHM) can 
handle them well. Furthermore, other firm-specific variables, such as corporate 
governance variables (discussed in detail in Chapter Six) are TVCs as well. For 
example, the CEO could be sacked for bad company performance and replaced by a 
more capable one. Also shareholding of investors are often variable from year to year. 
Hazard models are capable in dealing with TVCs.  
 
Thirdly, hazard models can make better predictions because they take advantage of 
utilising more data. Typically, cross-sectional models (except multi-periods models) 
can only employ single period data such as the information for year 2001 in the 
training sample in Chapter Four. But by observing data over a period of time, for 
instance, ten years in this chapter, the training sample is much larger than that in 
cross-sectional models. Estimates of parameters are then more robust over time as 
predictions.  
 
Apart from the above, additionally, hazard models take into account censoring (a 
failure event occurs but is not observed in the observation time window) (Cleves et 
al, 2008). Details of this are discussed in Section 5.3.4. Hazard models allow one to 
make a prediction in different time periods not just the predefined observation 
window time interval (Lane et al, 1986).  
 
However, hazard models are not the only models that researchers have tried in credit 
risk modelling. The next section will review various efforts that have been made in 







5.2.2 Dynamic models in corporate credit 
 
In the early days, researchers proposed many methods to capture the time effect or 
the time to default. Peel and Peel (1988) and Keasey et al (1990) employed 
multinomial logistic regression to discriminate between healthy and failed companies. 
They simply stacked lagged independent variables with the dependent variable of 
different classes to indicate the number of years to default. Compared to binary LR, 
the multinomial logit is suitable when alternative choices are offered, and these 
choices should be independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Their choices of the 
dependent variable, marked as 1, 2 and 3 years to default are obviously not irrelevant. 
Laitinen (1993) defined the typical process of failure into starting, intervening and 
final phases. His model can possibly identify the phase in which a firm is, and the 
trend of ratios measured by a naive estimation is used to capture the change over 
time. Besides, both survival statuses (failed or non-failed) and survival time are used 
as the dependent variables in two separate models. Sometimes, the trend and stability 
of ratios are measured and added to the model (Dombolena and Khoury, 1980; Betts 
and Belhoul, 1987).   
 
Multi-period LR may be more suitable than multinomial LR in handling panel data. 
In multi-period LR, the dependent variable is usually defined as Pr( 1)ity =  where ity  
is a binary outcome whether the event of interest is observed for company i  at time 
t . The probability is conditional on a function of covariates which are explanatory 
variables itx  in making predictions. A number of examples exist in studies such as 
Charitou et al (2004) and Campbell et al (2008). This kind of dataset was regarded as 
time-series-cross-sectional data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS data) by 
Beck et al (1998). When it is modelled by ordinary logit and probit regression, 
problems arise as the temporal dependence of the dependent variable violates the 
assumption of independent observations. Researchers tend to ignore this flaw as the 
estimate of the parameters was simple (Beck et al, 1998).  
 
Whilst static models imply a consistent hazard rate over time, survival models do not 
and so are more appropriate in modelling. The Cox (1972) proportional hazard model 
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is a classic survival model which assumes that a default can happen any time during 
the interval [ , )T T t+  where T  is the time of default. Therefore the Cox proportional 
model is a continuous time hazard model. Applications of it were used by Bonfim 
(2009) to Portuguese data of 113,119 observations over the period from 1996 to 2002, 
and Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) to US data over the period from 1971 to 2002. 
The former study tried five distributions of the baseline hazard: exponential, Weibull, 
Gompertz, lognormal and log-logistic distributions. More complicated, Duffie et al 
(2007) applied it to 390,000 firm-months data from 1980 to 2004 with respect to 
variables of Merton’s DD and Markov stochastic covariates. They found the 
conditional probability of default depends on the stock return, distance to default, 
S&P 500 returns and US interest rates. Much earlier work could be found in bank 
default prediction from Lane et al (1986).  
 
Sometimes when covariates are only observed at given points of time, it is more 
convenient to use Shumway’s (2001) simple hazard model which is a discrete time 
survival model. For example, abundant financial and accounting information is 
disclosed in annual reports and popular TVCs, such as macroeconomic indicators are 
also calculated by the Office of National Statistics on a regular basis, where the 
yearly data receives much attention and is of great importance. Therefore, in credit 
risk models, the default event is usually defined in a specific period of time, 
commonly one year (Carling et al, 2007). As recommended by Beck et al (1998), 
binary time series cross sectional (BTSCS) data could be used in hazard models 
because they allow corrections for censoring, heterogeneity and duration dependence 
(Bennett, 1997). BTSCS data should be grouped to duration data because the 
continuous process of the event of interest can only be observed at discrete intervals. 
Shumway (2001) stated that a DHM is equivalent to a multi-period logistic model in 
terms of computation but with an additional term 0 ( )h t  which is the baseline hazard 
function. This function, as Shumway (2001) comments, could be of any form 
regarding the duration time, though he used the time since listing. His simple hazard 
model, by incorporating market driven variables, market size, stock returns and 
volatility of returns, outperforms Altman’s (1968) and Zmijewski’s (1984) selections 




Shumway’s (2001) model has been followed by many studies on corporate credit risk 
such as Carling et al (2007), Nam et al (2008), De Leonardis and Rocci (2013) and 
Wilson and Altanlar (2014). One of their common features is that they all take 
macroeconomic variables into the model and find they indeed bring influences on the 
probabilities of business failure. More specifically, Nam et al (2008) implied that the 
baseline hazard to be two macroeconomic variables: volatility of foreign exchange 
rate and change in interest rates. This is similar to De Leonardis and Rocci (2013), 
but they employed separate analysis for the two dimensions of the default risk: 
whether the default happens and when given that it can happen. They call this a cure 
rate model. Basically they split the population into healthy ones modelled by a binary 
logit regression and unhealthy ones modelled by the discrete time hazard model. 
They conclude their cure model is better than traditional survival analysis at 
predicting defaults. However, their validation procedure was not an out-of-sample 
test but a subsample test. So the real predictive power is in question. Besides 
accounting and macroeconomic data, Carling et al (2007) also employed credit 
bureau opinions and the type of loan specific and payment behaviour variables. 
Wilson and Altanlar (2014) particularly focused on new incorporated companies 
where accounting data is not available before their first disclosure. They set the 
baseline hazard to be related to the macro-economy. Furthermore their 
macroeconomic data is regionally based on postcode in the UK as new start-up 
SMEs are more locally operated. The regional economic conditions and information 
of the board served the model well.  
 
Rather than focusing on variables, some other dynamic models paid attention to the 
change of concept drift, which is changes in the hidden context (Schlimmer and 
Granger, 1986). Sun and Li (2011, pp. 2567) defined the financial distress concept 
drift as ‘the change in distribution of training data which dynamically increases with 
continuous emergence of new enterprises in financial distress’. They illustrated the 
financial distress of start-up and grown-up companies under different situations. The 
virtual concept drift of financial distress could be modelled by instance selection, a 
method of model rebuilding, and instance would be collected in batches at time 
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intervals. Their window analysis indicated the concept change indeed existed and 
they concluded a fixed window (a fixed lag of time) was more suitable for dynamic 
prediction models.  
 
Credit ratings for corporations given by credit rating agencies, such as the 
internationally renowned Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, are frequently 
used in dynamic models, since those ratings are recorded in a transition matrix for 
individual companies and inherently suitable for dynamic analysis. Among many 
studies on dynamics in ratings, the ordered probit model from Tsoukas and Mizon 
(2012) is a recent one which aims to capture momentum (previous upgrades and 
downgrades), drift (change of the proportions of upgrades and downgrades) and 
ageing (number of periods in previous state) effects. These effects are all related to 
time. They found the initial and previous states could help a model predict the credit 
rating. Other dynamic studies about credit ratings can be found in Bangia et al (2002) 
and Frydman and Schuermann (2008).  
 
Discrete time survival analysis exists not only as parametric models but also as non-
parametric ones, such as the survival trees and forests proposed by Bou-Hamad et al 
(2009). It was further extended to a survival tree method to incorporate TVCs in 
bankruptcy prediction (Bou-Hamad et al, 2011). Many trees could be assembled into 
a survival forest to give a better performance. They concluded the performance of 
their random survival forest model was stable in predictive accuracy across periods. 
However, typically, as a machine learning technique, it involved a complicated 
selection process on covariate transformation and interactions. So it brought 
difficulties in its application.  
 
5.2.3 Dynamic models in DEA 
 
In the domain of Data Envelopment Analysis, there are several variations of the basic 
DEA models CCR (Charnes et al, 1978), BBC (Banker et al, 1984), the additive 
model (Charnes et al, 1985) and SBM (Slacks-Based-Measures) models (Tone, 
2001). Apart from some models which measure different distances to the frontier, 
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control on inputs and outputs, apply cost/price on variables, and a series of multiplier 
models with various purposes, there are other several types of DEA models which 
investigate multilevel or multiperiod relative efficiency. This section will review 
such dynamic DEA models.  
 
Network DEA deals with a system of many sub divisions which are linked together 
by intermediate inputs/outputs (Tone and Tsutsui, 2009). Each DMU may or may not 
have its own inputs and outputs which could be called direct inputs/outputs, but there 
must be intermediate inputs/outputs to link DMUs together. Network DEA provides 
a framework for systematically analysing a large organisation with a certain structure. 
Examples of Network DEA models are illustrated in Figure 5.2.1. Empirical analysis 
can be found in studies by Liu and Lu (2010) and Kao and Hwang (2010) which 
studied the  performance of R&D and IT departments respectively.  
 













































The second example of multi levels in Figure 5.2.1 can actually be seen as a multi-
period dynamic DEA model, where DMU1, DMU2, DMU3 are the same DMUi in 
period 1, 2, and 3. In the case of companies, the input could be the initial investment 
and the intermediates are retained earnings and net income in one year which could 
be left for expenditure in the next year and so on. An example by Lu et al (2014) 
measured the intellectual capital and performance in Chinese insurance companies.  
 
Whilst conventional DEA models (referring to static DEA) are conducted in single 
periods, many researchers and practitioners are interested in the variation of data. 
Specifically, if a DMU can be observed at different points in time, its change in 
efficiency over the period is rather informative for analysis of both productivity and 
the purpose of this research - financial distress. One method could be that static DEA 
analysis is carried out in each period and in the second stage a standard regression 
used to estimate the change over time and extend it to further periods. Emel et al 
(2003) and Min and Lee (2008) used this two-stage method to forecast DEA scores 












approach was unsatisfactory because it failed to capture the interaction of one period 
with another. Window DEA was introduced by Charnes et al (1985) to deal with the 
efficiency change in the sense of time series. The idea of Window DEA, which is 
similar to other window analyses, is to set up a fixed observation period of k  for 
each DMU and evaluate these n k×  observations at the same time, so k different 
scores (time period 1 to k ) for each DMU are obtained. The analysis then moves to 
period 2 to 1k +  and so on. When 1k = , we have a typical annual panel dataset. 
Pulina et al (2010) applied window DEA to investigate the relationship between size 
and efficiency in Italian hospitals, but Cooper et al (2006) argued that its 
shortcoming is in the beginning and last period when cases are less evaluated.  
 
In dealing with panel data, the Malmquist DEA model may be the most capable one. 
Malmquist Index (MI) was initially suggested by the Swedish economist and 
statistician Professor Sten Malmquist in 1953. The idea of the MI is to compare the 
production technology of two economies so it is a bilateral index. If aF  is the 
production function of Economy A, conditional on ax  which could be labour and 
capital inputs, then ( )a a aF f x= . To calculate the MI of Economy A with respect to 
Economy B, we can substitute ax in the production function ( )bf ⋅  and vice versa. So 
the MI is defined as 
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] / [ ( ) ( )]
( ) ( )
b a a a
a a b a a b b b
b b a b
f x f xMI f x f x f x f x
f x f x
= =  
Inspired by Caves et al (1982), in two papers, Fare et al (1992) and Fare et al (1994) 
introduced MI into DEA and developed a DEA-based Malmquist productivity index 
which could make use of panel data from across 42 Swedish pharmacies over the 
period 1980-1989, and 17 OECD countries over the period 1979-1988. The 
Malmquist productivity index evaluates the total factor productivity change of a 
DMU between two periods. It is defined as the product of efficiency change (catch-
up) and technological change (frontier-shift) where the catch-up effect described how 
much closer a DMU gets to the frontier and the frontier-shift effect describes the 
technology improvement in the sample. That is equivalent of saying that if a 
company’s relative efficiency increases in period 1t +  from period t , how much 
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improvement is credited to its individual effort and how much attributed to 
innovation within the industry. The efficiency change reflects to what extent a DMU 
improves or worsens its efficiency, while technological change reflects the change of 
the efficiency frontiers between two periods. Since the introduction of MI by Fare et 
al (1992) and Fare et al (1994), there have been various applications and studies on 
the productivity change over time in various fields, for example: US hospitals 
(Burgess and Wilson, 1996), US large banks (Luo, 2003), Taiwanese hotels (Hwang 
and Chang, 2003), computer industry (Chen and Ali, 2004), Australian universities 
(Worthington and Lee, 2008), etc.. They looked into the efficiency changes over time 
for managerial implications and strategic recommendations.  
 
Despite the wide applications of Malmquist DEA models in analysis of performance 
and change, and the fact that some scholars (e.g. Paradi et al, 2004; Cielen et al, 
2004; Psillaki et al, 2010 etc.) have used DEA efficiency to detect business failure, it 
is surprising to see that none have tried to link them together and conduct panel 
analysis in predicting financial distress, because dynamic credit risk models are 
found to be superior to static models. It has to be stated that solving DEA problems 
period by period separately, and building a panel dataset when DMUs are observed 
at several points of time is not real panel analysis (e.g. Bryan et al, 2013) and 
methodologically the scores in different periods are not comparable because DEA 
scores are calculated based on the frontier formed by the peers in that period. That is, 
a relative efficiency of 0.5 in the second period may be no better than a relative 
efficiency of 0.3 in the first period, but it depends on the change within the industry. 
This research is the first to apply Malmquist DEA scores in dynamically predicting 
financial distress by taking time into account. The methodological calculation is 
introduced in detail in Section 5.3. 
 
Other methodologies have been used to predict bankruptcy by using productive 
efficiency in multiple periods. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) introduced by 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) is a regression approach to approximate efficiency 
scores by using inputs as given variables and one output, but essentially SFA is not a 
DEA model but an alternative parametric method to calculate ‘efficiency’ other than 
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the relative efficiency. In addition, it can only include one output variable in the 
equation. Nevertheless, Becchetti and Sierra (2003) tried to employ SFA efficiency 
in predicting bankruptcy, but unfortunately, in their parametric equation of the 
production function, it is the other way round. The efficiency is the dependent 
variable and the ‘active’ or ‘failed’ dummy and the company size were two of their 
independent variables. They further used this ‘efficiency’ calculated by the dummy 
and the company size, in logit regression with the company size again and other 
variables to predict bankruptcy. There might be serious issues in their methodology. 
It is only acceptable if interpreting the inefficiency by the probability of default from 
one side as in Hwang et al (2011). The study of Hwang et al (2011) may still suffer 
criticism whether bankruptcy or not is a endogenous variable of inefficiency.  
 
Another inappropriate empirical study into bankruptcy risk and productivity came 
from Bryan et al (2013). They claimed to follow the argument of Banker and 
Natarajan (2008) for the two-stage model (DEA and regression) to forecast DEA 
scores to yield consistent estimators of regression coefficients. However what they 
did was different because they used multi-period productivity scores to predict 
Altman’s Z-score. It is still worth mentioning that their effort to include the firm’s 
business strategy as an explanatory variable is a kind of innovation.  
 
5.2.4 Industrial effect 
 
As discussed in the last chapter, since homogeneity of DMUs to be evaluated is 
important in both stages of running DEA models and regression analysis, handling 
industry classification becomes an important issue in its success of modelling. This 
requirement, as Li et al (2014) commented, may increase the complexity of 
modelling, but in fact it coordinates with the findings from corporate credit risk 
modelling: the industrial effect.  
 
The differences between industries in credit risk models have received academic 
attention for a long time. In the early days, this was addressed by matching failed and 
non-failed firms in the same industry and of similar size (e.g. Altman, 1968; Wilcox, 
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1973). Platt and Platt (1990) and Izan (1984) integrated the industrial effect into 
financial ratios by adjusting them by the average value within an industry because 
Lev (1969) found that the industry average value of a financial ratio is the optimal 
level for all companies in that industry. Later, by comparing Zmijewski (1984) and 
Ohlson (1980) models over two different periods: 1988-1991 and 1992-1999, Grice 
and Dungan (2001) suggested the predictive accuracy of a model would decline if 
one failed to apply it to the same industry for which the model is built. Bonfim (2009) 
used dummies as control for 11 industries as firm-specific characteristics. 
Alternatively, Glennon and Nigro (2005) integrated the industrial effect into 
macroeconomic conditions and calculated the deviations of income of the state and 
industry in the discrete hazard model. Chava and Jarrow (2004) included the 
industrial effect by the products of ratios and sector dummies as variables in 
regression.  
 
Our models which treat industries separately align with these studies that have found 




The preference of DEA model choices of input or output orientation, distance 
functions to the frontier and RTS, remains the same as in the cross-sectional models 
in the last chapter. The basic model used is input-oriented, slacks-based measures 
(SBM) with VRS assumed. The justification for them is discussed in Chapter Four, 
so it is not repeated here. Additionally for the indicator of level of RTS, since no 
significant relationship to financial distress was found in the cross-sectional analysis, 
is not investigated further. For other issues, such as dealing with negative values, 
selection of inputs and outputs, the arguments remain the same, hence the discussion 
about them in the last chapter still stands. The methodology of this part begins with 





5.3.1 Malmquist DEA 
 
In order to build a panel dataset, the first step is to calculate the efficiency scores for 
each company in each year of observation. Malmquist DEA can actually handle 
multiple inputs and outputs when DMUs are repeatedly observed on a certain 
interval basis and can calculate period to period efficiency change.  
 
Caves et al (1982) defined a distance function ( )D ⋅  based on the Malmquist 
productivity index (Malmquist, 1953) to calculate the technical efficiency in the 
basic CCR model (Charnes et al, 1978). If company k  is efficient, ( , ) 1k k kD x y = . 
When 0
t
ix is the i th input and 0
t
ry is the r th output for DMU0 both at period t , its 
relative efficiency ( *0 0 0 0( , )
t t tD x y θ= ) is calculated by the amount of input that can be 
reduced while producing the given output level compared to the most efficient 
company on the frontier. Similarly, 1 1 10 0 0( , )
t t tD x y+ + + is its efficiency score at period 
1t + . So, in the situation of multiple periods, 1 10 0 0( , )
t t tD x y+ +  and 10 0 0( , )
t t tD x y+  are 
actually efficiency scores using a set of inputs/outputs in one period compared with 
the frontier of the other period.  
 
Then, following the ideas of Farrell (1957) to decompose the total factor productivity 
into efficiency change (EC) and technology change (TC), Fare et al (1992) defined 
the input-oriented Malmquist productivity index (MI) to measure the productivity 
change of DMU0 in period t  to 1t +  as:  
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We can illustrate these concepts in a simple example with only one input and one 
output in Figure 5.3.1. 
 
Figure 5.3.1 Malmquist Index in a simple example 
 
 
Suppose the DMU to be evaluated is point A 1 10 0( , )x y  at period 1 and it moves to 
point E 2 20 0( , )x y at period 2 and in the meanwhile the efficient frontier moves from 1 




If catch-up > 1, this indicates a progress in relative efficiency. Catch-up = 1 and 
catch-up < 1 indicate no change or regress in efficiency respectively.  
 
In order to calculate the technology change (frontier-shift), the reference point for 











 is the relative efficiency of 1 10 0( , )x y  to the frontier of period 1 and 
DC
DA
 is the 
relative efficiency of 1 10 0( , )x y  to the frontier of period 2. 
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is the relative efficiency of 2 20 0( , )x y  to the frontier of period 2.  
Then the frontier shift is the geometric mean of the two: 
1 2frontier-shift frontier-shift frontier-shift= ×  
 
If frontier-shift > 1, this indicates a progress in technology and frontier-shift = 1 and 
catch-up < 1 indicates no change or regress in technology. Fare et al (1992; 1994) 
commented that the frontier shift is measured locally but not overall. So sometimes 
recession in efficiency happens.  
 
Other than using a distance function ( )D ⋅  to calculate the efficiency, under the 
nonparametric framework, Fare et al (1994) calculated the MI by an oriented radial 
DEA model. Also, Cooper et al (2006) comment, other DEA models are also suitable 
to calculate MI.  
 
Let ( 1, , )tijx i m=   and ( 1, , )
t
rjy r q=  denote the inputs and outputs for DMUj 
( 1, ,j n=  ) respectively at any given point of time t . The production possibility set 
is defined by 
( , ) ( ) ,0 , , 0
n n
t t t t
j j j j
j j
X Y L Uλ λ
  = ≥ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≥ 
  
∑ ∑ eλ λx, y x x y y  
where e  is the row vector with all elements equal to one, mR∈λ is the intensity 
vector and L  and U are the lower and upper bounds for the sum of the intensity. For 
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BCC (VRS) model, ( , ) (1,1)L U = . Here we follow Tone (2001) and let 0 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ  to 
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And the reciprocal efficiency +1 +10 0 0( , )









1( , ) min    1-
m
. .             
                  
                  
                  ,
m























x λ s 0
y λ
eλ
λ 0 s 0
                              (5.5) 
 
By solving the linear program four times for 0 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ , 1 1 10 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ + + + , 1 10 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ + + , 
1
0 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ + , we can calculate  to 10
t tM + .  
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t t
t t t t t t
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θ θ
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+ + + + +
+
+=                           (5.6) 
 
Actually, Cooper et al (2006) referred to the two intertemporal scores, 1 10 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ + +  
and 10 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ + as the exclusive schemes. In the exclusive scheme, 1 10 0( , )
t tx y+ + (point 
E in Figure 5.3.1) is removed from the evaluator group ( , )t tX Y so its score may be 
greater than 1. It is understandable that for an efficiency unit at period t , if both of 
its efficiency and technology improve in the following periods, its relative efficiency 




Unlike other studies (e.g. Burgess and Wilson, 1996; Luo, 2003) which employed 
Malmquist DEA models to study efficiency change, technology change or Malmquist 
change, we are only interested in the relative efficiency calculated for each period. 
By multiplying 0 0 0( , )
t t tx yθ by  to 10
t tM +  we can get the relative efficiency at period 1t +   
compared to period t . 
 
There is a concept of reference set in the definition above. More specifically, we 
define the model by comparing two continuing periods t  and 1t + , which can be 
called adjacent periods. This is the original design in Fare et al (1992). Suppose there 
are five periods 1, ,5t =  , by running Malmquist DEA with adjacent references, we 
can only get relative efficiency 1θ , 2θ  compared to period 1, 3θ compared to period 2 
and so on. It is not intuitive for 3*θ to be compared to period 1 or 4*θ compared to 
period 2. Then we are unable to interpret the relative efficiency directly with adjacent 
moving references. A solution is to use a fixed reference set as suggested by Berg et 
al (1992). Therefore, in this research, all relative efficiency is referred to the first 
period as the beginning of the observation. Thus it is not period 1t + compared to 
period t but period t ( 2t ≥ ) compared to period 1. In this way, it is very likely that in 
later periods, efficiency scores are larger than 1 as economy and technology develops. 
We may note that apart from the scores at period 1, all other scores larger than 1 do 
not necessarily imply being efficient in that period. Conversely, we can also appoint 
the last period as the referent set and all others compared to it may get more ‘regular’ 
efficiency scores less than 1 (assuming technology improves). However in the sense 
of financial distress prediction, in the process of model training, predicting 
probability of default in the current period by using a relative efficiency score 
compared to a later period in the panel seems absurd, though it is an ex post test. 
Therefore the appointment of period 1 as the fixed reference set is appropriate.  
 
5.3.2 Global reference 
 
Furthermore, in the choice of reference set, another option could be found in Pastor 
and Lovell (2005) who introduced the global reference. In some cases where efficient 
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frontiers of different periods cross each other, a global reference set can be chosen by 
the best practices in all periods. For example, in Figure 5.3.2, there are four DMUs 
lying on two frontiers ABCD and EFGH. The DMU to be evaluated, point N, could 
be referred to frontier ABCD, frontier EFGH or the most efficient units ever existing 
in history: AFBGH. It is acceptable that when the observation window is long 
enough, all DMUs at the current period are under the cover of the best historical 
DMUs, possibly including themselves. Thus the relative efficiency in this 
circumstance could be treated as absolute efficiency. Apparently the scores to the 
global reference would be less than or equal to 1. In practice, when we build the 
model, it is the historic data prior to the current moment used in modelling and the 
historic global reference of the past is available.  Therefore the efficiency calculated 
by the global reference as an option is embedded into the comparative models.  
 
Figure 5.3.2 An example of Global reference 
 
 
5.3.3 Super efficiency 
 
As Cooper et al (2006) explained, the exclusive scheme in solving intertemporal 
programming treats the DMU to be evaluated to be removed from the evaluator 
group of the other period. This is mathematically equivalent to what is known as 
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“super efficiency” in DEA. Super efficiency is used as a solution to the fact that 
common DEA models do not provide a ranking or difference for efficient units as 
their scores are equal to 1 (Andersen and Petersen, 1993). The difference between a 
super efficiency model and standard models is that in super models, the DMU to be 
evaluated is eliminated from the reference set, so its score can be greater than 1. We 
can illustrate it in Figure 5.3.3. Units A, B, C, D and E consist of the productivity 
possibility set. If unit E is to be evaluated, its efficiency score is 1 as it is on the 
frontier AECD of standard DEA models; but in super models, the new frontier 
ABCD is employed. For another unit C, its new reference frontier is AED. In this 
way, though unit E and C are both efficient (score = 1) in standard models, we can 
notice a difference between them by obtaining a new unbound score greater than 1.  
 
Figure 5.3.3 An example of Super efficiency 
 
 
DEA as a frontier technique is arguably an outlier analysis. But extreme outliers 
would change the local frontier dramatically enough so other units referring to them 
may not be correctly measured. In this circumstance, super efficiency can be used to 
identify outliers (Banker and Chang, 2006). Obviously, super efficiency scores offer 
more discriminant power in units which is particularly useful in classifying good and 
bad companies in credit risk models. This can be found that in the model of 
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Premachandra et al (2011) who employed super efficiency scores in predicting 
corporate failure. The research will follow them and calculate super efficiency in a 
model for comparison with the main model.  
 
The Malmquist SBM DEA model with super efficiency consideration is described by 
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5.3.4 Discrete hazard model 
 
Same as in the cross-sectional analysis in Chapter Four, this research uses a two-
stage analysis. In the first stage, DEA efficiency scores for each company at each 
period are calculated by DEA models defined in the previous section. In the second 
stage, we follow the discrete hazard model introduced by Shumway (2001) and 
incorporate efficiency scores as covariates in a panel dataset.  
 
In the hazard model (or survival model or duration model) where time is continuous, 
let T  be a non-negative random variable as the time to a failure. Its cumulative 
distribution function is  
( ) Pr( )F t T t= ≤  
and the survival function to report the probability of survival beyond time t  is 
defined as  
( ) 1 ( ) Pr( )S t F t T t= − = >  
The survival function is a monotone, non-increasing function of time with a starting 




The density function, the rate of failure per unit time, ( )f t  can be obtained by  
( )( ) [1 ( )] '( )dF t df t S t S t
dt dt
= = − = −  
The hazard function, denoted by ( )h t  is the event rate at time t  conditional on 
survival until time t or later.  
0
Pr( ) ( ) '( )( ) lim
( ) ( )t
t T t t T t f t S th t
t S t S t∆ →
≤ < + ∆ ≥
= = = −
∆
 
The hazard rate can range from 0 to ∞  and the cumulative hazard function to 
measure the total risk that has been accumulated up to time t   is 
0 0
'( )( ) ( ) ln[ ( )]
( )
t t S uH t h u du du S t
S u
= = − = −∫ ∫  
Conveniently, we have  
( ) exp[ ( )]
( ) 1 exp[ ( )]
( ) ( ) exp[ ( )]
S t H t
F t H t





For a continuous hazard function, ( )h t  can follow a popular distribution such as 
exponential, Weibull or lognormal distribution. And also we can use Cox and Oakes 
(1984) semi-parametric proportional regression to estimate the parameters β  by 
assuming the proportional hazard remains constant. 
0( , ( ), ) ( ) exp( )
Th t t h t=x xβ β  
where ( )x t  could be both time-variant and time-invariant covariates and 0 ( )h t  is the 
baseline hazard.  
 
For a discrete time hazard function, we assume failure can only occur in a period of 
time t . The survival function and hazard function would be a little different (Cox 
and Oakes,  1984): 
( , ; ) [1 ( , ; )]
ij t
S t x h j xβ β
<
= −∏  
The likelihood function for the panel of Shumway (2001) is the product of the 
probability of survival until each period and the hazard in that period. 
1





l h t x h j xβ β
= <
= −∏ ∏  
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Where , 1ii ty = if company i  suffer financial distress in period it , 0 otherwise.  
Assuming the hazard function is a logistic function to be consistent with Shumway 
(2001), we have  
, , ,
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1( 1 ) ( , ; )
1 exp[ ( ( ) )
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]
P i t i t i t T
i t





+ − + +
         (5.8) 
where 0 ( )h t  is the function of the duration time, itx  is covariates and α  is a constant. 
Then 
, 0 , 0 ,
1 1 1
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By the maximum likelihood method, parameters ˆ ˆˆ , ,α θ β could be estimated. Cox and 
Oakes (1984) showed that ˆ ˆˆ , ,α θ β are consistent for , ,α θ β . Shumway (2001) 
proved a multi-period logit model is equivalent to a discrete time hazard model 
because the likelihood functions of the two are identical.  
 
Alternatively, equation (5.8) can be written as  
1 0 0 1 , 2 2 , 2logit( ( )) ( )
e r
ST i t i th t h t x xα β β β= − −= + + +                  (5.9) 
where the default indicator is ST, when a company suffers financial distress, 1ST = ; 
, 2
e
i tx − and , 2
r
i tx −  are covariates of company i  at time 2t −  when a fixed lag of 2 years 
is applied; 0β  is the coefficient of the baseline hazard; 1 2,β β  are vectors of 
coefficients. 
 
If we take industrial classification into account and follow the specification in 
equation (4.20), we have  
1 0 0 1, , , 2 2 , 2
1
logit( ( )) ( )
S
e T r T
ST s s i s t i t
s
h t h t Dα β β β= − −
=
= + + +∑ x x            (5.10) 
Where 1,sβ  denotes a parameter for efficiency score for sector s  to be estimated; 
105 
 
1sD =  if company i  is a member of sector s , 0 otherwise; 
, , 2
e
i s t−x denotes efficiency score for sector s  company ; 
, 2
r
i t−x is a selection of financial ratios that may vary between periods. 
 
In general, there is an issue of censoring in hazard models. Censoring occurs when 
cases are lost or not observed. When a failure happens before the observation time 
window, the value of the dependent variable is left censored. It is right censored 
when a case remains active till the end of observation and failure is not observed. 
The dependent variable ST is a binary indictor that equals 1 if financial distress is 
observed. For all companies they may meet several situations as new ones are listed 
and failed ones exit, described in Table 5.3.1.  
 
Table 5.3.1 Examples of censoring data 
     Period 
No. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1    
3   0 0 0 0 
4  0 0 0 1  
 
There are four types of censoring in the sample of panel data. Company 1 is healthy 
throughout the observation (right censored). Company 2 was listed before period 1 
but suffered distress at period 3 (left censored). Company 3 was listed at period 3 and 
survived until period 6 (right censored). Company 4 was listed at period 2 but was 
distressed at period 5 (not censored). For a hazard model, censoring is not a problem. 
Originally, Malmquist DEA models do not require the panel dataset to be completely 
balanced, i.e. a full set of observations across all periods for all DMUs, but most 
DEA solving packages8 require a balanced dataset to be input into the program, 
which leads to a problem for prediction purposes if the panel is not balanced. This is 
because when a case is censored, there is no sense in which it remains in the 




                                                 
productivity possibility set and participates in comparison. This is not realistic. 
Fortunately, the latest version of MaxDEA Pro 6.1 can handle unbalanced panel 
dataset. Therefore MaxDEA Pro 6.1 is the package to solve our Malmquist DEA 
models.  
 
5.3.5 Model specification 
 
In this section, we specify the models we use to predict financial distress. 
 
As identified in the preceding chapter, there are generally two methods of using 
efficiency to predict financial distress. Firstly, efficiency score is used as a single 
classifier (Paradi et al, 2004; Cielen et al, 2004; Emel et al, 2003) and secondly, as a 
variable into the second stage analysis where other methods are used to classify (for 
example logistic regression in Chapter Four). As no one has tried panel DEA score in 
predicting financial distress before, it is rather interesting to see how it performs in a 
simpler and more direct way – to make predictions directly. Then efficiency scores 
calculated from a Malmquist DEA model with reference to the first period (equation 
(5.6)) is used directly as scores from standard credit scoring techniques. Model 1 is 
the pure Malmquist DEA model. However, industries are still specified, i.e. 
classification of Goods and Bads is only made according to the proportion of Goods 
and Bads within the company’s industry.  
 
Model 2, as introduced in Section 5.3.1, uses Malmquist DEA scores calculated by 
equation (5.6) as covariates in the DHM (equation (5.10)). The efficiency score is TE 
or CRS efficiency which has been found to be efficient in the cross-sectional analysis. 
Model 2 is actually the main model and basic model of this research.  
 
In Model 3, TE is decomposed into PTE and SE by assuming VRS. As stated in 
Chapter Four, decomposition of the overall technical efficiency may provide more 
information and the cross-sectional analysis has found SE is more stable and 











equation (5.10) is replaced by its components 1, , , 2 1, , , 2
1 1
S S
PTE PTE PTE SE SE SE
s s i s t s s i s t
s s
D x D xβ β− −
= =
+∑ ∑
that only take into effect the specific industry of the company.  
 
Model 4 applies the global reference as introduced in Section 5.3.2. In this model, 
the relative efficiency score of company i  in sector s  at period t  is calculated with 
reference to the most productive companies in all possible periods in the same sector.  
 
Model 5 follows what has been described as the super efficiency model in Section 
5.3.3. Super efficiency scores provide more discrimination for efficient companies. 
So it is expected to see its discriminative power increased in prediction.  
 
Model 6 actually is the simplest method (in terms of DEA calculation and regression) 
but heterogeneous technologies are applied. In the first stage when calculating the 
efficiency scores, all industries are pooled together. So the efficient frontier may be 
pushed outward as more samples are considered. At the second stage, the term 
 in equation (5.10) is replaced by a simpler form 1 , 2
e
i txβ − . This just 
provides a reference to our models as most previous literature considers 
heterogeneous samples in bankruptcy prediction.  
 
Table 5.3.2 Model comparison 2 
Model  Modelling 
process 
Covariates in regression  
Model 1 DEA None  
Model 2 DEA + DHM Overall technical efficiency + financial ratios   
Model 3 DEA + DHM Pure Technical Efficiency + Scale Efficiency+ 
financial ratios 
 
Model 4 DEA + DHM Global reference efficiency + financial ratios  
Model 5 DEA + DHM Super efficiency + financial ratios  
Model 6 DEA + DHM Mixed industry efficiency+ financial ratios  
 












Finally a summary of model specification can be found in Table 5.3.2. Their 
predictive accuracy is compared by measures AUR, Gini, KS and H introduced in 
Section 3.5.  
 
5.4 Sample 
5.4.1 Sample description 
 
Following what has been stated in Section 4.4.1, because the number of employees is 
only available in annual reports after year 2000, the observation period begins in 
2001 through to 2010, ten years in total. After the initial filtering, 2,027 individual 
listed companies over the period 2001 to 2010, a total of 12,431 firm years were left 
in the sample for analysis. Among them, there are 12,058 healthy firm years and 373 
distressed firm years, which gives a bad rate of approximately 3%.  
 
As industry classification is essential to this research, it is necessary to view the 
distribution of companies across all industries. Table 5.4.1 displays the distribution 
of the 12,431 firm years according to the second level industry classification in the 
Wind database. Banking and insurance companies are excluded from this sample as 
their accounting standards are different from that in other sectors. We notice that the 
industries Raw Materials (code 1510),  Industrial Equipment (code 2010) and Real 
Estate (4040) account for nearly half of all distressed cases (49.87%). We select 
companies from these industries as the sample for analysis for the following reasons: 
firstly, as the panel analysis is ten years, the valid number of firm years falling in 
each period cannot be too small. Secondly, DEA models require that in each period 
the number of units is more than double as the number of inputs and outputs (8 in our 
case) for a good estimate (Dyson et al, 2001). Thirdly, because the cross-sectional 
analysis used these three sectors, it is better to keep the same for convenience of 











valid censored 0 1 
Energy 1010 205 375 10 385 
Raw materials 1510 1465 2479 66 2545 
Industrial equipment 2010 1758 2100 62 2162 
Business services 2020 105 64 1 65 
Transportation 2030 209 574 7 581 
Vehicles and parts 2510 249 466 15 481 
Consumer goods and apparels 2520 609 767 24 791 
Consumer services 2530 98 186 6 192 
Media 2540 77 111 2 113 
Retail 2550 148 589 13 602 
Food 3010 67 200 3 203 
Beverage and tobacco 3020 447 699 24 723 
Family and personal goods 3030 23 46 1 47 
Medical equipment 3510 74 34 2 36 
Pharmacy and biology technology 3520 458 747 25 772 
Financial services 4020 4 5 1 6 
Real estate 4040 380 952 58 1010 
Software 4510 412 230 8 238 
Hardware and equipment 4520 756 758 26 784 
Semiconductor 4530 127 111 2 113 
Telecommunication 5010 23 27 0 27 
Public services 5510 145 538 17 555 








Table 5.4.2 Distributions of samples in three industries over 2001-2010 
Sector 1510 2010 4040 Total 










0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2001 208 1 209 167 5 172 121 5 126 496 11 507 
2002 217 8 225 176 6 182 115 9 124 508 23 531 
2003 224 9 233 181 8 189 104 11 115 509 28 537 
2004 234 6 240 193 7 200 101 5 106 528 18 546 
2005 231 5 236 189 6 195 98 3 101 518 14 532 
2006 237 7 244 189 13 202 86 14 100 512 34 546 
2007 251 9 260 214 4 218 82 6 88 547 19 566 
2008 273 5 278 221 5 226 82 2 84 576 12 588 
2009 265 6 271 219 2 221 80 2 82 564 10 574 
2010 254 10 264 214 5 219 79 1 80 547 16 563 
Total 2394 66 2460 1963 61 2024 948 58 1006 5305 185 5490 
 





Table 5.4.2 indicates that the average distress rate is 3.37% (185 / 5490 3.37%= ). 
The average number of observations for each company in ten years is 7.4 
(5490 / 742 7.40= ). In the years 2002, 2003 and 2006 there are significantly more 
companies suffering financial distress than in other years. Figure 5.4.1 shows the ST 
rate of three industries at each period of observation. Generally, there are more 
distressed Real Estate companies than in the other two sectors. In later years (2008 to 
2010) the distress rate is considerably lower than that during 2002-2003 and during 
2006-2007.  
 
In order to split the bad rate and industries as even as possible, the stratified sampling 
is applied within each industry (referring to Section 3.3) and finally the training 
sample (Panel A) contains 3648 firm years and the test sample (Panel B) contains 
1842 firm years. Details can be found in Table 5.4.3. 
 
Table 5.4.3 Sample 2 
 
Sector 1510 2010 4040 Total 
Panel A 
Non-ST (0) 1643 1215 666 3524 
ST (1) 44 38 42 124 
Total 1687 1253 708 3648 
Bad rate 2.61% 3.03% 5.93% 3.40% 
Panel B 
Non-ST (0) 751 748 282 1781 
ST (1) 22 23 16 61 
Total 773 771 298 1842 
Bad rate 2.85% 2.98% 5.37% 3.31% 
 
The test sample with Panel B is actually out-of-sample validation and a hazard model 
is also capable of out-of-time prediction (Shumway, 2011). Therefore two extra 
datasets Panel C and Panel D are used to make out-of-time validation. Because there 
is a two-year lag in prediction, actually the observed data in 2009 and 2010 needs 
information of independent variable ST in 2011 and 2012 to be validated. There are 7 
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and 11 new ST companies in these three industries in 2011 and 2012 respectively9. 
So practically, Panel C (2009 and 2010) consists of the untouched data in the last two 
years of Panel A (2001 to 2010) and predicts financial distress in 2011 and 2012 
(out-of-time validation). Panel D, similarly, consists of the untouched data in the last 
two years of Panel B (2001 to 2010) to predict financial distress in 2011 and 2012 
(out-of-time and out-of-sample validation).  
 
5.4.2 DEA inputs and outputs 
 
We apply the same selection of DEA variables as in the cross-sectional analysis, all 
of which are expressed in physical or monetary items in standard annual reports. 
There are five inputs: number of employees, total liabilities, total costs, total assets, 
share capital and three outputs: total profits, total cash flow and total sales. For 
censored dependent firm years, ,i tST is recorded as missing. Although these firms are 
only distressed but not bankrupt and they still have in listing, their DEA inputs and 
outputs and other covariate values are all set to be missing because we assume they 
exit the sample and do not take part in the DEA comparison anymore. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the covariates are reported in aggregate because DEA 
models are conducted on the whole dataset (both training and test samples). For 
convenience of presentation, the descriptive tables are attached in Appendix B and 
only graphs of means over time are presented here (Figure 5.4.2).  
 
Generally, the size of those listed companies (in terms of total assets) increased in 
those ten years. Along with it, their total debts, total costs and share capitals took 
similar pace of growth accordingly. It is the same in total sales for output. However, 
we can notice some changes in some periods that did not follow the trend. For 
example, the number of employees in sector 2010 nearly doubled in the three years 
2006-2008. There was a large drop in profit for sector 1510 in year 2008 and in 2009, 
which might be the influence of the global financial crisis. Additionally, there was a 
9 The original observation window is till year 2010. However Panel C and Panel D do not require the 




                                                 
sharp net cash inflow in sector 4040 in 2009. These large changes call for the 
importance of running DEA peer comparison analysis separately for each industry so 
that the relative efficiency scores are not biased.  
 
Figure 5.4.2 Descriptions of DEA variables over 2001-2010 
Number of employees Debts (mCNY) 
  
Costs (mCNY) Assets (mCNY) 
  
Capitals (mCNY) Profits (mCNY) 
  





5.5.1 Dynamic DEA score 
 
Table 5.5.1 shows that generally the ST group has a lower efficiency than the non-ST 
group across all of the different measures. Values of TE range from 0.004 to 8.638 
whilst its component PTE ranges from 0.135 to 15.738 and SE ranges from 0.008 to 
8.638. Global efficiency scores are in a conventional sense, ranging from 0.002 to 1 
because they refer to the best performance in history. As expected, Super Efficiency 
has a larger standard deviation than overall Technical Efficiency, which indicates a 
better discrimination for those efficient companies, especially in the non-ST group.  
 
Table 5.5.1 Description of efficiency scores 
Sector ST Stats TE PTE SE GE SPE ME 
1510 
0 
N 2394 2394 2394 2394 2394 2394 
Mean 1.225 1.253 1.064 0.653 1.234 0.918 
SD 0.772 0.971 0.582 0.167 0.788 0.315 
Min 0.029 0.161 0.059 0.021 0.029 0.028 
Max 8.638 14.369 8.638 1.000 8.638 5.000 
1 
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Mean 0.756 0.896 0.868 0.464 0.756 0.670 
SD 0.487 0.650 0.222 0.207 0.487 0.313 
Min 0.040 0.255 0.048 0.026 0.040 0.035 
Max 3.458 4.799 1.000 0.929 3.458 2.234 
All 
N 2460 2460 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Mean 1.212 1.243 1.058 0.648 1.221 0.912 
SD 0.770 0.965 0.576 0.171 0.785 0.317 
Min 0.029 0.161 0.048 0.021 0.029 0.028 
Max 8.638 14.369 8.638 1.000 8.638 5.000 
2010 
0 
N 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 
Mean 1.033 1.049 1.014 0.457 1.059 0.936 
SD 0.530 0.550 0.407 0.180 0.603 0.405 
Min 0.070 0.274 0.153 0.032 0.070 0.062 
Max 7.378 9.093 7.378 1.000 7.378 6.178 
1 
N 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Mean 0.702 0.872 0.825 0.307 0.702 0.664 
SD 0.329 0.404 0.273 0.193 0.329 0.293 
Min 0.004 0.135 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.003 
Max 1.930 2.106 0.999 1.000 1.930 1.821 
All 
N 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 
Mean 1.023 1.044 1.008 0.452 1.048 0.927 
SD 0.528 0.547 0.405 0.182 0.600 0.404 
Min 0.004 0.135 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.003 










N 948 948 948 948 948 948 
Mean 0.972 1.142 0.964 0.702 1.017 0.929 
SD 0.569 1.084 0.448 0.196 0.666 0.503 
Min 0.059 0.276 0.065 0.049 0.059 0.059 
Max 6.277 15.738 5.931 1.000 8.204 5.931 
1 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Mean 0.660 1.042 0.714 0.518 0.667 0.628 
SD 0.381 0.641 0.321 0.260 0.389 0.350 
Min 0.024 0.202 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.023 
Max 1.805 3.750 1.570 1.000 1.805 1.603 
All 
N 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Mean 0.954 1.137 0.950 0.691 0.996 0.911 
SD 0.565 1.064 0.445 0.204 0.658 0.500 
Min 0.024 0.202 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.023 
Max 6.277 15.738 5.931 1.000 8.204 5.931 
Total 
0 
N 5305 5305 5305 5305 5305 5305 
Mean 1.109 1.158 1.027 0.589 1.131 0.926 
SD 0.665 0.869 0.501 0.205 0.709 0.388 
Min 0.029 0.161 0.059 0.021 0.029 0.028 
Max 8.638 15.738 8.638 1.000 8.638 6.178 
1 
N 185 185 185 185 185 185 
Mean 0.708 0.934 0.806 0.429 0.710 0.655 
SD 0.407 0.579 0.279 0.237 0.409 0.318 
Min 0.004 0.135 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.003 
Max 3.458 4.799 1.570 1.000 3.458 2.234 
All 
N 5490 5490 5490 5490 5490 5490 
Mean 1.095 1.150 1.020 0.584 1.116 0.917 
SD 0.662 0.862 0.497 0.208 0.705 0.389 
Min 0.004 0.135 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.003 
Max 8.638 15.738 8.638 1.000 8.638 6.178 
TE, PTE, SE, GE, SPE and ME are referred to overall Technical Efficiency, Pure Technical Efficiency 
(component of TE), Scale Efficiency (component of TE), Global Efficiency, Super Efficiency and Mixed 
Efficiency respectively.  
 
Alternatively, if we want to see if efficiency and technology change over time, we 
draw graphs of their mean scores across all periods (Figure 5.5.1). For convenience, 
graphs of three sectors are drawn on one chart. Generally the efficiency and 
technology levels increased while in the later years, there were some declines, which 





Figure 5.5.1 Distributions of efficiency scores over 2010-2010 
Technical Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency 
  
Scale Efficiency Global Efficiency 
  
Super Efficiency Mixed Efficiency 
  
 
5.5.2 Model 1 
 
Model 1 uses DEA scores directly as a nonparametric method to predict financial 
distress, so there is no parameter to estimate. Therefore, it is not necessary to split the 
whole sample into training and test samples but that prediction is applied to the 
whole sample (2001-2010). The efficiency scores with reference to the first period, 
2001 are directly applied on the dependent variable with a lag of two fixed years, i.e. 
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use efficiency scores at period 2t −  to predict ,i tST (scores over 2001-2010 to predict 
ST over 2003-2012). A cut-off point on the score is applied according the observed 
proportion of healthy and distressed companies. The analysis must be carried out for 
each industrial sector separately because cross industries comparisons using DEA 
scores is invalid.  
 
Table 5.5.2 Classification of Model 1 
Sector N Non-ST ST Type I error Type II error Overall accuracy 
1510 2328 2258 70 74.29% 2.30% 95.53% 
2010 1911 1858 53 62.26% 1.78% 96.54% 
4040 897 851 46 78.26% 4.23% 91.97% 
 
In Table 5.5.2, the Type I errors are relatively high compared to that in Table 4.5.8, 
the Type II errors are reasonably good. The overall classification accuracy is lower in 
sector 4040 than others but basically they outperformed the out-of-sample prediction 
in Table 4.5.8. 
 
Rather than using a single cut-off and confusion matrix, predictive power of these 
panel efficiency scores are given by H, AUC, Gini and KS measures. The average 
performance is weighted by the number of firm years in the specific sector to give an 
indicator of the predictive accuracy of Model 1. Table 5.5.3 shows a poorer 
predictive power than we found in Models 1-6 when only efficiency scores are used 
in prediction (Table 4.5.9).  
 
Table 5.5.3 Predictive accuracy of Model 1 
Sector H AUC Gini KS 
1510 0.071 0.825 0.651 0.549 
2010 0.128 0.888 0.776 0.678 
4040 0.069 0.821 0.642 0.521 




5.5.3 Selection of the duration time and financial ratios  
 
There are several possible ways to calculate the survival (duration) time: the time 
since the foundation, the time since the IPO, the time since official listing at the stock 
exchange, and the time since the first year of the period of observation. All are 
available to be used as the duration time. Theoretically, for survival analysis, the 
survival time should be calculated from the birth of an object which remains 
observed until death or the end of the observation period. Therefore, the survival 
time would be ideally calculated from the foundation year of incorporation. However, 
the regulation of Special Treatment has been implemented only since 1998 as the 
policy makers then started to pay attention to financial risks in the security markets. 
Data shows the average real age of companies is about 10 years. Considering the 
observation window is much later than the time of incorporation, many periods are 
lost due to censoring.  
 
Shumway (2001) used the trading age which was the time since listing as the 
duration time because companies were homogeneous to meet the requirements of 
listing at an exchange. Our samples are also listed companies so it is decided the 
trading age to be the duration time in the hazard model. In the sample, the average 
trading age is 7.79 years. Shumway (2001) also commented that any function of the 
duration time could be included in the model and 2 2,  ,  ln( ) and ln( )t t t t  have all 
been tried in the preliminary analysis but only ln( )t  fits well (significant) with the 
model. ln( )t was also the choice of Shumway (2001).  
 
Note that the indicator of financial distress, ST, is a status indicator where a company 
can go to ST and recover from ST. Here, only the first occurrence of ST is regarded 
as the event of distress and the information after the year of ST is marked as missing. 
All companies entering the observation window in 2001 are ensured to be healthy 
companies in the beginning (not in the status of ST). So the model is actually 
predicting the probability of going into financial distress (ST) by lagged values of 




In Table 3.4.1, there is a list of eligible financial ratios to be included in the 
regression models and in the previous chapter, stepwise selection process in the 
cross-sectional analysis was conducted. However, stepwise selection, no matter 
whether it is forward selection or backward elimination as appeared in most 
analytical packages, is problematic in multi period data. Greenland (1989) 
commented, stepwise selection leads to invalid estimates and tests of effect in 
survival analysis. We cannot use stepwise selection on those financial ratios and it is 
impossible to include them all either.  
 
In the cross sectional analysis we found that each of the predefined groups of 
financial ratios can contribute to the probability of financial distress. We choose only 
one ratio from each group in Table 3.4.1 and they are decided by their significance in 
the model and by reference to previous literature.  
 
Finally, six ratios from six groups have been chosen and the results presented in 
Table 5.5.4.  
 
Table 5.5.4 Result of the model to select financial ratios 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 0.112 0.308 0.36 0.717 
  
    ROE -12.837** 2.033 -6.31 0.000 
Current Liabilities / Total Liabilities 8.681** 1.281 6.78 0.000 
Tangible Assets / Total Assets -1.975** 0.645 -3.06 0.002 
Cash Flow from Operation per Share -1.235** 0.275 -4.49 0.000 
Total Assets Turnover -3.570** 0.592 -6.03 0.000 
Total Assets Growth -2.794** 0.624 -4.48 0.000 
      
Constant -7.711** 1.320 -5.84 0.000 
Log likelihood -296.37      
Number of observations      2665    
LR chi2(8) 279.38    Prob > chi2                0    




5.5.4 Model 2-6 
 
These six ratios, Return on Equity, Current Liabilities / Total Liabilities, Tangible 
Assets / Total Assets, Cash Flow from Operation per Share, Total Assets Turnover 
and Total Assets Growth, together with efficiency scores, are integrated in Model 2-6 
as specified in Table 5.3.2. Results are presented in Table 5.5.5.  
 
Generally the five regression models are well fitted according to the 2χ  test. The 
coefficient for each type of efficiency has the expected sign, which indicates that the 
more efficient a company is, the less likely it goes into financial distress. The values 
of their coefficients are different between models because their mean values and 
distributions are different. For Models 2 to 5, when three industries were treated 
separately, their differences between each other are shown in the coefficients. Most 
parameters are significant at the 95% level of confidence. The only exception is that 
when TE is decomposed into PTE and SE, SE remains significant but PTE in some 
sectors does not.  
 
There are four ratios in Table 5.5.5 which have been found significant in the cross 
sectional analysis, with the same signs. The other two ratios, Current Liabilities / 
Total Liabilities and Total Assets Turnover, are positively and negatively associated 





Table 5.5.5 Results of Model 2-6 
ST Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
ln(duration) 0.262 0.394 0.192 0.219 0.194 
Model 2      
TE1510 -1.451**     
TE2010 -1.964**     
TE4040 -2.132**     
Model 3      
PTE1510  -2.099*    
PTE2010  -1.803    
PTE4040  -1.266    
SE1510  -1.441**    
SE2010  -2.137**    
SE4040  -2.705**    
Model 4      
GE1510   -3.511**   
GE2010   -6.021**   
GE4040   -3.271**   
Model 5      
SPE1510    -1.436**  
SPE2010    -1.943**  
SPE4040    -2.063**  
Model 6      
ME     -3.805** 
      
Return on Equity -13.05** -12.70** -13.04** -13.04** -12.43** 
Current Liabilities / Total 
Liabilities 8.994** 9.423** 8.766** 9.037** 8.533** 
Tangible Assets / Total Assets -1.401** -1.890** -1.400** -1.453** -1.586** 
Cash Flow from Operation per 
Share -1.076** -1.156** -0.960** -1.067** -0.983** 
Total Assets Turnover -3.193** -3.194** -2.656** -3.171** -2.160** 
Total Assets Growth -2.177** -2.285** -1.974** -2.238** -1.745** 
       
Constant -7.235** -5.517** -6.643** -7.185** -5.660** 
Log likelihood -285.59 -280.48 -282.93 -284.15 -280.01 
Number of observations      2665 2665 2665 2665 2665 
LR chi2 300.95 311.18 306.27 303.84 312.10 
Prob > chi2                0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.3451 0.3568 0.3512 0.3484 0.3579 
TE, PTE, SE, GE, SPE and ME are referred to overall Technical Efficiency, Pure Technical Efficiency 
(component of TE), Scale Efficiency (component of TE), Global Efficiency, Super Efficiency and Mixed 
Efficiency respectively. Some of them are attached with the sector code. 
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5.5.5 Predictive accuracy 
 
Table 5.5.6 Predictive accuracy of Model 2-6 
  Panel A  (training) 
Panel B  
(within time out-of-sample) 
  H AUC Gini KS H AUC Gini KS 
Model 2 0.269 0.888 0.777 0.636 0.095 0.832 0.665 0.522 
Model 3 0.304 0.891 0.782 0.638 0.11 0.841 0.682 0.542 
Model 4 0.279 0.891 0.782 0.635 0.094 0.842 0.684 0.538 
Model 5 0.275 0.89 0.781 0.64 0.097 0.834 0.668 0.52 
Model 6 0.265 0.901 0.801 0.651 0.106 0.855 0.709 0.566 
 
Panel C 




H AUC Gini KS H AUC Gini KS 
Model 2 0.018 0.862 0.724 0.601 0.086 0.824 0.647 0.586 
Model 3 0.018 0.862 0.725 0.601 0.070 0.831 0.662 0.594 
Model 4 0.018 0.868 0.737 0.679 0.109 0.841 0.682 0.570 
Model 5 0.018 0.863 0.725 0.602 0.086 0.824 0.647 0.586 
Model 6 0.021 0.872 0.744 0.687 0.109 0.855 0.710 0.575 
The highest value for each statistic is in bold. If Model 6 performed the best, the next largest value is 
also highlighted.  
 
If we look at the predictive accuracy based on the H, AUC, Gini and KS statistics 
(Table 5.5.6), we have different results from different preferences. We have to bear 
in mind that Model 1 is using the efficiency score directly to classify the distressed 
and non-distressed companies and the whole sample was used for validation. Model 
6 is the model with heterogeneous samples (pooled industries) is only a reference to 
this study.  
 
The predictive accuracy of Model 1 (H=0.092, AUC=0.848, Gini=0.696, KS=0.592) 
is generally better than the out-of-sample predictions (Panel B and Panel D) but 
poorer than the within sample out-of-time prediction (Panel C). This means if we 
build Malmquist DEA and DHMs on the same sample, Malmquist DEA is less 
capable in making dynamic predictions of financial distress than hazard models. 
Obviously, a DHM which takes additional ratios can be more informative in 
prediction. Nevertheless, Malmquist DEA as a direct classifier, is simple and does 




Model 6, regardless of industrial classification, seems to be consistently better than 
other models through four panels. This indicates that if we do not consider the 
assumption of homogeneity of DEA, pooling all industries together, calculating DEA 
scores and predicting using statistical regression may be a more effective and 
accurate way in detecting corporate distress. This is a practical method, though 
methodologically incorrect. This result may be caused by the limitation of sample 
size. When industries are pooled together, relative efficiency can be more objective 
by taking more peers into comparison than industry segmentation where certain 
group leaders have to be identified in each industry.  
 
Apart from Model 6, Model 4 is the next best according to what most indictors 
indicate in Table 5.5.6. Particularly, Model 4 with global reference has larger AUC 
(Panel B=0.842, Panel C=0.868, Panel D=0.841) and Gini (Panel B=0.684, Panel 
C=0.737, Panel D=0.682) than that in Model 2, 3 and 5 in both out-of-sample and 
out-of-time predictions.  
 
The decomposition of TE (Model 2) into PTE and SE (Model 3) provides more 
discriminant power in all H, AUC, Gini and KS measures. This is consistent with 




Dynamic models have inherent advantages over static models in the context of 
prediction because there may be changes over time in the values of covariates. By 
taking the effect of time into account, dynamic models are able to adjust predictions 
based on the influence of changes or predict the credit risk in a given period of time. 
More accurate predictions can be made by using more data in multiple periods. 
Hazard models considering the natural risk associated with the age of the company 
are particularly preferred because they can also incorporate time varying covariates 
and deal with censoring when information is lost. Shumway’s (2001) discrete hazard 
model is even more convenient in corporate credit predictions because most 
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corporate information and other TVCs are disclosed periodically. In the previous 
chapter, we successfully conducted a cross sectional analysis on decomposed DEA 
efficiency based on a sample of mixed industries. This chapter has extended it to a 
panel analysis when these three industries have been observed over ten years.  
 
Hazard models need a panel dataset of covariates and the first task is to find a 
dynamic DEA model which is suitable to calculate the efficiency of a company 
relative to others over a period. Network DEA and Window DEA have been 
considered but Malmquist DEA is found to be the best because its efficiency is 
comparable in both cross sectional and time serial formats. A Malmquist productivity 
index is defined as the product of efficiency change (catch-up) and technological 
change (frontier-shift) and mathematically it is calculated by the standard DEA 
scores at two periods and two intertemporal scores with reference to the efficiency 
frontier of the other period.  
 
The reference set in Malmquist DEA models may change the relative values in 
efficiency scores and both the fixed reference to the first period and the global 
reference which comes from the historically most efficient units were used in our 
models. In addition, super efficiency which removes the unit to be evaluated from the 
frontier was also used as an option. Efficiency with mixed industries was also 
included because most previous literature did not consider the differences between 
industries. The main model of this research uses the overall Technical Efficiency in 
the discrete hazard models with financial ratios to predict the probability of financial 
distress. Other efficiency including decomposed efficiency (Pure Technical 
Efficiency and Scale Efficiency), global efficiency, super efficiency and mixed 
efficiency has also been used on the Chinese data of 5,490 company years.  
 
In the descriptive analysis, efficiency calculated from different methods of DEA has 
demonstrated different characteristics between industries. Global efficiency has the 
smallest mean and standard deviation whist Pure Technical Efficiency shows the 
largest dispersion in the values of scores. Generally all types of efficiency show a 
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trend of improvement over the period of 2001 to 2010 though some rises and falls 
can also be observed.  
 
DEA efficiency can be used to predict financial distress directly. Model 1 displays an 
overall accuracy of classification over 90%. When adding financial ratios in hazard 
models, it has found that various efficiency scores perform similarly as they are all 
negatively associated with the probability of financial distress. It confirms that the 
more efficient a company is, the less likely it incurs financial difficulties.  
 
In all types of efficiency, if not considering the one calculated by mixed industries, 
the model with global efficiency is the best in both out-of-sample and out-of-time 
predictions. Global efficiency takes all historic records into account and chooses the 
most efficient company years as the reference units. When the sample is sufficiently 
large, the global efficiency could be seen as absolute efficiency which is generalised 
in all units and periods. In this way, efficiency will be precisely measured and used 
to predict credit risk accurately. 
 
The simplest way of using DEA efficiency (Model 1) produces considerably good 
discriminant power. It outperforms the out-of-sample predictions. Using Malmquist 
DEA scores to directly predict financial distress in future time is not ideal as we find 
DHMs with financial ratios can do better. It is still an effective and efficient way to 
apply DEA to corporate credit risk as it only requires one step calculation (DEA 
programming) compared to a two stage analysis (DEA and regression). 
 
Pooling all industries together to calculate DEA scores may be practically effective 
but it ignores the assumption of homogenous industries. However it is not sure yet 
whether its outperformance over other models comes from its inherent advantages or 
from combining more comparative samples. It requires further analysis by taking 
various sectors into modelling to conclude on this but our sample has a limit which 




Super efficiency models show no special features among other models. More 
discrimination in efficient companies seems unnecessary.   
 
As no literature has attempted a panel analysis of DEA efficiency in predicting the 
probability of financial distress, this chapter has bridged this gap by calculating 
dynamic relative efficiency using Malmquist DEA and using it in two ways. The first 
simple way is using the efficiency scores directly to classify good and bad companies 
and secondly, it can be incorporated as variables in the hazard models. Both methods 
produce relatively good predictions and future work can be extended within the 





Chapter Six  




One of the classical theories in corporate governance, agency theory explains the 
bankruptcy risk internally. Agency theory describes the agency problem that 
cooperative parties have different goals and interests in their agency relationship 
where the principal delegates the work to the agent who perform the work 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As Eisenhardt (1989) stated the future of organisations 
(bankruptcy, prosperity or intermediaries) is in the hands of organisational members. 
They have to think about the uncertainty of the future and rewards they may get. The 
agency problem between the principal and the agent may influence the willingness to 
take risks and the subsequent outcomes. Keasey and Watson (1991) also mentioned 
that it is necessary not only to understand the economic process behind a business 
becoming insolvent but also how the agents determine the fate of a company in terms 
of its financial condition and financial support.  
 
Previous research provides evidence to show that corporate governance has indeed 
influenced the probability of financial distress. Chaganti et al (1985) was the first 
investigate the association between board size, outsiders on a board, the number of 
offices and the chances of failure. This work was followed by Daily and Dalton 
(1994a; 1994b), Simpson and Gleason (1999), Fich and Slezak (2008) and Platt and 
Platt (2012). This chapter will follow their work and extend it to panel analysis with 
a comprehensive selection of corporate governance measures.  
 
In China, due to its unique social background and history, State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) have played a significant role in its great economic achievement in the last 
thirty years. Corporate governance in SOEs is very different from private companies. 
However, this aspect of corporate governance has not been fully investigated in 
relation to predicting financial distress. In this chapter we will try to incorporate 
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corporate governance measures into prediction models and see how they increase 
predictive accuracy of financial distress models for Chinese listed companies.  
 
This research is the first comprehensive and thorough study to date using more 
variables in a panel data structure covering the recent financial crisis. There will be a 
focus on SOEs and SOE ownership to explain the time to distress. SOEs exist in 
nearly all countries. China’s planned economy provides a sufficient number of cases 
to study the effect of state ownership. This chapter will also model time to default 
using a DHM proposed by Shumway (2011) rather than cross sectional logistic 
regression as in other research. The hazard probability produced by the dynamic 
model ensures the robustness of prediction under different macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
This research has found that some aspects of board composition, ownership structure, 
management compensation and director characteristics can impact on the probability 
of financial distress. However, using corporate governance measures alone, does not 
make sufficiently accurate predictions. If they are assisted by financial ratios, models 
can then be applicable in detecting early financial distress, and the best model comes 
from this combined with macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, it also finds that the 
predictive accuracy is heavily reduced when the prediction window is more than 
three years.  
 
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the main findings from 
previous research on some aspects of corporate governance in the application of 
bankruptcy or financial distress are reviewed. Various corporate governance 
measures are generally classified into four groups: (1) board composition, (2) 
ownership structure, (3) management compensation and (4) director characteristics 
and these are discussed separately. Secondly, the background to corporate 
governance in China is introduced to help with the selection of variables and 
understanding of the results. Thirdly, the methodology including the model 
specification, corporate governance measures and other variables are presented. The 
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chapter then proceeds with the results including data description, variable selection 
process, and discussion of model output.    
 
6.2 Literature review 
6.2.1 Corporate governance and its importance 
 
It is difficult to trace back to who first proposed the concept of corporate governance 
but its simplest definition comes from the Cadbury Committee at the London Stock 
Exchange: “corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Financial Reporting Council, 1992, Section 2.5). It aims to fulfil the 
long-term strategic goals of owners, take care of the interests of employees, show 
consideration for the environment and local community, maintain relationships with 
customers and suppliers and follow applicable legal and regulatory requirements. A 
more concrete definition comes from Blair (1995) that it is “the whole set of legal, 
cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised and how the 
risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated.” Although his 
definition was focused on publicly traded corporations, it still needs pointing out that 
all other types of corporations should also have a proper governance structure to 
make their management more efficient and benefit their business in the long term. 
Because maximising the value of shareholders’ benefits is the ultimate goal for 
common corporations, appropriate corporate governance can ensure investors get 
back the return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Effective corporate governance can improve corporate performance by optimising 
the total cost of managers’ and shareholders’ incentives and avoid self-interested 
managerial behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the Board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of shareholders, and should facilitate effective monitoring to 
encourage managers to use their resources more efficiently. In contrast, poor 
corporate governance can damage the interests of shareholders, and may lead to poor 




According to the framework proposed by the World Bank (OECD, 2004), corporate 
governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders and its stakeholders. Like previous research defining 
corporate governance measures from those aspects, this research will discuss 
literature in credit assessment from the perspectives of board composition, ownership 
structure, management compensation and director characteristics. However, many 
corporate governance theories are built on private companies. In SOEs, the situation 
is likely to be different. Therefore, the issues of SOEs are discussed first.  
 
6.2.2 State Owned Enterprises 
 
Under the central planning system, SOEs in China have contributed to and 
dominated the Chinese economy in all important industries such as banking, 
transport and energy. SOEs have inherent advantages in many aspects: they do not 
have to fully cover expenses from sales and income; unprofitable SOEs and losses 
are subsidised; they receive funds from state-owned banks regardless of risks (Kornai, 
1986). On the one hand, they take the benefits of being part of a planned economy 
and so rarely go bankrupt while on the other hand, they are criticised by corporate 
governance theory - the agency theory that many levels of agents and their conflicts 
exist (Han, 2012). Wang and Deng (2006) found that large shareholder ownership 
and state ownership reduced on the probability of distress. Similarly, Li et al (2008) 
found that ownership concentration and state ownership are negatively associated 
with the likelihood of bankruptcy. Zeitun and Tian (2007) agreed with this negative 
association and suggested government ownership could be used as a predictor to 
detect default. However, at the same time, they commented that although reducing 
government ownership can increase a firm's performance it could also cause some 
firms to go bankrupt in the short term.  
 
Clarke (2006) referred to two explanations of why state control causes poor 
performance: firstly, the government is not as effective a monitor as outside investors 
and secondly, the government does not pursue maximisation of profit or value of 
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shares as the ultimate goal which is normally the aim of common private companies. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also noticed that the agency problems in large companies 
in many countries are not between investors and managers but between outside 
investors and concentrated shareholders who have dominant full control over the 
managers. In state companies where the government has large concentrated shares, it 
leads to problems of harm to social interests and low efficiency.  
 
If the state is the controlling owner, it makes the situation very complicated. As 
Claessens and Fan (2002) summarised, firstly, the state is not the real owner but the 
agent of the ultimate owner - all citizens and tax payers, and usually it is the 
governance agencies, such as SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission) in China that control the equity of an SOE. Below them, 
there are representative directors and managers. There are too many levels of 
agencies but a lack of incentive to maximise the value. Secondly, there are conflicts 
of interests because the state is both the regulator and manager of the banking system 
at the same time.  
 
Faccio (2006) found that SOEs have higher leverage, lower taxation and take larger 
market shares by achieving dominant positions, but in the meanwhile, in most cases 
they have a high level of corruption, barriers to foreign investment and less 
transparent systems. Therefore, state ownership is more like a double-edged sword. 
Both advantages and disadvantages interact to influence the firm’s performance. It 
still needs empirical evidence to find out the relationship between state ownership 
and financial distress.  
 
6.2.3 Board composition 
 
Many countries have regulations on the composition of the board. For example, in 
the UK, the Companies Act 2006 (2006) dictates that a private company must have at 
least one director and a public company must have at least two. The directors are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. In some companies the 
132 
 
CEO and the Chair of the Board may be the same people (duality), even though their 
roles are very different.  
 
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) found a significant relationship between dominant 
CEOs and the likelihood of bankruptcy in a sample of 165 American companies. 
Moreover, Daily and Dalton (1994) studied 57 firms that filed for bankruptcy 
between 1972 and 1982 and their empirical results confirmed that CEO duality is 
positively related to bankruptcy. In a survey of the role of the board of directors, 
Abdullah (2006) provided Malaysian evidence that board independence and CEO 
duality (the same person taking two roles) are not associated with financial distress 
status while surprisingly management and non-executive directors' interests (for 
those who own shares) are associated negatively with financial distress.  
 
Generally, a board could consist of inside directors (executive directors), grey 
directors (non-independent non-executive directors) and outside directors 
(independent directors) (Hsu and Wu, 2009). Much literature (Hsu and Wu, 2009; 
Chaganti et al, 1985; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Santen and Soppe, 2009; Salloum et al, 
2013) has discussed the influence of directors on the performance of companies. 
However, they have not reached agreement. For example Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) found insider-outsider ratio was not significantly related to firms’ 
performance but Mangena and Chamisa (2007) found that a small proportion of non-
executive directors and a lack of an audit committee were all positively related to the 
likelihood of delisting.  
 
In addition, in recent years, the role of independent or outside directors within the 
board structure has received much attention, since this is believed to strengthen the 
monitoring of firm’s performance and diverse backgrounds. In the research of Li et 
al (2008), independent directors turned out to be negatively associated with the 
probability of financial distress. Daily (1996, p.372) explains the relationship 
between outside directors and bankruptcy. The actual possibility of bankruptcy can 
be reduced because an independent outside director in the negotiation process may 
assist the firm in “convincing creditor groups to agree to a proposed reorganisation 
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plan prior to the formal bankruptcy filing”. However, Chaganti et al (1985) used a 
retail example to argue that the influence of outside directors is not significant in 
corporate failure. Also Hsu and Wu (2009) agreed that more outside directors on the 
board and an audit committee could not effectively contribute to the decrease in the 
likelihood of corporate failure. They argued that a high percentage of outside 
directors on an audit committee is even unfavourable to firm survival. The 
Netherlands case study from Santen and Soppe (2009) even showed that distressed 
firms have a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors. Whether 
independent directors have any positive or negative effect on financial distress 
remains an open question. 
 
Board size effect has been mentioned in many studies. Daily and Dalton (1994a), 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) suggested that small boards are more 
efficient and have lower productivity costs during any coordination process. This 
argument was later confirmed by Yermack (1995) and Simpson and Gleason (1999). 
Recently, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Hsu and Wu (2009) also believed that 
more executive directors on a board given a fixed board size would increase the 
likelihood of corporate failure. This is the same in Santen and Soppe’s research 
(2009). However, in retailing firms, non-failed ones tend to have bigger boards 
within the size range suggested by regulators (Chaganti et al, 1985). Darrat et al, 
(2010) even found a mixed effect of board size that having a larger board reduces the 
risk of bankruptcy for complex firms with diverse business segments, but not for 
simpler (less diversified, single market oriented) firms. The effect of board size was 
not very clear. There appeared to be an interacted effect.  
 
6.2.4 Ownership structure 
 
Ownership structure is a crucial aspect when judging the governance of a corporation 
because it states the relationship of inside and outside investors (Lemmon and Lins, 
2003). A great deal of research has addressed issues in ownership structure, for 
example, the type of controller, the proportion of shares owned by institutional 
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holders, the proportion held by all inside holders, the proportion held by block 
holders and so on.  
 
Lee and Yen (2004) used a Taiwanese case to comment that in a concentrated 
ownership environment such as ownership by a family, weak corporate governance 
will lead to a greater chance of going to distress, but they did not explain what 
exactly ‘weak corporate governance’ is. In Taiwan, family control is very common 
and this is also true in many East Asian countries especially in emerging markets 
such as Thailand and Singapore. Polsiri and Sookhanaphibarn (2009) and Claessens 
et al (1999) have also addressed this issue. Focusing on the UK data, Wilson et al 
(2013) documented that family business is more likely to survive than nonfamily 
companies. In China, family controlled companies do exist, but there is not enough 
information to determine whether a company is a family business. What really 
matters is state ownership, which has been discussed in Section 6.2.2.  
 
In addition to the type of ownership, the role of institutional shareholders also 
receives attention. Lee and Yen (2004) found that institutional shareholding is 
smaller in distressed companies than in healthy ones. This was confirmed by 
Campbell et al (2008) and the distress risk was also linked to analyst coverage. Fich 
and Slezak (2008), Daily (1996) and Donker et al (2009) found institutional 
ownership has no relationship with bankruptcy. Wang and Deng (2006) found block 
ownership and institutional holdings offered mixed results. In Mangena and 
Chamisa’s case (2008) using listing suspension as the indicator, institutional 
shareholding also had mixed effects. It remains open for discussion.  
 
Furthermore, Simpson and Gleason (1999), Abdullah (2006) and Salloum et al (2013) 
agreed that the nature of share ownership  had no definite link to financial distress.  
 
6.2.5 Management compensation 
 
Salary, bonus and options are three common forms of compensation for managers. 
Mann (2005) investigated the relationship between CEO compensation and credit 
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risk. He found that large, unexplained bonuses and option awards increased credit 
risk while a salary did not seem to have the same effect. High levels of unexplained 
compensation may indicate that board oversight is loose and, as a result, 
management has insufficient pressure to deliver good financial performance. He 
argued that directors tend to pursue short term profits instead of longer term financial 
benefits. They have an incentive to adopt high risk business strategies which may 
result in strong positive but also adverse potential payoffs.  
 
Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) carried out a survey about CEO compensation in 
financial distressed firms. One-third of the CEOs in their sample were replaced in a 
given year around default, and those who remained often took substantial cuts in 
salary and bonus. They suggested management compensation is a potentially 
significant variable to predict financial distress. Li et al (2008) also found that 
administrative expense ratio is positively related to the likelihood of financial distress. 
Furthermore, Chan et al (2010) tested the association between bankruptcy and both 
executive compensation and the size of the remuneration committee and found that 
compensation was positively related to the likelihood of bankruptcy whereas the size 
of the committee was negatively related.  
 
6.2.6 Director and manager characteristics 
 
Santen and Soppe (2009) incorporated non-executive directors’ (NEDs) personal 
characteristics in prediction models. They set up six variables to describe directors: 
workload, nationality, dependency, interlocking directorships, age and education. It 
was found that a foreign NED or a ‘very busy’ NED on the board are positively 
related to financial distress. However, there was no relevant relationship between 
experience, education or network and financial distress. 
 
Other literature has focused on the characteristics of general directors rather than 
non-executive directors only. Wilson and Altanlar (2011) built a survival model on a 
large dataset of 6 million observations and found strong links between director 
characteristics (networks, proximity and involvement) and survival. They found that 
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having female directors on a board reduces the likelihood of insolvency and that 
companies with female directors appear to take on less debt and have better cash 
flow. They suggested there is gender difference in risk preference and behaviour. 
Males are more likely to take excessive risks while females are more conservative. A 
‘balanced’ board of directors has a better performance due to the balance of skills. 
Darrat et al (2010) referred to the female as ‘diversified’ on the board and that is 
helpful. The finding from Wilson et al (2013) on this is similar with them.  
 
Ruigrok et al (2007) concluded that a foreigner on the board brings different 
perspectives, skills and knowledge on the one hand, but different values, norms and 
understanding on the other. The accumulated effect of these two aspects of foreign 
nationality is unclear.  
 
Educational background is likely to affect managerial performance. Higher education 
at least indicates a person’s previous learning abilities and skills in solving problems. 
Holding an MBA degree is evidence of both theoretical and practical experience in 
business management and therefore is preferred by the board. D'Aveni (1990), Daily 
and Dalton (1994a) and Ruigrok et al (2007) used education to partly represent the 
quality of a board. Basically they agreed business education may affect the prestige 
of a company but no one has yet linked education to the probability of financial 
distress directly.  
 
Experience is hard to measure in a simple way since it is personal and unique. But 
even so some common results can be seen. Wilson and Altanlar (2011) concluded 
that directors with previous insolvency experiences or recent resignations have a 
higher insolvency hazard risk. Previous failure experience of a director may lead to a 
high risk of bankruptcy in the future (Wilson et al, 2013) but Salloum et al (2013) 
did not find enough evidence to conclude that the shorter time a director has served 
on a board (experience), the greater the probability its company goes to distress.  
 
Age is often used as a proxy for experience and basically older people have more 
living and working experience than the young. Zahra and Pearce (1989) mentioned 
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age as one of the relevant characteristics in their study and it is probably linked to 
financial performance. Ruigrok et al (2007) applied age as a control variable. Platt 
and Platt (2012) found the increase in both the CEO’s age and the average age of the 
board decreased the chance of bankruptcy, but Fich and Slezak (2008) only found the 
CEO’s age as significant in one of their four models of bankruptcy prediction.  
 
6.2.7 International studies 
 
The effect of corporate governance could vary from country to country. Most studies 
that have investigated corporate governance and financial distress were conducted in 
the US, for example, Daily and Dalton (1994b), Simpson and Gleason (1999), Parker 
et al (2002). Elloumi and Gueyle (2001) introduced corporate governance variables 
into their financial distress prediction model within Canada, and identified the 
reasons why some firms find themselves in financial distress. Hsu and Wu (2009) 
investigated similar issues in the UK and find that grey directors, defined as non-
independent non-executive directors, are more informative and knowledgeable than 
independent directors in management oversight. Lee and Yeh (2004) examined 
Taiwanese firms by using the number of director seats held by the controlling 
shareholders. Their results indicated there exists significant relationships between 
corporate governance variables and financial distress in the following year. Studies 
using samples from South African (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), the Netherlands 
(Donker et al, 2009) and Taiwan (Chen, 2008) found some associations between 
corporate governance variables and the likelihood of financial distress using cross-
sectional models.  
 
There are also studies using Chinese samples, but they have weaknesses. Wang and 
Deng (2006) explained the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
distress in Chinese companies. Their sample size is rather limited, consisting only of 
96 healthy and 96 distressed cases. Li et al (2008) have a slightly larger sample but 
they used a cross sectional logistic model. Li and Liu (2009) extended the sample to 
panel data, however, their model is a multi-period logistic regression without time. In 
addition, their indicators of financial distress are ‘Special Treatment’ and ‘Particular 
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Transfer’ which involved consequences other than financial distress only. Han (2012) 
built her own indicator of distress in a hazard model but she only included a dummy 
to distinguish SOEs and private companies, no other governance variables were 
included. Our research clears up all of the limitations of those Chinese studies by 
constructing a dynamic survival model with a group of corporate governance 
measures over a long period of time.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that among international studies of corporate 
governance, a popular quantitative method is to build a corporate governance index 
(GCI) to measure the overall standard and make it comparable across nations. 
Examples are G-Index from Gompers et al (2003), and an entrenchment index from 
Bebchuk et al (2009). Besides, there are the Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia’s 
(CLSA) governance index and the S&P disclosure score. In China, there is a China 
Corporate Governance Index Nankai (CCGINK) which was developed by Naikai 
University and the National Audit Office, but their methodology and data are not 
disclosed to the public. In academia, Cheung et al (2008) built their own CGI to 
measure the quality of corporate governance practice. However, in the light of the 
purpose of this study, employing an external index may look convenient but 
essentially introduce extra model risk and errors to our model. Neither can we know 
which aspect of governance is important to financial distress.  
 
Although previous research successfully incorporated corporate governance 
measures into financial distress prediction, they did not reach a comprehensive 
consensus as to whether, how and to what extent corporate governance variables 
determined financial distress. Different countries have different regulatory systems 
of company structure. This complexity might lead to controversy in this field. 
Compared to other corporate credit modelling, the work on the effects of corporate 
governance on credit risk is far from extensive although they generally agree that 
corporate governance measures will improve the accuracy of the financial distress 
prediction model. This chapter will investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance measures and the probability of financial distress again, with a large 
sample size of more than 1600 companies over 8 years covering the recent financial 
139 
 
crisis which ensures the robustness of the modelling results. A wide coverage of 
corporate governance measures from board composition, ownership structure, 
management compensation and director characteristics is built into a collection of 35 
potential predictive variables. The case of China is a supplement to the study in this 
field where SOEs are critical in affecting the ability to finance and create credibility. 
 
6.3 Corporate governance in China 
 
As this research mainly uses corporate governance measures as predictive variables 
and applies them to Chinese data, it is necessary to introduce the background of 
corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. One cannot simply apply 
knowledge in the West to China. It has unique features and without understanding 
Chinese corporate governance, it would be hard to interpret the results. According to 
Clarke’s (2006, p.145) definition, Chinese corporate governance is “the set of rules 
and practices regulating relationships among participants in a post-traditional 
Chinese business enterprise and governing decision-making within that enterprise.” 
It includes all stakeholders from governors, regulators, shareholders, directors, 
managers and other employees. Particularly, it is the laws, rules and regulations that 
define Chinese corporate governance today. In this part, a brief history of the 
securities market in China will be introduced and relevant topics in corporate 
governance regarding board composition, ownership structure and management 
compensation will be raised.  
 
6.3.1 Chinese securities market: a short history 
 
The Chinese economy has started to fast track since the Economic Reform in late the 
1970s. Since then, the Chinese economy has grown at an average speed of over 10% 
annually for more than thirty years. But its securities markets were opened very late. 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange was established in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange was established in 1991 and now they are still the only two exchanges in 
Mainland China. Both exchanges were initially aimed to finance SOEs by providing 
private funds (Liebman and Milhaupt, 2008). Data shows by 2000, over 80% of 
140 
 
listed companies in the two exchanges were SOEs (Tam, 2002) and by 2001, over 84% 
of them were ultimately controlled by the state (Liu et al, 2003) and even as recently 
as 2006, 60% of listed companies were state controlled (Liebman and Milhaupt, 
2008). In this circumstance where SOEs totally controlled and overwhelmed the 
securities market, corporate governance did not seem necessary. After the gradual 
progress of the Chinese economy and the securities market, the Chinese government 
finally realised the importance of corporate governance in 1999 and wanted to build 
a modern enterprise system (Tam, 2000). Since 2005, a reform of non-tradable shares 
has begun as the latest effort to reform the SOEs. As a result, though it may take long, 
eventually investors will be able to trade state shares and other restricted shares in a 
traditional SOE (Jingu, 2007).  
 
The Company Law10 is the fundamental basis for corporations, corporate governance 
and the securities market. It has evolved several times by means of amendments in 
1999, 2004 and 2006 because its first draft in 1994 mainly was focused on SOEs. 
Other regulations and rules mostly affecting corporate governance are the Securities 
Law 11 (2006) , the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 12, the 
Guidelines of Election and Behaviour of Directors in listed companies13 and the 
Guidelines on the Establishment of the Independent Director System in Listed 
Companies14. The frequency of the introduction and revision of regulation over a 
short timeframe in two decades indicates a speedy improvement. By applying the 
widely recognised LLSV indicator for shareholder rights protection (LLSV, 1998), 
Liu (2006) concluded that law enforcement in China is relatively weak. 
 
10  The Company Law of the People's Republic of China, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-
10/28/content_85478.htm 
11  The Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-
10/28/content_85556.htm 
12  The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 2002, 
http://www.sse.com.cn/lawandrules/regulations/listed/c/c_20120917_49179.shtml 
13  The Guidelines of Election and Behaviour of Directors in listed companies, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 2013, 
http://www.sse.com.cn/lawandrules/sserules/listing/stock/c/c_20130613_3720551.shtml 
14 The Guidelines on the Establishment of the Independent Director System in Listed Companies, 




                                                 
However, as Roe (2002) commented, proper corporate governance depends not only 
on the laws but also the participation of other institutions. The regulatory authority is 
one of the most important ones. Shi (2007) summarised that there are three models of 
securities regulation: the American model, the English model and the hybrid model. 
The American model employs a series of laws and regulations and the US Securities 
and Exchanges Commission (SEC) implements them to protect investors. The 
English model paid much attention to self-regulation by market players and did not 
rely on a lot of regulations. However, the UK government has strengthened the 
regulations and their enforcement by using the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
which leads to the combination of both, the hybrid model. Shi (2007) commented 
that many emerging economies such as China try to apply the hybrid model with 
both law regulation and self-regulation in the securities market. The CSRC is the 
major administrative agency of the central government to regulate the activities in 
the securities market. The other important institutions are the stock exchanges 
organised by membership. Under the securities law, they require self-regulatory 
autonomy and in theory, the CSRC is supposed to delegate some power to the two 
stock exchanges. In fact, the government maintains its high centralisation of 
authority and it is the CSRC not the exchange that has the power to approve new 
listings and delist companies (Shi, 2007). Besides, the CSRC also appoints and has 
the power to dismiss the general managers of the two stock exchanges (Liebman and 
Milhaupt, 2008). The lack of self-regulation causes problems of fraud, poor 
disclosure and inefficient pricing (Liebman and Milhaupt, 2008). Nonetheless, the 
two stock exchanges in China continue to expand. While the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange mainly takes listings of large corporations and traditional SOEs, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened the SME board in 2004 and the Growth 
Enterprises Market (GEM) board in 2009. At the end of 2012, there were a total of 
2,494 listed companies valued at 3.7 trillion USD, the second largest in the world 
only after the US.  
 





Table 6.3.1 Important events in Chinese securities market history 
Year Event 
1978 The Economic Reform began. 
1979 The Reform of SOEs began. 
1990 Shanghai Stock Exchange was established. 
1991 Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established. 
1992 The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was set up. 
1993 The first Company Law was promulgated. 
1998 The first Securities Law was promulgated. 
2005 The Reform of Non-Tradable Shares began. 
2006 The latest Company Law and the latest Securities Law were promulgated. 
2007 Stock Indices in Shanghai and Shenzhen reached historic peak.  
 
6.3.2 Board composition 
 
Berle and Means (1932) were amongst the first to empirically examine the separation 
of ownership from control. There are different types of models of corporate 
governance. Firstly there is an outsider-based model or one tier model represented by 
the Anglo-American model (Tan and Wang, 2004) where the governance structure is 
vertical: the shareholders’ meeting, the Board of directors and management. The 
shareholder’s meeting elects the Chair and other directors of the board and the board 
monitors the management for shareholders. Secondly, there is an insider-based 
model, represented by the German and Japanese models where a board of supervisors 
is set up alongside the board of directors (Tan and Wang, 2004). The supervisory 
board consists of representatives from employees, shareholders and work unions who 
can be regarded as insiders. They supervise the management, examine accounts and 
influence the decision making. The Chinese corporate governance model stems from 
the Anglo-American model and also incorporates the German model by setting up a 
board of supervisors (Tam, 1999). Therefore it is a two tier model as described in 


















According to the Company Law (2006), for common limited liability corporations, 
there should be 5 to 19 members on the board of directors and at least 3 supervisors. 
At least one third of directors are independent directors who are appointed by the 
shareholders’ meeting. The Guidelines on the Establishment of the Independent 
Director System in Listed Companies (CSRC, 2001) emphasises that independent 
directors should be independent from major shareholders, the controller and other 
listed companies but, interestingly, it also says a person can be an independent 
director in up to 5 listed companies. This means there are ‘professional’ independent 
directors who serve in and are independent from several listed companies at the same 
time.  
 
Internal governance was criticised by Tan and Wang (2004) in that the Chair of the 
Board and the CEO are often the same person, and independent directors are not 
independent enough to protect shareholder’s interests. Clark (2006) also has negative 
comments that the supervisory board is completely useless except in meeting the 
minimum requirement of regulations. It is understandable that in circumstances 
where large shareholders exist, usually in SOEs, they can appoint anyone who can 
protect the interests of large shareholders rather than those of small shareholders.   
All shareholders’ meeting 




Board of supervisors Independent directors 
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6.3.3 Ownership structure 
 
One feature of a Chinese listed company is that it can issue several types of shares to 
investors in terms of their location listing: A shares, B shares and H shares and 
Overseas shares. A shares are issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen and traded in 
Chinese currency (CNY). B shares are issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen and traded 
in foreign currency. H shares are issued in Hong Kong and traded in Hong Kong 
dollars. Overseas listing may be in NYSE (New York), NASDAQ (New York) and 
LSE (London). In the early days of the Chinese securities market, most listed 
companies were SOEs but later the government realised the security market was not 
efficient as a financing method. In 2005, the CSRC (2005) issued the Measures for 
the Administration of the Share trading Reform of Listed Companies. Since then 
many shares in SOE have been released to the public but shares of a company’s 
equity can still be divided into tradable shares and restricted shares (non-tradable). 
Thus the total share capital of a Chinese listed company can be described in Table 
6.3.2 and the descriptive data is from the sample of this research. 
 
Table 6.3.2 Share types in Chinese listed companies 
All types of 
shares in total of 
2472 listed 
companies 
restricted shares (1808 
or 73.1% of listed 
companies) 
state owned shares 481 (19.5%) 




private placement of 







others 654 (26.5%) 
tradable shares (all 
companies) 
A shares 2472 (100%) 
B shares 86 (3.5%) 
H shares 81 (3.3%) 




The term ‘legal person’ is a well-established concept which can be found in Germany, 
Italy and the US. By their Civil Laws, it is described as the organisation that has the 
capacity for civil rights, civil conduct and civil obligations in accordance with the 
law (Martin, 2003). In many cases, legal persons are state-controlled so Clarke (2006) 
argued that to some extent many legal person shares could be regarded as state shares. 
SOEs typically have more responsibilities than maximisation of profits only (Clarke, 
2003). Examples of extra responsibilities are maintaining employment levels, 
absolute control over critical industries such as national security, transportation and 
energy, and some diplomatic trading agreements.  
 
Xu and Wang (1999) studied the relationship between the performance and corporate 
governance in Chinese listed companies with specific attention to ownership 
structure. They found profitability was positively correlated with ownership 
concentration and legal person shares and they suggested the importance of 
institutional shareholders and the inefficiency of state ownership.  
 
6.3.4 Management compensation 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explained that the agency problem in large companies 
also exists in how to restrict expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders. In Chinese SOEs, both the Chair and chief manager are appointed by 
the government and those enterprises are actually places where the government trains 
their senior governors and promotes government officials (Jingu, 2007). For example, 
the current vice-premier of China used to be the CEO of the China Construction 
Bank in the 1990s. Thus, apart from common incentives, people in the top 
management of SOEs have extra expectations of political rewards. Their jobs are not 
to maximise profits but correctly implement the intentions of the government. These 
government representatives are paid according to their ranks (Li et al, 2008), but 
generally they are underpaid. So in Chinese SOEs, it is common for directors and 
executives to misuse their powers to seek personal gains or even to seize corporate 
properties (Chen, 2005). For instance, some SOE directors and managers control the 
power to appoint and dismiss treasurers, and therefore have the means to force 
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treasurers to keep several different accounting books for fraudulent purposes. The 
irresponsibility of directors and executives has resulted in the insolvency or 
bankruptcy of many SOEs. A survey (cited in Chen 2005) in 1997 revealed that 
directors and executives were responsible for more than half of the insolvency or 
bankruptcy cases in 110 SOEs. Another example is, the former Chair and CEO of 
Hongta Tobacco Corporation who embezzled millions of US dollar in corporate 
funds. His lawful yearly salary was only 3,000 USD, just like an ordinary worker, 
while the corporation’s annual income was 2.3 billion USD in 1996 (New York 
Times, 1998). In other words, his lawful income accounted for only 0.00014% of the 
corporation's total income. In contrast, in western countries the CEO averagely 
receives 0.014% of corporate revenue (Core et al, 1999) which is one hundred times 
as that in China. It is essential to improve the compensation mechanism for directors 
and executives in SOEs. To help attain this objective, innovative compensation 
mechanisms, such as stock option programs, should be made available to directors 
and executives in most SOEs (Chen, 2005). 
 
In other companies, it is often found that the bonus system is not clearly defined or 
not disclosed so the performance bonus may not applicable in practice. The CSRC 
launched the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed 
Companies in 2006 but it is more like a recommendation for guidance but not a 
compulsory scheme. Our data shows that only about a quarter of companies have 
stock option incentive plans and their rules so various that they cannot be used as a 
measure of compensation. Furthermore, Firth et al (2006) find that the sensitivities of 
pay to performance for CEOs in China are low so the effectiveness of incentive 
systems could be in question.  
 
Several researchers (Hovey et al, 2003; Clarke, 2006; Tam, 2002; Allen et al, 2005) 
have found the problems of corporate governance in China including high 
concentration ratios, insider trading, collusion, dysfunction of independent directors 
and supervisors, inadequate legal systems. We still need to bear in mind that China is 
in the process of transition and its great success in economic development has 
indicated that those problems are not serious. We have carefully taken them into 
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consideration in selecting corporate governance measures. All governance data 
collected is valid across the years and changes in regulations such as reform of non-
tradable shares are reflected in the values of state shareholding. This study has 
limited interest in exploring those problems further but prefers to investigate the 
relationships between corporate governance measures and the probability of financial 




Studies that have considered corporate governance variables have used different 
classification algorithms. Platt and Platt (2012) compared means of governance 
attributes between bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies. Lizal (2002) used a probit 
model and Polsiri and Sookhanaphibarn (2009) used Neural Networks. The majority 
(e.g. Lee and Yeh, 2004), not surprisingly, have applied logistic regression models 
and they worked well in prediction. However, Lee and Yeh (2004) applied a fixed 
cut-off point of 0.5 to predicted probabilities based on a 2:1 sample, which made 
their classification problematic.  
 
The DHM introduced by Shumway (2001) has been discussed in Section 5.2.1 and 
defined in Section 5.3.4. In the studies of corporate governance measures, some 
researchers have followed this lead, for example Fich and Slezak (2008) and Darrat 
et al (2010). Furthermore, Han (2012) and Parker (2002) have tried the Cox 
Proportional Hazards Regression. Chan et al (2010) compared logit, probit and a 
survival model and found predictions using Corporate Governance Variables, 
Executive Compensation Variables and Shumway (2001) Control Variables were the 
best.  
 
From the literature review, we can see many tests of hypotheses based on corporate 
governance theories have been inconsistent or even controversial, regarding the 
issues of whether it is positive or negative and to what degree those corporate 
governance measures are associated with the probability of financial distress. But 
overall, some papers (Lee and Yeh, 2004; Fich and Slezak, 2007; Polsiri and 
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Sookhanaphibarn, 2009; Chan et al, 2010) have found predictive accuracy is 
improved by the incorporation of corporate governance measures. In this research, 
we mainly focus on predicting the probability of financial distress using new 
variables. Including as many variables as possible may increase the predictive 
accuracy because more information is added. It is, however, not practical to do so 
and we may suffer the problem of overfitting. We want our model to be simple and 
dedicated by including only the most significant and informative ones. Therefore, 
although we have a large collection of corporate governance measures, it is 
impossible that all of them are useful and it is unwise to keep those insignificant ones. 
We thus select them based on their significance.  
 
6.4.1 Model specification 
 
During the sample period, few listed companies experienced a change from SOE to 
private or from private to SOE. The dummy of the actual controller of each company 
remains constant in all periods. All other variables are time varying. Therefore we 
follow the DHM of Shumway (2001) to incorporate TVCs. The form is as follows: 
 
ST 1 0 0 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2logit( ( )) ( ) + 
g T r T m T
i t i t i th t h tα β β β β= − − −= + + +x x x         (6.1) 
  
Where t is the survival time; 
           ST 1( )h t= is the probability of being ST in duration time t ; 
           0 ( )h t is the hazard in duration time t ; 
           , 2
g
i t−x  is column vectors  of corporate governance variables for company i  in 
duration time -2t ; 
          , 2
r
i t−x is a selection of financial ratios of predictive power; 
          , 2
m
i t−x is a selection of macroeconomic factors; 
          0β is the coefficient of the baseline hazard; 
          1 2 3, ,β β β  are vectors of coefficients to be estimated; 




First of all, we include four groups of corporate governance measures (board 
composition, ownership structure, management compensation and director and 
manager characteristics) into equation (6.1) but without any other covariates. In this 
way, significant corporate governance measures are identified and they enter the first 
model to make predictions (Model 1). The second model uses the financial ratios 
only (Model 2) and the third model combines both significant corporate governance 
measures and financial ratios (Model 3). Model 4 then incorporates macroeconomic 
factors. The predictive accuracy is measured by the H measure, AUR, Gini and KS 
(Hand, 2009) (defined in Section 3.5). Four groups of results of both in-sample and 
out-sample predictions are given for comparison (Table 6.4.1). 
 
Table 6.4.1 Model comparison 3 
Model Specification 
Model 1  DHM with corporate governance measures only 
Model 2  DHM with financial ratios only 
Model 3 DHM with governance measures and financial ratios 





Much information about corporate governance was only disclosed after 2001 or 2002. 
This significantly reduced the sample size of companies and the observation period. 
Finally, the sample data consists of 2014 companies over an eight year period 










Table 6.4.2 Number of ST in 2003 - 2010 
  ST 
Total 
Bad 
rate year  0 1 
2003 1123 39 1162 3.36% 
2004 1189 35 1224 2.86% 
2005 1177 26 1203 2.16% 
2006 1177 58 1235 4.70% 
2007 1234 55 1289 4.27% 
2008 1291 22 1313 1.68% 
2009 1359 27 1386 1.95% 
2010 1370 39 1409 2.77% 
Total 9920 301 10221 2.94% 
 
Table 6.4.2 shows the whole sample used in the analysis. There are a total of 301 
distressed cases which lie in 10,221 company-years across eight years. It can be 
noticed that in some years such as 2006 and 2007, more distressed companies are 
observed (4.7% and 4.27%) but in some years such as 2008 and 2009, a smaller 
proportion of distressed companies are observed (1.68% and 1.95%). In order to 
make out-of-time predictions, another two years of ST information has been 
collected to make use of the data in year 2009 and 2010 because of the two year lag. 
There were 11 and 22 new ST companies in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
 
The whole sample of 1,688 companies is divided into two samples in a 2:1 ratio. 
According to the sampling strategy proposed in Section 3.3, similarly to the last 
chapter, the whole sample is broken down into the four panel datasets shown in 
Table 6.4.3. We applied a two-year lag when making predictions in the main models, 
i.e. it uses covariates from year - 2t  to predict whether a company is distressed in 






Table 6.4.3 Sample 3 








Total Bad rate 
0 1 0 1 
2003 744 28 772 3.63% 2003 379 11 390 2.82% 
 2004 793 21 814 2.58%  2004 396 14 410 3.41% 
Panel A 
2005 785 18 803 2.24% 
Panel B 
2005 392 8 400 2.00% 
2006 787 44 831 5.29% 2006 390 14 404 3.47% 
2007 827 33 860 3.84% 2007 407 22 429 5.13% 
2008 866 14 880 1.59% 2008 425 8 433 1.85% 
2009 907 17 924 1.84% 2009 452 10 462 2.16% 
2010 911 26 937 2.77% 2010 459 13 472 2.75% 
Panel C 
2011 904 7 911 0.77% 
Panel D 
2011 455 4 459 0.87% 
2012 889 15 904 1.66% 2012 448 7 455 1.54% 
 Total 8413 223 8636 2.58%  Total 4203 111 4314 2.57% 
 
The average proportion of bad cases across all years is 2.58% in Sample One and 
2.57% in Sample Two (Table 6.4.3), which are very similar. Some variation could be 
noticed, for example, in 2006 and 2007, just before the financial crisis, there are 
more ST companies (4.7% and 4.27% compared to a mean of 2.94%) than in other 
years (Table 6.4.2), while more recently the proportion of distressed companies has 
been lower than in the early 2000s.  
 
6.4.3 Corporate governance measures 
 
As discussed in the literature review and according to availability of date in the 
database, corporate governance variables are classified into four groups and 











Table 6.4.4 List of corporate governance measures 




Board size Boardsize number of total directors 
Independent 
director 
IndependentDirector proportion of independent director in board 
Number of 
supervisors  
Supervisor number of supervisors 
Number of senior 
managers  
SeniorManager number of senior managers 
Duality of Chair 
and CEO 










State ownership StateShares proportion of state owned shares to total shares 
State control SOE_d 1 if the ultimate controller is the government 
Board shares BoardShares shares held by the board to total shares 
Supervisor shares SupervisorShares shares held by the supervision board to total shares 
Top 10 
shareholders 
Top10Shares Total shares of largest 10 shareholders to total shares 
Institutional share 
holding 
InstitutionShares Total shares of institutional shares to total shares 
Average share 
holding 
AverageShares Average shareholding to total shares 
Listing somewhere 
else 
OtherListing_d 1 if it issues B, H or overseas shares 
Share capital 
change 
CapitalChange_d 1 if it changes from previous year 
Connected top 10 
shareholders 






Salary of senior 
management 
ManagementSalary salary of directors, supervisors and senior managers to 
total salary cost 
Salary of top 3 
directors 
DirectorSalary salary of top 3 directors to total salary cost 




ry salary of top 3 independent directors to total salary cost 
Salary of top 3 
senior managers 
SeniorSalary salary of top 3 senior managers to total salary cost 
Number of non-
paid senior staff 


















Chair age ChairAge age in the year 






4 dummies (1 for college level or under, 0 otherwise; 1 
for undergraduate, 0 otherwise; 1 for master, 0 
otherwise; 1 for doctorate, 0 otherwise), 
Chair professional 
qualification 
ChairQualification_d 1 if it has professional qualification 
Chair nationality ChairNationality_d 1 if it is not Chinese 
Chair get paid ChairPaid_d 1 if it is get paid 
Chair concurrent 
post 
ChairConpost_d 1 if it has another position in other companies 
CEO age CEOAge age in the year 






4 dummies (1 for college level or under, 0 otherwise; 1 
for undergraduate, 0 otherwise; 1 for master, 0 
otherwise; 1 for doctorate, 0 otherwise) 
CEO professional 
qualification 
CEOQualification_d 1 if it has professional qualification 
CEO nationality CEONationality_d 1 if it is not Chinese 
CEO get paid CEOPaid_d 1 if it is get paid 
CEO concurrent 
post 
CEOConpost_d 1 if it has another position in other companies 
 
Lee and Yen (2004) discussed the issue of ultimate control which is very common in 
the emerging markets where highly concentrated shares are held by family or the 
state. They defined the ultimate controller as the largest shareholder that controls at 
least 20% of voting rights. Claessens et al (1999) argued that the controlling 
shareholder needs to be considered in bankruptcy prediction models. In China, due to 
the strong background of SOEs, one may find that the government remains the 
controlling power of SOEs even though the share-holding by the government does 
not place it in a dominant position. This leads to the concept of the Ultimate 
Controller in Chinese listed companies. Its definition can be found in CSRC (2008). 
An individual or organisation shall be considered to have ultimate control of a listed 
company in any situation below: 
 
• if the shareholder has over 50% shares of the listed company; 
• if it has over 30% of voting rights of the listed company; 
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• if it is able to decide the election of more than half of the members of the 
board of directors by means of exercising its voting rights; 
• if its voting rights can have influential impact on organisational decisions; 
• in other circumstances determined by the CSRC. 
 
Therefore, the ultimate controller is an important variable to denote the nature of a 
company, and it is available in the database. It indicates whether a company is a SOE. 
 
There is a variable in ownership structure to denote the connection between large 
shareholders. According to Platt and Platt (2012), interlinked directorship provides 
benefits for the company.   
 
Whilst some papers (Fich and Slezak, 2008; Platt and Platt, 2012) are interested in  
the characteristics of the CEO who is the highest administrator in charge of the 
company, this research takes into account characteristics of both the Chair and the 
CEO. Generally the CEO’s power is authorised by the board and he or she is 
responsible for the overall management, decision making, execution and the daily 
operation of the company. Therefore, the personality and characteristics of the CEO 
will be reflected in the development of the business. This is why the CEO is more 
important to the performance of a company than other directors. In the situation that 
the Chair of the board has control of the company and is more involved in the 
management and decision making, the Chair will have more influence on the 
performance. This is the case in many Chinese companies where the founders have 
made major contributions to the company’s success during the development of the 
Chinese economy and they would like to have control of the companies created by 
themselves. In these cases, their influence and their characteristics should not be 
ignored.  
 
Personal information concerning both the Chair and the CEO for each company is 
recorded in the database including four types of personal demographic information, 
age, gender, nationality, and education and another three types of information 
regarding their professions: whether they have professional qualifications, whether 
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they get paid  by the company and whether they possess another position in any other 
organisation.  
 
Figure 6.4.1 Distribution of the year of birth 
 
 
Preliminary analysis of over 4,500 individual chairs and CEOs indicated that 95.9% 
of the Chairs and the CEOs are males, and females only account for 4.1% of the total. 
To calculate their ages, their real year of birth is used. We remark on two points 
relating to age in the bar chart (Figure 6.4.1). The first is that the oldest Chairman 
was born in 1905. The second is that there is a big dip in relative frequency during 
years from 1958 to 1961. This was the result of the Three Years of Great Chinese 
Famine caused by political mistakes and natural disasters. Over 15 million deaths 
were recorded during this period according to government statistics (Grada, 2010), 
not to mention new births.  
 
The distribution of director nationalities shows that there are 97.9% Chinese, 0.4% 
Taiwanese, 0.3% Hong Kong people, and the others are from countries such as US, 
UK, and Canada. Therefore, we included a dummy variable to indicate nationality as 
1 if the person was not Chinese and 0 if they were not.  
 
For education level, the original data is very detailed. The lowest to highest is 
represented by middle school, college, undergraduate degree, master degree and 
doctorate. College educated people (15%), undergraduates (36.2%) and masters 
(40.1%) are the largest three groups. Four dummies are used to denote whether the 
156 
 
director has college or below, undergraduate level, master level and doctorate level 
education. The reference category is other types of education and unknown education.  
 
6.4.4 Financial ratios and macroeconomic variables 
 
The argument of the selection of financial ratios and the duration time remains the 
same as in Section 5.5.3. Six ratios selected from each group in Table 3.4.1 are 
Return on Assets, Current liabilities / Total Liabilities, Tangible Assets / Total Assets, 
Cash Flow from Operating / Total Liabilities, Receivables Turnover and Total Assets 
Growth. The duration is the time since listing at the exchange and its function is the 
natural logarithm of the duration.  
 
There is a series of macroeconomic indicators available for analysis and they are 
typical time varying covariates. However unlike firm-specific covariates, 
macroeconomic factors are variant in period but not in case. So for all companies 
existing in a period, we assume macroeconomic conditions have the same impact on 
them. As previously discussed, some researchers (e.g. Nam et al, 2008) use 
macroeconomic changes as the baseline hazard and others (e.g. Carling et al, 2007) 
argue that macroeconomic conditions have a lagged impact on the real economy. 
With reference to literature and professional opinions, we include four 
macroeconomic variables in the model. They are GDP growth, unemployment, the 
inflation rate and interest rates.  
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the most important indicators which reflect 
a country’s economic status. It is defined as the market value of all officially 
recognised final goods and services produced within a country. It generally indicates 
how wealthy a country is. China has overtaken Japan to become the second largest 
economy in the world, only after the US, since the end of 2010 (BBC News, 2011). 
That is the achievement of China’s economic reform which contributes to a 
continuous growth of over 9% per annum (See Table 6.4.5). GDP growth is simply 




In calculating GDP growth, using real values of the current year may cause distortion 
because of the inflation on the price of goods and services. The inflation rate is then 
included in this research. Essentially, inflation is another important indictor to 
describe consumer prices, where a positive inflation rate indicates a reduction in the 
purchasing power per unit of money. Usually a fast growing economy has a problem 
of inflation while most economists prefer a low and steady rate of inflation.  
 
The unemployment rate is a key indicator to influence domestic consumption of a 
country. A high unemployment rate indicates that it is difficult to find a job and 
people may have limited income to support consumption, which brings a negative 
impact on businesses.   
 















2003 10 1.16 4.3 5.31 
2004 10.1 3.88 4.2 5.58 
2005 11.3 1.82 4.2 5.58 
2006 12.7 1.46 4.1 6.12 
2007 14.2 4.75 4 7.47 
2008 9.6 5.86 4.2* 5.31 
2009 9.2 -0.70 4.3* 5.31 
2010 10.4 3.31 4.1 5.81 
 
The interest rates basically are the prices for borrowing money. As most companies 
have liabilities and loans, the interest rates will affect the financial costs of a 
company. In this research, the base lending interest rate (one year maturity) is used. 
Since the interest rate may change in a year, it is aggregated weighted interest rates 




All these four macroeconomic indicators are annualised in percentage terms. The 
data is extracted from the database of the World Bank, World Databank (Table 
6.4.515).   
 
6.4.5 Data description 
 
Table 6.4.6 Description of corporate governance measures 1 
  Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Board 
composition 
Boardsize 10221 9.46 2 3 19 
IndependentDirector 10221 0.35 0.05 0 0.8 
Supervisor 10221 4.08 1.37 0 13 
SeniorManager 10221 6.29 2.37 1 45 
Ownership 
structure 
StateShares 10221 0.25 0.25 0 0.86 
BoardShares 10221 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.75 
SupervisorShares 10221 0.0014 0.01 0 0.27 
Top10Shares 10221 0.58 0.15 0.07 0.99 
InstitutionShares 10221 0.14 0.18 0 0.93 
AverageShares 10221 0.0004 0.0004 0 0.005 
Management 
compensation 
ManagementSalary 10221 0.5 0.11 0.03 0.85 
DirectorSalary 10221 0.17 0.07 0 0.51 
IndependentDirectorS
alary 10221 0.05 0.04 0 0.33 
SeniorSalary 10221 0.2 0.07 0 0.65 




ChairAge 10221 50.08 7.28 28 84 
CEOAge 10221 46.27 6.47 24 75 
 
For descriptive statistics, variables are observed separately according to their levels 
of measurement. For ratio variables in corporate governance measures (Table 6.4.6), 
results show that there are on average 9.46 directors on the board, among which 3.31 
(or 35%) are independent directors. And there are on average 4.08 supervisors and 
6.29 senior managers in each listed company. The government holds about one 
quarter of the total shares which means the influence of government on Chinese 
listed companies could not be ignored. Supervisors own relatively small proportions 
15 The unemployment rates in 2008 and 2009 marked with * in the table are missing but replaced by 
the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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of the shares (0.14%) because they consist of shareholder and employee 
representatives. On average, the top 10 shareholders own over half of total shares 
(58%) and so they are often the block holders who make important decisions. 
Institutional shareholders hold a considerably large part of all shares and in some 
cases they can own up to 93% of total shares.  
 
Table 6.4.7 Description of corporate governance measures 2 
  N 0 1 
0 (% to 
total) 




Duality_d 10221 8835 1386 86.4 13.6 
WorkLocation_d 10221 6390 3831 62.5 37.5 
Ownership 
structure 
SOE_d 10221 3226 6995 31.6 68.4 
OtherListing_d 10221 9368 853 91.7 8.3 
CapitalChange_d 10221 3731 6490 36.5 63.5 




ChairGender 10221 9833 388 96.2 3.8 
ChairCollege_d 10221 8937 1284 87.4 12.6 
ChairUndergraduate_d 10221 7470 2751 73.1 26.9 
ChairMasters_d 10221 6936 3285 67.9 32.1 
ChairDoctorate_d 10221 9673 548 94.6 5.4 
ChairQualification_d 10221 4374 5847 42.8 57.2 
ChairNationality_d 10221 10130 91 99.1 0.9 
ChairPaid_d 10221 3487 6734 34.1 65.9 
ChairConpost_d 10221 3951 6270 38.7 61.3 
CEOGender_d 10221 9757 464 95.5 4.5 
CEOCollege_d 10221 9036 1185 88.4 11.6 
CEOUndergraduate_d 10221 7367 2854 72.1 27.9 
CEOMasters_d 10221 6922 3299 67.7 32.3 
CEODoctorate_d 10221 9830 391 96.2 3.8 
CEOQualification_d 10221 4750 5471 46.5 53.5 
CEONationality_d 10221 10120 101 99 1 
CEOPaid_d 10221 321 9900 3.1 96.9 
CEOConpost_d 10221 6589 3632 64.5 35.5 
 
For the categorical variables relating to corporate governance measures (Table 6.4.7), 
we present only their frequencies and percentages. It should be noted that that the 
incidence in Table 6.4.7 is recorded according to the company year but not the 
company case, but it is still surprising to find that in over two thirds of company 
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years, companies are state controlled. In 40.7% of companies, some of their largest 
10 shareholders are connected, which means they share similar benefits and goals in 
management. 
 
Financial ratios and macroeconomic factors (Table 6.4.8) are transformed into 
percentages for ease of interpretation. Generally, if only looking at the means, 
Chinese listed companies have been getting positive returns and growing in the past 
few years. The Chinese economy has been growing comparatively quickly for 
decades while keeping inflation and unemployment rates at a relatively low level.  
 
Table 6.4.8 Description of financial ratios and macroeconomic factors 
 Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Financial ratios 
Return on Assets 10221 4.98 7.01 -18.94 28.64 
tangible Assets / Total Assets 10221 39.65 20.00 -35.64 96.53 
Current Liabilities / Total 
Liabilities 
10221 79.81 13.52 28.29 100.00 
Net cash flow from operation / 
Total Liabilities 
10221 9.64 24.18 -106.98 101.45 
Receivables Turnover 10221 57.14 52.18 -8.42 244.66 
Total Assets Growth 10221 15.45 31.00 -93.33 126.21 
Macroeconomic 
factors 
GDP 10221 10.92 1.61 9.20 14.20 
Inflation 10221 2.70 2.04 -0.70 5.86 
Unemployment 10221 4.17 0.10 4.00 4.30 
Interest 10221 5.81 0.68 5.31 7.47 
 
Before moving to further analysis, the correlation coefficient matrix between all 
covariates has been calculated. High correlation or collinearity between explanatory 
variables could lead to serious problems in testing the significance of covariates. For 
example, it may cause the performance of variables to be unstable, reduce the 
significance of correlated variables, and sometimes reverse the sign of coefficients 
(Farrar and Glauber, 1967). By checking the correlation matrix, highly correlated 
variables can be deleted in a pre-analysis, but whether collinearity is a problem is 
subjective and whether one of the correlated variables should be omitted would 
really depend on the theoretical framework of specific research (Farrar and Glauber, 
1967). In this study, we focus on corporate governance measures so they are 
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carefully examined. The matrix of current variables shows that there is not any pair 
of variables with high correlation over 0.7, but between corporate governance 
measures, state ownership and dummy of state control is highly correlated (0.64), 
and professional qualifications and the concurrent position of the Chair and CEO are 
correlated, 0.53 and 0.69 respectively. This may be because in some cases, the Chair 
and the CEO is the same person. GDP growth, inflation and interest rates are often 
highly correlated in economic models. We would like to keep them all because there 
are no better indicators. Between corporate governance and financial ratios, all VIFs 
are smaller than 3 and the average VIF is 1.57. The only problem is with 
macroeconomic variables which have large VIF values and low tolerance, but as 
explained, they are still retained but will be carefully considered in analysis.  
 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Model 1 
 
As there is no stepwise method for a panel regression, corporate governance 
measures are selected manually based on their significance. Firstly, measures of 
different aspects of corporate governance were entered into separate models. The 
tables show the results of DHMs.  
 
Board composition 
Table 6.5.1 Variable selection of board composition 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.296** 0.287 4.52 0.000 
     Boardsize -0.092* 0.051 -1.78 0.075 
IndependentDirector -2.466 1.574 -1.57 0.117 
Supervisor -0.093* 0.072 -1.3 0.195 
SeniorManager -0.117** 0.044 -2.67 0.008 
Duality_d -0.090 0.258 -0.35 0.728 
WorkLocation_d -0.770** 0.199 -3.88 0.000 




Apart from the duration time and constant term, significant variables in board 
composition are board size, the number of senior managers and whether independent 
directors work at the registered office of the company. Generally, the larger the board 
and the more senior managers in a company, the lower the risk it will experience 
financial difficulty in the following years. If the independent directors work location 
is in the company, there is evidence that they will perform and reduce the risk of 
wrong managerial decisions. In other words, if independent directors work remotely, 
they do not really fulfil their duties. This finding is similar to that in Wilson et al 
(2013) who found that if directors live close to companies, they can better monitor 
their management.  
 
The duality of the Chair and CEO and the proportion of independent directors on the 
board do not present any significance to the probability of financial distress.  
 
Ownership structure 
Table 6.5.2 Variable selection of ownership structure 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.409** 0.353 3.99 0.000 
     StateShares -0.312 0.524 -0.59 0.552 
SOE_d -0.704** 0.234 -3 0.003 
BoardShares -1.993 2.252 -0.88 0.376 
SupervisorShares -1387.530 981.066 -1.41 0.157 
Top10Shares -0.076 0.730 -0.1 0.917 
InstitutionShares -8.139** 1.658 -4.91 0.000 
AverageShares 75.538 269.263 0.28 0.779 
OtherListing_d -0.576* 0.340 -1.69 0.090 
CapitalChange_d -0.375** 0.178 -2.11 0.035 
ConnectedShareholder_d -0.222 0.189 -1.17 0.241 
     Constant -5.554** 1.140 -4.87 0.000 
 
For ownership structure variables, if the company is state controlled, it has a lower 
chance of becoming distressed. This may be taken as evidence that the government 
has provided abundant resource to support the company. The possible advantages 
have been discussed in previous sections. The results also suggest that when the 
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institutional investor has a stake in a listed company, it has less chance of becoming 
distressed. The institutional investors have expertise and skills in detecting 
companies worthy of investment. If the share capital structure is different from a 
previous year, despite lack of clarity about the reasons for any change, the company 
has lower risk of financial distress. The variable of listing at any other exchange 
implies that when companies are regulated and invested by different backgrounds of 




Table 6.5.3 Variable selection of management compensation 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.316** 0.290 4.54 0.000 
     ManagementSalary  0.871 0.837 1.04 0.298 
DirectorSalary -0.565 1.247 -0.45 0.650 
IndependentDirectorSalary  6.567** 1.910 3.44 0.001 
SeniorSalary  1.150 1.267 0.91 0.364 
NonpaidSeniorStaff -0.074** 0.030 -2.44 0.015 
     Constant -7.414** 0.848 -8.74 0.000 
 
Among the variables of management compensation, if the salary cost of an 
independent director is large, the company has a high risk of financial distress.  
There may be two reasons for this. On one hand, the salary cost for an independent 
director places a burden on a company’s financial condition. On the other hand, more 
importantly, when an independent director is paid a lot of money, he or she tends not 
to speak negatively or disagree with the management. When there are more unpaid 
senior staff, it is a possible indicator that the company’s future is promising. Unpaid 
senior staff who may be the founders of the company can then be rewarded by the 








Table 6.5.4 Variable selection of director and manager characteristics 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.427** 0.294 4.86 0.000 
     ChairGender_d -0.788 0.596 -1.32 0.186 
ChairAge -0.041** 0.012 -3.27 0.001 
ChairCollege_d  0.143 0.454 0.32 0.753 
ChairUndergraduate_d  0.451 0.346 1.3 0.192 
ChairMasters_d  0.083 0.356 0.23 0.815 
ChairDoctorate_d  0.277 0.511 0.54 0.588 
ChairQualification_d -0.434 0.278 -1.56 0.118 
ChairNationality_d -0.268 1.088 -0.25 0.806 
ChairPaid_d  0.245 0.199 1.23 0.218 
ChairConpost_d -0.147 0.204 -0.72 0.469 
CEOGender_d -0.023 0.405 -0.06 0.955 
CEOAge -0.019 0.014 -1.34 0.181 
CEOCollege_d  0.326 0.400 0.81 0.416 
CEOUndergraduate_d -0.071 0.341 -0.21 0.835 
CEOMasters_d -0.669* 0.372 -1.8 0.072 
CEODoctorate_d -0.097 0.583 -0.17 0.868 
CEOQualification_d  0.110 0.273 0.4 0.687 
CEONationality_d  1.262* 0.669 1.89 0.059 
CEOPaid_d -0.172 0.479 -0.36 0.720 
CEOConpost_d -0.685** 0.251 -2.73 0.006 
     Constant -3.888** 1.152 -3.38 0.001 
 
Among those seven characteristics for both the Chair and the CEO, only four of them 
are significant at 10% level of significance. They are: the Chair’s age, the CEO’s 
education if he or she has a master degree, the CEO’s nationality and whether the 
CEO has another position in other organisations. As the Chair grows older, his or her 
experience increases and they become more cautious in doing business than young 
entrepreneurs. When the CEO has a Master’s degree, our data shows one third of 
them hold an MBA degree (Master for Business Administration) which is helpful in 
chief executive jobs. Compared to the Chair, only a quarter of them possess MBA 
degrees out of all master degrees. When the CEO is not Chinese, they may have 
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difficulties in adapting to the business culture in China. When the CEO has another 
position in other organisations, they possess more social relationships and resources. 
In a country like China where social relationships (guanxi) are important in doing 
business (Xin and Pearce, 1996), such concurrent posts provide extra benefits for the 
listed companies.  
 
All significant variables above the 10% significance level enter the next step of 
regression and those remaining significant at 5% significance level compose Model 1. 
This procedure can keep the most explanatory variables in the model.  
 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.481** 0.312 4.75 0.000 
  
    Boardsize -0.054 0.050 -1.08 0.282 
Supervisor -0.024 0.075 -0.32 0.749 
SeniorManager -0.072 0.046 -1.59 0.111 
WorkLocation_d -0.593** 0.203 -2.93 0.003 
SOE_d -0.451** 0.195 -2.31 0.021 
InstitutionShares -8.368** 1.751 -4.78 0.000 
Otherlisting_d -0.128 0.347 -0.37 0.712 
CapitalChange_d -0.556 0.368 -1.51 0.103 
IndependentDirectorSalary  2.226** 0.648 3.43 0.001 
NonpaidSeniorStaff -0.031 0.031 -1.01 0.314 
ChairAge -0.034** 0.012 -2.86 0.004 
CEOMasters_d -0.597** 0.253 -2.35 0.019 
CEONationality_d  0.942 0.643 1.47 0.143 
CEOConpost_d -0.818** 0.231 -3.54 0.000 
  
    Constant -3.951** 1.081 -2.85 0.004 
 
It can be noted that the board size, the number of senior managers, indicator if the 
share capital is changed, and the number of non-paid senior staff become 
insignificant when putting them together into one model. Finally, Model 1 consists of 
seven corporate governance measures, one from the board composition, two from the 
ownership structure, one from the management compensation, three from the 
director’s characteristics (Table 6.5.5). With the exception of the salary cost of the 
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top 3 independent variables which increase the probability of financial distress when 
it goes up, all the rest will reduce the probability when they are of specific quality.  
 
Table 6.5.5 Results of Model 1 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.670** 0.304 5.49 0.000 
  
    WorkLocation_d -0.726** 0.219 -3.32 0.001 
SOE_d -0.969** 0.181 -5.35 0.002 
InstitutionShares -12.916** 2.152 -6.00 0.000 
IndependentDirectorSalary 3.866** 0.601 6.42 0.000 
ChairAge -0.064** 0.012 -5.32 0.000 
CEOMasters_d -0.827** 0.274 -3.02 0.003 
CEOConpost_d -1.119 ** 0.252 -4.45 0.000 
  
    Constant -3.277** 0.757 -4.33 0.000 
Logistic Regression          Log likelihood = -542.607  
Number of obs = 4635      LR chi2(8) = 245.89 
Prob > chi2 = 0                 Pseudo R2 = 0.185 
 
6.5.2 Model 2 
 
Table 6.5.6 Results of Model 2 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 0.0466* 0.285 1.62 0.87 
  
    Return on Assets -0.069** 0.016 -4.28 0.000 
tangible Assets / Total Assets -0.028** 0.005 -5.85 0.000 
Current Liabilities / Total Liabilities 0.078** 0.012 6.72 0.000 
Net cash flow from operation / Total Liabilities -0.025** 0.005 -5.22 0.000 
Receivables Turnover 0.007** 0.001 4.67 0.000 
Total Assets Growth -0.026** 0.005 -4.68 0.000 
  
    Constant -8.938** 1.170 -7.64 0.000 
Logistic Regression          Log likelihood = -505.959  
Number of obs = 4635      LR chi2(7) = 319.19 




In Model 2 (Table 6.5.6), all six financial ratios are forced into the model and they all 
appear to be significant in making a prediction about whether the company will have 
financial difficulty. Return on assets, tangible assets / total assets, net cash flow from 
operation / total liabilities and total assets growth, are negatively associated with the 
probability of financial distress. Current liabilities / total liabilities and receivables 
turnover, are positively associated with the probability of financial distress.  
 
6.5.3 Model 3 
 
In Model 3, all significant corporate governance measures and financial ratios are 
combined and all of them remain significant with the same signs as in Model 1 and 
Model 2. Details of results are presented in Table 6.5.7.  
 
Table 6.5.7 Results of Model 3 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 1.048** 0.347 3.02 0.003 
  
    WorkLocation_d -0.718** 0.233 -3.08 0.002 
SOE_d -0.877** 0.195 -4.50 0.000 
InstitutionShares -6.782** 2.010 -3.38 0.001 
IndependentDirectorSalary 3.649** 0.660 5.53 0.000 
ChairAge -0.061** 0.013 -4.61 0.000 
CEOMasters_d -0.836** 0.295 -2.83 0.005 
CEOConpost_d -0.881** 0.270 -3.26 0.001 
      
Return on Assets -0.065** 0.017 -3.70 0.000 
tangible Assets / Total Assets -0.028** 0.005 -5.70 0.000 
Current Liabilities / Total Liabilities 0.069** 0.011 5.96 0.000 
Net cash flow from operation / Total Liabilities -0.020** 0.005 -3.86 0.000 
Receivables Turnover 0.006** 0.001 3.69 0.000 
Total Assets Growth -0.022** 0.005 -4.04 0.000 
  
    Constant -7.510** 1.340 -5.61 0.000 
Logistic Regression          Log likelihood = -438.580  
Number of obs = 4635      LR chi2(14) = 453.95 




6.5.4 Model 4 
 
In Model 4, macroeconomic factors are added into Model 3. Finally it was found that 
the consumer price inflation rate is significant in the model. Accordingly coefficients 
of other covariates are slightly changed.  
 
Table 6.5.8 Results of Model 4 
ST Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
ln(duration) 0.482 0.340 1.20 0.228 
  
    WorkLocation_d -0.649** 0.235 -2.76 0.006 
SOE_d -0.877** 0.196 -4.48 0.000 
InstitutionShares -7.861** 2.104 -3.74 0.000 
IndependentDirectorSalary 3.915** 0.676 5.79 0.000 
ChairAge -0.061** 0.013 -4.58 0.000 
CEOMasters_d -0.863** 0.296 -2.91 0.004 
CEOConpost_d -0.802** 0.272 -2.95 0.003 
      
Return on Assets -0.066** 0.017 -3.76 0.000 
tangible Assets / Total Assets -0.029** 0.005 -5.79 0.000 
Current Liabilities / Total Liabilities 0.069** 0.011 5.93 0.000 
Net cash flow from operation / Total Liabilities -0.019** 0.005 -3.81 0.000 
Receivables Turnover 0.006** 0.001 3.73 0.000 
Total Assets Growth -0.022** 0.005 -4.09 0.000 
      
Inflation 0.197** 0.070 2.81 0.005 
  
    Constant -7.341** 1.345 -5.46 0.000 
Logistic Regression          Log likelihood = -434.551  
Number of obs = 4635      LR chi2(15) = 462.01 
Prob > chi2 = 0                 Pseudo R2 = 0.3471 
 
6.6 Predictive accuracy 
 
Table 6.6.1 presents the results of predictive accuracy which is measured by Hand’s 
H measure, AUR, Gini and KS. Four panels were built where Panel A is the 
estimation of parameters. Generally in-sample prediction produces the best results 
among out-of-sample or out-of-time predictions and the within time out-of-sample 
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prediction comes the next. Understandably, results in Panel D is underperformed 
because neither the sample nor the time is attached to the model training.  
 
Table 6.6.1 Predictive accuracy of Model 1-4 
  Panel A  Panel B  (training) (within time out-of-sample) 
  H AUC Gini KS H AUC Gini KS 
Model 1 0.064 0.829 0.658 0.523 0.024 0.811 0.622 0.498 
Model 2 0.082 0.871 0.743 0.591 0.056 0.833 0.666 0.545 
Model 3 0.158 0.915 0.831 0.687 0.094 0.902 0.803 0.671 
Model 4 0.170 0.916 0.833 0.686 0.110 0.903 0.805 0.666 
  
Panel C Panel D 
(within sample out-of-time) (out-of-time out-of-sample) 
  H AUC Gini KS H AUC Gini KS 
Model 1 0.137 0.694 0.389 0.301 0.034 0.768 0.536 0.512 
Model 2 0.065 0.826 0.651 0.528 0.002 0.785 0.570 0.516 
Model 3 0.105 0.868 0.736 0.568 0.019 0.852 0.704 0.628 
Model 4 0.169 0.876 0.752 0.586 0.111 0.860 0.721 0.688 
The highest value for each statistic is in bold.  
 
The performance of Model 1 with only governance measures is acceptable in the in-
time validation (Gini=0.622). However it declines dramatically when it is applied to 
the other period. Its Gini coefficients are only 0.389 and 0.536 in Panel C and Panel 
D respectively, which means using only corporate governance measures to predict 
financial distress is not practical. When combined with financial ratios in Model 3, 
the predictive accuracy is much improved. The larger KS values indicate the 
probabilities of the Good and Bad are enhanced as the absolute distance between 
them is wider.   
 
The best performance comes from Model 4 when corporate governance measures, 
financial ratios and macroeconomic factors are all used in the modelling. If the 
differences in the within-time predictions are not that clear (0.833 to 0.831 and 0.805 
to 0.803), in the out-of-time predictions, macroeconomic factors make a significant 
contribution to the predictive accuracy (0.752 to 0.736 and 0.721 to 0.704). The 




In the further analysis when looking at the predictive accuracy in separated years, we 
take AUC as an example (Table 6.6.2). Figure 6.6.1 may present the contrast clearly. 
The predictive accuracy of Model 1 is poorer than that of Model 2 except in 2007. 
The difference between Model 3 and Model 4 is very close because only one 
macroeconomic factor (inflation) is added to Model 4.  
 
Table 6.6.2 Model performance (AUC) in separated years 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Model 1 0.806 0.787 0.835 0.712 0.874 0.800 0.727 0.798 
Model 2 0.809 0.864 0.760 0.819 0.910 0.833 0.829 0.772 
Model 3 0.879 0.914 0.865 0.862 0.950 0.908 0.863 0.851 
Model 4 0.901 0.915 0.868 0.866 0.954 0.899 0.891 0.856 
 





Corporate governance has attracted wide academic attention in many subjects in 
recent 20 years and some studies have found that certain aspects of the corporate 
governance of a company were linked to corporate performance or financial 
conditions. However, such studies cannot completely be regarded as applicable to 
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corporate credit modelling because most of them looked into their relationships and 
testing hypotheses. A good credit scoring model should also apply them to making 
predictions in advance on the probability of becoming distressed.  
 
This research is the first to apply a large selection of corporate governance measures 
in predicting corporate credit risk by using a large panel dataset of 8 years for 1688 
companies. The data of Chinese listed companies has provided an opportunity to 
look in more detail at the ownership structure of SOEs which are common in China 
and the influence on other corporate governance practices. A discrete time hazard 
methodology is applied to investigate the question. The discrete time hazard model 
not only gives dynamic results which are more robust and reliable but also is able to 
take into account time-varying covariates such as macroeconomic factors. Four 
models of different groups of covariates are compared.  
 
In total, thirty-five corporate governance measures were extracted from the database. 
They are grouped into four categories: board composition, ownership structure, 
management compensation and director and manager characteristics. For board 
composition, a large board, more supervisors and senior managers will lead to a low 
chance of having financial difficulty, but only the independent director’s working 
location is significant in prediction. This is because an independent director could be 
hired by many companies, and only when he does work within the company and 
carries out his duties can he provide suggestions and improve performance.  
 
For ownership structure, the indicator of SOEs, the indicator of share capital change 
and institutional ownership are found to be strongly significant. Their signs are all 
negative which means SOEs are not easily distressed. When active investors such as 
institutional shareholders have the ability to detect potential risks so when to the 
companies in which they have large investment, there is lower risks of financial 
distress. For management compensation, when independent directors are paid more, 
the company can easily go into distress because the independent directors are 
reluctant to comment negatively on their employers. When there are more senior 
staff including directors, supervisors and managers who are not paid, the company 
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has less probability of distress. As for director and manager characteristics: the 
Chair’s age, the CEO’s Masters education and positions in other organisations could 
help the company reduce the probability of distress. Six financial ratios are selected 
in prediction and model comparison. In macroeconomic factors, only the inflation 
rate has been found to be positively correlated with the distress risk.  
 
In terms of predictive accuracy, corporate governance measures alone have limited 
capacity in detecting financial distress no matter whether by H, AUROC, Gini and 
KS. Financial ratios can do relatively well in predicting alone. However, when 
combining the two together, the predictive accuracy is significantly improved. The 
best prediction model comes from the combination of corporate governance 
measures, financial ratios and a macroeconomic factor (inflation). It outperforms the 
other three models in both out-of-sample and out-of-time predictions. In the 
performance separated by individual years, the ranking of models in most years 
remains the same.  
 
There are some other points which could be further investigated in the scope of 
corporate governance in predicting corporate credit risk, such as shareholders’ 
meetings, accountancy and audit opinions, and the director’s previous experience. 


















While accounting and market related information has dominated corporate credit 
models for decades, researchers are still trying to find some other explanatory 
variables to predict bankruptcy or financial distress to improve the classification 
accuracy or act as the main variables when financial information is not available. 
This thesis mainly investigates the use of corporate efficiency and corporate 
governance measures in standard statistical credit models including cross-sectional 
and discrete hazard models.  
 
In Chapter Two, various literature regarding the algorithms and variables in credit 
models was reviewed. The definition of ‘default’ in corporate credit models is rather 
a broad concept and in many papers, different definitions have been used. This 
research focuses on financial distress which is common in business. Generally the 
development of classification algorithms started from discriminant analysis, and then 
regression models dominated. In recent years, artificial intelligence models have 
become popular and other classification methods such as mathematical programming 
have also been used. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages and usually 
hybrid models, which can make use of their strengths and eliminate their weaknesses, 
are preferred. The models with DEA in this research are a kind of hybrid model 
because they combine both DEA and logistic regression in two stages. Accounting 
and market-related information is the most used predictive variables in previous 
models but at the same time, nonfinancial and management related information is 
generally useful. This thesis follows the studies of nonfinancial information by 
investigating the use of corporate efficiency and governance measures whist we do 
not disregard the importance of financial ratios.  
 
In Chapter Three, the data used in modelling was introduced. Over 2,000 Chinese 
listed companies made up the sample for this research. A stratified sampling method 
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is applied to ensure the distributions of good samples and bad samples are similar 
across industries. The indicator of financial distress, Special Treatment, is officially 
imposed by the government on all Chinese listed companies. The measurement of 
model performance is Type I and Type II errors, AUC, Gini, KS and the H measure 
which takes the cost of misclassification into account.  
 
Chapter Four is the first main project of this thesis which is a cross sectional analysis 
using corporate efficiency measures. Unlike most previous literature that does not 
consider the VRS and homogeneity industry assumptions in DEA, our models 
carefully addressed these issues in both the calculation of DEA efficiency and 
regression parameters. Two periods of time were selected to be the training and test 
samples and three industries were used in modelling. DEA inputs and outputs were 
chosen to be physical and monetary items in annual reports. Results have revealed 
that efficiency measures can improve the predictive accuracy among which Scale 
Efficiency is more significant.  
 
Chapter Five extended Chapter Four to a panel analysis based on three industries 
over the period of 2001-2010. It was found that the latest credit models in the 
literature have changed from static models to multi period dynamic models because 
the latter are more capable and suitable in the context of prediction. The different 
characteristics between industries were addressed by recognising the heterogeneity of 
them in both DEA and hazard models. Malmquist DEA can deal with panel data and 
all efficiency scores were calculated with reference to the first period. Global 
referenced efficiency and super efficiency scores were also calculated. Dynamic 
models were successfully built up in two ways: DEA scores to predict financial 
distress directly and to be used in the simple hazard models as a variable with some 
financial ratios.  
 
Chapter Six turned to investigate the use of corporate governance measures. 
Corporate governance in China is a little different from that practised in Western 
countries because of its socialism background, short history of the securities market 
and heavy concentration on state ownership. Nevertheless, important features have 
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been captured in four groups of corporate governance measures. There were 35 
governance variables integrated in simple hazard models and used in predictions on 
1688 companies over 8 years. Each of those four groups of corporate governance 
were found to contribute to the probability of financial distress and macroeconomic 




In the cross sectional analysis, the empirical results confirmed that companies of 
lower efficiency have higher risks of financial distress. We further decomposed the 
overall technical efficiency into Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency and 
found that an inefficient company should improve the efficiency of its use of inputs 
or adjust its operating scale to the optimum level to achieve better performance. 
However the decomposition offers little help in improving predictive accuracy. In the 
out-of-time validation, a simple model using technical efficiency to assist financial 
ratios is more effective than in the others. The inclusion of a  indicator has no 
influence on the predictive accuracy. DEA efficiency cannot predict financial distress 
well enough without the information of financial ratios because financial ratios are 
still powerful and dominant in their explanatory ability. The industry specific 
regression model made it possible to use DEA efficiency correctly and models 
considering homogeneity of sample are recommended for other similar research. 
 
In the panel analysis, some results of the cross sectional analysis were further 
validated by multi period data and the discrete hazard models which take account of 
the effect of time. Malmquist DEA is found to be capable of calculating dynamic 
efficiency scores because its efficiency is comparable in both cross sectional and 
time serial formats. A Malmquist productivity index is defined as the product of 
efficiency change (catch-up) and technological change (frontier-shift) and 
mathematically it is calculated by the standard DEA scores at two periods and two 
intertemporal scores with reference to the efficiency frontier of the other period. The 
reference set in Malmquist DEA models may change the relative values in efficiency 
scores and both the fixed reference to the first period and the global reference which 
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comes from the historically most efficient units were used in our models. Six types of 
efficiency scores were tried in hazard models and the model with Global Efficiency 
performed best in both out-of-time and out-of-sample. In practice, the global 
reference could be obtained by utilising a considerably long period of historic data on 
a large sample. This then gave a better prediction on the probability of financial 
distress when taking corporate efficiency into account. Using Malmquist DEA scores 
to directly predict financial distress in future time is still an effective and efficient 
way to apply DEA to corporate credit risk as it only requires a one-step calculation 
(DEA programming) compared to a two stage analysis (DEA and regression).  
 
In the research of corporate governance measures, it was found that a large board, 
more supervisors and senior managers will lead to a low chance of having financial 
difficulty. SOEs are less likely to have financial difficulties. When independent 
directors are paid less or fewer senior staff are not paid, the company has a lower 
probability of distress. Additionally the Chair’s age, the possession by the CEO of a  
Master’s degree and positions in other organisations could help the company reduce 
the probability of distress. When activist investors such as institutional shareholders 
have the ability to detect potential risks in the companies in which they have large 
investment, there will be have lower risks of financial distress. In terms of the 
predictive accuracy, the best model comes from the combination of corporate 
governance measures, financial ratios and the inflation rate. The discriminant power 
of governance measures is heavily reduced in out-of-time predictions.  
 
7.3 Contributions  
 
Distinctive contributions have been made by this thesis to the literature. They are 
generally divided into three parts consequential to each research project. 
 
First, it is concerned with the assumptions of DEA to calculate the relative efficiency 
scores. In DEA models, the efficiency of a company is relative to the most efficient 
one in its peer group. Homogeneity of comparable samples is required to be 
consistent across similar activities, similar resources and a similar environment 
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according to Dyson et al (2001). Almost all studies such as Cielen et al, (2004); 
Premachandra et al, (2009); Premachandra et al, (2011) did not pay attention to this 
so their relative efficiency may not be valid. This thesis has corrected this by treating 
each industry separately and built industry specific regression models. Our cross 
sectional models have also applied VRS and further decomposed the overall 
Technical Efficiency into Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency to add 
extra information in predictive models. This has not been done before.  
 
Second, no study has ever carried out a panel analysis of DEA scores in predicting 
credit risk. Chapter Five has successfully extended the cross sectional analysis into a 
multi period analysis, more specifically a survival analysis. Hazard models are not 
unfamiliar in this field after Shumway (2001) commented that the likelihood function 
of discrete hazard models are the same as those for multi period logistic regression. 
Many examples of discrete hazard models in corporate risk can be found in Carling 
et al (2007), Nam et al (2008), De Leonardis and Rocci (2013), Wilson and Altanlar 
(2014) etc. and some DEA models of multi period capacity can be found in Tone and 
Tsutsui (2009), Charnes et al (1985) and Fare et al (1994) but our model is the first 
to join together Malmquist DEA in the first stage and a discrete hazard model in the 
second stage. In this way, it is possible to combine the benefits from the previous 
paragraph with the advantages of hazard models into prediction of credit risk. More 
robust and informative results can be provided for academics and businessmen. 
Various reference sets in Malmquist DEA models have some differences in the 
results and modellers can choose the best for their preferences.  
 
Third, this research is the first to integrate four aspects of corporate governance 
measures: board composition, ownership structure, management compensation and 
director and manager characteristics in a panel analysis to predict the probability of 
financial distress. Though some attributes of these four aspects have been tested 
individually in past literature (Dalton, 1994; Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Fich and 
Slezak, 2008; Platt and Platt, 2012; etc.), this research is the most comprehensive, 
including 35 variables in predictive models. In each of the four aspects of corporate 
governance, we conclude that SOE status, institutional shareholding, the salary of 
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independent directors, their working location, the Chair’s age, the CEO’s Masters 
degree all can contribute significantly to a prediction of the probability of financial 
distress. 
 
Fourth, this research uses Chinese data, which is different from most studies that 
instead have concentrated on the US, the UK or other EU countries. It is one of the 
very few studies in the literature of credit models focusing on China (Wang and 
Deng, 2006; Sun and Li, 2008). Credit scoring and corporate credit models 
originated in Western countries and we can also see the importance of applying them 
to emerging markets represented by China. Financial risks have to be addressed 
despite its great economic development. As the volume of foreign investment 
increases every year, the corresponding increased use of credit scoring should be 
followed as an efficient way of evaluating loan requests. 
 
Fifty, the empirical data used in this research covers the recent global financial crisis. 
Though the default rate in China over the crisis period was unlike that found in other 
parts of the world (in China the peak was prior to the crisis as in Figure 3.4.1), it is 
certainly because of China’s unique economic trend and default also follows the 
pattern of its economy. The model with macroeconomic variables has given evidence 
that inflation rate is a significant predictor of the probability of financial distress. The 
panel models that included the effect of changes over the crisis period make 
predictions robust over time.  
 
7.4 Policy implications 
 
Apart from the academic contributions, this thesis can also give policy makers 
insightful thoughts which can be implemented in practice.  
 
It is found that Scale Efficiency is more significant than Pure Technical Efficiency in 
predicting financial distress which means that practically a firm which wants to 
perform better should pay more attention to optimising its scale of business rather 
than optimising resources or applying new technology. This can benefit managers 
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and owners of companies and tell them how to improve the efficiency of their 
management to generate more output and profits for shareholders. 
 
In this thesis we find that measures of corporate governance have been found 
significantly linked to financial distress. It is not only the responsibility of 
shareholders, owners and managers of companies to carefully address the appropriate 
corporate governance structure but also regulators who supervise listed companies 
and other forms of companies have to realise the importance of corporate governance, 
specifically for aspects of state ownership and independent directors. Policy makers 
set standards for companies to follow.  
 
Unlike China’s economic success, the financial regulations and corresponding risk 
management system in China have not been well established. Although BIS has 
implemented the Basel Accords for decades, in China, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC, 2007) finally, in 2007, put the Guidance on the Implementation 
of New Capital Accord Chinese Banking into effect. The Chinese version of the 
Capital Accord has followed a progressive plan that it is compulsory for large 
international Chinese banks which are required to implement it by the end of 2013 
but it has been voluntary for other small commercial banks since 2011. The banking 
policy makers in China need to pay attention to credit risk and its control and 
management to prevent any possible crisis. It is obvious that most banks in China 
have not established their own internal risk management tools because the Guidelines 
on Advanced Capital Measurement Method and Validation just came out in 2009 and 
it takes slow steps in its implementation. Because credit risk control is one of the 
focuses, Chinese banks may be interested in the calibration of the credit risk of their 
portfolios and this thesis can provide them with some options. Other investors who 
want to invest in Chinese stocks can clearly import the models in this thesis and build 
their ratings and scores to predict how Chinese listed companies are going to perform 
in the future.  
 
In addition, policy makers should also pay attention to the influence of the economy 




7.5 Limitations and future research 
 
Although this thesis has made several contributions, at the same time it has some 
limitations as is reasonable for all kinds of research. The availability of data is one of 
the biggest concerns in this research. Due to the consideration of the credibility and 
reliability of data, because we wished to focus on Chinese data, listed companies was 
the only option we could choose. Despite the short history of the Chinese securities 
markets, the slow development of regulations restricts the availability of data even 
further as regulations adhered to the market cannot be sound in the beginning. It is 
only since 1998 or even 2000 that the important information about financial distress, 
accounting and corporate governance started to become usable. This has significantly 
reduced the available data to be more or less ten years. For a panel analysis, it is 
acceptable.  
 
Apart from this, the sample size in the cross sectional analysis is relatively small. In 
2000, there were only 1,000 listed companies and by the end of 2012, there were 
nearly 2,500 (Figure 3.2.1). Though the growth of the size of the market (both the 
value and the number) was fast, over 900 companies were newly listed after 2008. 
These are relatively young and can hardly be used by the model. For the sample of 
distressed companies, as we used the indicator imposed by the government, there 
were only about 450 such companies from 2000 to 2010, including those with 
multiple ST experiences. As the first two projects have to consider industrial 
classification, a smaller sample and less bad cases can only be employed in analysis. 
In the process of modelling, because of censoring and the time lag, only 2,665 
observations were actually useful in training the model, which is not comparable 
with some studies with millions of samples. For statistical analysis, the larger the 
sample size the better to make the results statistically robust. Future research can be 
easily extend the work here by including data of recent years or applying the 




The models with DEA efficiency only applied them in three industries. These were 
Raw Materials, Industrial Equipment and Real Estate as we wanted to fit the models 
with the most bad cases. At the same time, we should bear in mind that the risks of 
financial distress between industries are naturally different, which can be reflected in 
the baseline hazard. As our industry specific models can deal with DEA efficiency in 
different industries, more sectors can be added in both DEA and regression but we 
still need to pay attention to the requirements of DEA and require that the samples 
from each industry be large enough. When the target is not restricted in large or 
listed companies, there may be no problem in model training. The only argument 
may lie in the debate between complexity of models and accuracy of predictions, and 
it largely depends on the preference of practitioners and modellers. There were 
studies such as Bonfim (2009) who used 11 dummies to control for 11 sectors. 
Furthermore, if one wants to keep the homogeneity of DMUs even more rigid, a 
further detailed level of industry classification can be applied. According to the 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC), dozens of subsectors can be defined so the 
predictive models can be correspondingly segmented.  
 
Another limitation may be concerned with the indicator of financial distress – 
Special Treatment. In the survival analysis, some cases of ST were censored before 
and after the observation period. The former cases were left out of the sample and the 
latter cases were treated as healthy. ST is a financial condition state which means a 
company may remain in ST for years and move into this state several times. It would 
be interesting to model the severity (length in distress) or behaviour (the number of 
occasions) when a company moves in to ST. Besides, the Chinese government 
imposes a marker of ‘*’ (star) on those distressed companies which have three 
consecutive losses in profits to give a warning of delisting for investors. Therefore 
Chinese listed companies actually have four states of financial conditions: normal, 
ST, ST* and delisted where stochastic models may be suitable. Further work could 
be done by the combination of DEA and the stochastic process, which may be 




The evolution of corporate governance in China also brings limitations to Chapter 
Six. The transition in regulations and enforcement of laws can be viewed as positive 
changes in terms of corporate governance but it is harmful for modelling. The study 
of corporate governance measures may come from countries such as the UK and the 
US where sound systems have already been established. In the case of China, we still 
would like to see the compensation schemes being clearer, including bonus and 
option incentives for senior managers and directors being disclosed, as one of the 
important variables in this research. The database also provides information about 
auditing, shareholder meetings, dividends distribution and the resumes of directors 
and managers, which could all be used in modelling as they have been tried in past 
literature. Particularly, the resumes can be coded into qualitative data such as 
previous experience and employment and this saves much time in collecting data by 
qualitative methods for so many people.   
 
Finally, although this research focuses on large corporations, the methodology can 
also be applied to SMEs whose efficiency and governance are especially important to 
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# This is R code for H, AUC, AUCH, GINI, and KS statistic 
# In addition to these statistics, the output includes 
# - the kernel smoothed score distributions of the two classes 
# - the ROC curve and convex hull 
#  - a plot of the minimum loss produced for each value of c 
#  - the weight function implicitly used by the AUC, as a 
function of score 
# - the weight function implicitly used by the AUC, as a 
function of c 
# - the weight function used by the AUC measure 
 
# data is in a matrix called ‘inp’ with two columns 
# column 1: classes, labelled 0 or 1 
# column 2: classifier scores 
 
n0n1 <- nrow(inp) 
 
x <- t(inp) 
 
# alpha and betad are the parameters in the beta  
# cost distribution ~ c^alpha * (1-c)^betad 
 
alpha <- 2 




# Smoothed histograms 
class0 <- x[,x[1,]==0] 
class1 <- x[,x[1,]==1] 
 
xmin <- min(x[2,]) 
xmax <- max(x[2,]) 
plot(density(class0[2,]),xlim=c(xmin,xmax),main= "Kernel smoothed 
score distributions ",xlab= "Score ") 
lines(density(class1[2,]),lty=4) 
 
# order data into increasing scores 
zord <- order(x[2,]) 
 
sc <- x[,zord] 
 
n1 <- sum(sc[1,]) 
n0 <- n0n1 - n1 
pi0 <- n0/n0n1 
pi1 <- n1/n0n1 
 
# Calculate the raw ROC, replacing any tied 
# sequences by a ‘diagonal’ in the ROC curve. 
 
# The raw ROC starts at F0[1]=0, F1[1]=0, and ends at 
# F0[K1]=n0, F1[K1]=n1. 
 
F0 <- c(0:n0n1) 
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F1 <- c(0:n0n1) 
 
sc <- cbind(sc,sc[,n0n1]) 
 
K1 <- 1 
k <- 2 
for (i in 1:n0n1) 
{ 
F0[k] <- F0[K1]+(1-sc[1,i]) 
F1[k] <- F1[K1]+sc[1,i] 
K1 <- k 
k <- if (sc[2,i+1] == sc[2,i]) (k) else (k+1) 
} 
 
F0 <- F0[1:K1] 
F1 <- F1[1:K1] 
 
# Plot the ROC 
plot(F1/n1,F0/n0, xlab= "F1 ",ylab= "F0 ",type= "l", main= "ROC 
curve and convex hull ") 
lines(c(0,1),c(0,1),type= "l") 
 
# Compute KS statistic 
KS <- max((F0/n0) - (F1/n1)) 
 
# Find the upper concave hull 
 
G0 <- c(0:(K1-1)) 
G1 <- c(0:(K1-1)) 
 
 
i <- 1 
hc <- 1 
while (i < K1) 
{ 
c1 <- c((i+1):K1) 
for (j in (i+1):K1) 
{ 
u1 <- (F1[j]-F1[i]) 
u0 <- (F0[j]-F0[i]) 
c1[j] <- u1/(u1+u0) 
} 
 
argmin <- i+1 
c1min <- c1[i+1] 
for (k in (i+1):K1) 
{ 
argmin <- if (c1[k] <= c1min) (k) else (argmin) 
c1min <- c1[argmin] 
} 
hc <- hc+1 
G0[hc] <- F0[argmin] 
G1[hc] <- F1[argmin] 
i <- argmin 
} 
G0 <- G0[1:hc]/n0 
G1 <- G1[1:hc]/n1 
 
# Draw hull 
lines(G1,G0,type= "l",lty=2) 
 
# Calculate the LHalpha value 
 
cost <- c(1:(hc+1)) 
b0 <- c(1:hc+1) 




cost[1] <- 0 
cost[hc+1] <- 1 
 
b0[1] <- 
  pbeta(cost[1],shape1=(1+alpha), shape2=betad)* 
  beta((1+alpha), betad)/   beta(alpha, betad) 
 
b1[1] <- 
  pbeta(cost[1],shape1=alpha, shape2=(1+betad))* 
  beta(alpha, (1+betad))/   beta(alpha, betad) 
 
b0[hc+1] <- 
  pbeta(cost[hc+1],shape1=(1+alpha), shape2=betad)* 
  beta((1+alpha), betad)/ beta(alpha, betad) 
 
b1[hc+1] <- 
  pbeta(cost[hc+1],shape1=alpha, shape2=(1+betad))* 
  beta(alpha, (1+betad))/ beta(alpha, betad) 
 
for (i in 2:hc) 
{ 
cost[i] <- pi1*(G1[i]-G1[i-1]) /  
   (pi0*(G0[i]-G0[i-1]) + pi1*(G1[i]-G1[i-1])) 
 
b0[i] <- 
  pbeta(cost[i],shape1=(1+alpha), shape2=betad)* 
  beta((1+alpha), betad)/ beta(alpha, betad) 
 
b1[i] <- 
  pbeta(cost[i],shape1=alpha, shape2=(1+betad))* 




LHalpha <- 0 
for (i in 1:hc) 




B0 <-  
  pbeta(pi1,shape1=(1+alpha), shape2=betad)* 
  beta((1+alpha), betad)/ beta(alpha, betad) 
 
B1 <- 
  pbeta(1,shape1=alpha, shape2=(1+betad))* 
  beta(alpha, (1+betad))/ beta(alpha, betad) - 
 
  pbeta(pi1,shape1=alpha, shape2=(1+betad))* 
  beta(alpha, (1+betad))/ beta(alpha, betad) 
 
H <- 1 - LHalpha/(pi0*B0 + pi1*B1)  
 
 
# Calculate the area under the ROC curve, AUC 
 
K11 <- K1+1 
 
F0[K11] <- n0 
F1[K11] <- n1 
 
F0 <- F0[1:K11] 
F1 <- F1[1:K11] 
 
F0A <- F0[2:K11] 




F1A <- F1[2:K11] 
F1B <- F1[1:K1] 
 
AUC <- sum((F0A-F0B)*(n1-(F1A+F1B)/2))/(n0*n1) 
Gini <- 2*AUC - 1 
 
# CALCULATE THE AREA UNDER THE CONVEX HULL, AUCH 
 
AUCH <- 0 
for (i in 1:(hc-1)) 
{ 




# CALCULATE THE MINIMUM LOSS VS c CURVE 
 
Q <- c(1:(hc+1)) 
 
for (i in 1:hc) 
{ 
Q[i] <- cost[i]*pi0*(1-G0[i]) + (1-cost[i])*pi1*G1[i] 
} 
Q[(hc+1)] <- 0 
 
plot(cost,Q,type= "l", main= "Minimum loss by cost ",xlab= "cost 
",ylab= "Minimum achievable loss ") 
 
# PLOT THE AUC MIXTURE WEIGHT FUNCTION IN TERMS 
# OF THE SCORE 
 
plot(density(x[2,]),lty=1,xlab= "Score ",main= " AUC measure weight 
function of T", ylab= "W(t)") 
 
# PLOT THE AUC MIXTURE WEIGHT FUNCTION IN TERMS 
# OF THE COST 
 
aucd <- c((n0*G0 + n1*G1),1) 
aucd2 <- c(1, (n0*G0 + n1*G1)) 
aucf <- (aucd-aucd2)/n0n1 
 
plot(cost[2:hc],aucf[2:hc],type= "h", xlim=c(0,1), ylim=c(0,1),main= 
"AUC measure weight function of c",xlab= "Cost",ylab= "w(c)") 
 
# PLOT THE BETA WEIGHT FUNCTION IN TERMS OF THE COST 
 
b <- c(1:100)/100 
y <- dbeta(b,alpha,betad) 
plot(b,y,type= "l",xlab= "Cost ", main= "H measure weight function 










Appendix B  Description of Malmquist DEA inputs and outputs  
 
Values are in million CNY except the number of employees. 
 
   
employees debts costs assets capitals profits cash sales 
2001 
1510 Mean 4207 1147 1491 2539 538 92 27 1581 
 Max 45943 31752 25498 58042 12512 3710 872 29171 
 Min 104 43 38 144 51 -1797 -3686 20 2010 Mean 2866 824 972 1659 295 50 46 1009 
 Max 33874 4810 19359 9908 1884 1012 883 19565 
 Min 54 46 38 198 51 -1010 -686 24 4040 Mean 1159 789 503 1573 288 41 47 530 
 Max 5349 7381 4157 9690 1868 502 819 4455 
 Min 36 6 30 168 65 -538 -330 12 
2002 
1510 Mean 4167 1290 1625 2730 539 121 19 1748 
 Max 45766 33304 27784 61489 12512 5942 1937 33877 
 Min 115 46 25 146 51 -1031 -729 17 2010 Mean 2764 888 1129 1731 291 41 8 1211 
 Max 37243 7567 28063 13493 1884 1220 791 28333 
 Min 47 56 59 172 51 -577 -757 18 4040 Mean 1137 944 563 1768 301 33 31 588 
 Max 7119 6670 4063 8416 1868 603 577 4574 
 Min 33 7 7 171 66 -690 -675 3 
2003 
1510 Mean 4209 1441 2050 3068 529 213 79 2266 
 Max 45738 25227 34475 60918 12512 9929 2689 44460 
 Min 173 22 25 248 60 -570 -1811 9 2010 Mean 2804 1088 1458 2005 296 60 27 1559 
 Max 40946 19022 51712 21288 1884 1655 1248 52123 
 Min 42 70 68 153 51 -788 -618 1 4040 Mean 1148 1192 664 2105 326 37 -1 696 
 Max 9756 6696 5561 10561 1868 830 1383 6380 
 Min 34 6 14 208 66 -642 -506 3 
2004 
1510 Mean 4359 1804 2930 3646 573 318 62 3245 
 Max 44722 22242 45202 64255 12512 13586 2911 58638 
 Min 179 35 61 260 60 -923 -881 16 2010 Mean 2721 1235 1767 2196 312 78 47 1880 
 Max 42783 15382 63680 18144 2690 2802 1709 64593 
 Min 29 57 77 129 51 -524 -505 28 4040 Mean 1171 1366 814 2361 349 42 37 858 
 Max 13558 9230 6422 15534 2274 1260 2163 7667 
 Min 33 5 17 202 55 -954 -600 14 
2005 
1510 Mean 4688 2331 3889 4493 635 317 -8 4198 
 Max 44421 63097 108422 142024 17512 18311 1784 126608 
 Min 173 23 49 164 60 -997 -2665 18 2010 Mean 2757 1430 2102 2456 333 78 -10 2165 
 Max 32755 24234 66058 27219 2690 3061 1342 66597 
 Min 30 56 110 173 58 -696 -954 1 4040 Mean 1180 1526 828 2572 381 57 -34 888 
 Max 12568 13411 8529 21992 3723 1976 598 10559 
 Min 21 7 12 200 63 -1142 -1100 11 
2006 
1510 Mean 4841 3040 4716 5483 659 377 101 5009 
 Max 44104 78313 143657 164847 17512 19204 9263 162326 
 Min 177 27 57 156 59 -1679 -2275 69 2010 Mean 2789 1757 2646 2918 361 132 34 2748 
 Max 46355 25348 75825 31430 3082 3187 3694 76491 
 Min 30 50 46 223 59 -1376 -5237 105 4040 Mean 1343 2449 1103 3897 475 148 178 1215 
 Max 15174 32466 14664 49920 4370 3434 7495 17918 





1510 Mean 5373 3753 6169 6967 769 575 176 6697 
 Max 94269 93735 173608 188336 17512 19308 6253 191559 
 Min 158 56 52 312 50 -364 -2276 63 2010 Mean 4280 2920 3951 4643 465 239 283 4118 
 Max 266607 156283 177619 215213 21300 4329 26987 180507 
 Min 136 32 78 219 50 -1048 -2099 94 4040 Mean 1432 3955 1665 6368 608 364 310 1957 
 Max 16464 66175 28059 100094 6872 7642 6303 35527 
 Min 16 44 12 200 63 -933 -2674 4 
2008 
1510 Mean 5451 4197 7357 7568 814 198 60 7520 
 Max 107887 102183 193014 200021 17512 8154 8356 200638 
 Min 147 27 38 238 50 -8022 -8837 32 2010 Mean 5742 4739 6130 7054 667 260 184 6331 
 Max 267188 191001 233114 252096 21300 4569 26267 234619 
 Min 165 49 58 222 59 -425 -9926 62 4040 Mean 1417 4981 1734 8024 849 386 119 2066 
 Max 16515 80418 34856 119237 10995 6322 5016 40992 
 Min 18 38 16 182 87 -432 -1764 5 
2009 
1510 Mean 5948 4986 6507 8665 871 214 -60 6667 
 Max 107831 99923 142118 201143 17512 7295 1996 148525 
 Min 135 18 33 245 67 -5391 -8583 31 2010 Mean 6047 5987 7566 8766 724 377 202 7855 
 Max 276150 245422 347495 311781 21300 8645 5615 355521 
 Min 146 39 70 230 59 -300 -1812 74 4040 Mean 1643 7173 2206 11190 962 581 902 2694 
 Max 17616 92200 41122 137609 10995 8617 9758 48881 
 Min 18 43 11 192 87 -59 -1746 12 
2010 
1510 Mean 6248 5970 8897 10175 953 441 81 9269 
 Max 108256 104723 186586 216065 17512 17076 3114 202413 
 Min 124 19 53 204 75 -2537 -6261 8 2010 Mean 6590 7692 10365 11225 849 541 335 10781 
 Max 285054 315414 464434 389306 21300 10515 15319 473663 
 Min 109 41 69 213 62 -848 -1568 70 4040 Mean 1865 10576 2838 15218 1095 782 282 3508 
 Max 22850 161051 39582 215638 10995 11941 13094 50714 




Appendix C  Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
Major variables in Chapter Four (ratios in initial abbreviations) 
     Mean VIF      2.68
----------------------------------------------------
        AG      1.77    1.33    0.5653      0.4347
       NPG      2.83    1.68    0.3528      0.6472
       TPG      2.98    1.73    0.3360      0.6640
       ORG      2.34    1.53    0.4272      0.5728
        CI      1.27    1.13    0.7883      0.2117
     CFOOR      2.70    1.64    0.3705      0.6295
       COR      1.22    1.11    0.8176      0.1824
       CAT      3.57    1.89    0.2800      0.7200
        RT      1.54    1.24    0.6480      0.3520
        IT      2.29    1.51    0.4365      0.5635
       ARP      1.84    1.36    0.5437      0.4563
       AIP      3.67    1.92    0.2722      0.7278
       CCC      4.33    2.08    0.2310      0.7690
     CFOCL      4.59    2.14    0.2178      0.7822
     CFOIL      3.76    1.94    0.2662      0.7338
      CFOL      1.75    1.32    0.5701      0.4299
    EBITAL      1.92    1.39    0.5203      0.4797
        CR      2.30    1.52    0.4356      0.5644
       CUR      3.25    1.80    0.3075      0.6925
       CLL      1.41    1.19    0.7104      0.2896
       TAA      4.64    2.15    0.2156      0.7844
       CAA      3.12    1.77    0.3205      0.6795
        EM      3.84    1.96    0.2602      0.7398
       FES      1.83    1.35    0.5456      0.4544
       OES      1.34    1.16    0.7479      0.2521
       OPS      2.64    1.62    0.3791      0.6209
       GMS      2.36    1.54    0.4242      0.5758
      ROIC      5.02    2.24    0.1992      0.8008
       ROE      3.68    1.92    0.2721      0.7279
    FCFEPS      2.17    1.47    0.4613      0.5387
    FCFFPS      2.25    1.50    0.4435      0.5565
    EBITPS      4.55    2.13    0.2200      0.7800
      CFPS      1.45    1.21    0.6874      0.3126
      UPPS      2.07    1.44    0.4825      0.5175
      SRPS      1.28    1.13    0.7838      0.2162
      SCPS      1.59    1.26    0.6282      0.3718
      ORPS      3.64    1.91    0.2750      0.7250
     CFOPS      3.28    1.81    0.3048      0.6952
Efficiency      2.59    1.61    0.3863      0.6137
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
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  Mean VIF      1.12
----------------------------------------------------
        r6      1.10    1.05    0.9097      0.0903
        r5      1.04    1.02    0.9590      0.0410
        r4      1.14    1.07    0.8743      0.1257
        r3      1.19    1.09    0.8372      0.1628
        r2      1.11    1.05    0.9007      0.0993
        r1      1.07    1.03    0.9353      0.0647
        TE      1.15    1.07    0.8679      0.1321
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Mean VIF      1.10
----------------------------------------------------
        r6      1.09    1.04    0.9177      0.0823
        r5      1.03    1.02    0.9683      0.0317
        r4      1.13    1.06    0.8887      0.1113
        r3      1.20    1.09    0.8367      0.1633
        r2      1.11    1.06    0.8970      0.1030
        r1      1.07    1.03    0.9359      0.0641
        SE      1.10    1.05    0.9099      0.0901
       PTE      1.11    1.05    0.9006      0.0994
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Mean VIF      1.12
----------------------------------------------------
        r6      1.11    1.05    0.9006      0.0994
        r5      1.04    1.02    0.9653      0.0347
        r4      1.15    1.07    0.8731      0.1269
        r3      1.20    1.09    0.8340      0.1660
        r2      1.12    1.06    0.8921      0.1079
        r1      1.06    1.03    0.9467      0.0533
        GE      1.16    1.08    0.8652      0.1348
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Mean VIF      1.11
----------------------------------------------------
        r6      1.10    1.05    0.9128      0.0872
        r5      1.04    1.02    0.9639      0.0361
        r4      1.14    1.07    0.8777      0.1223
        r3      1.20    1.09    0.8367      0.1633
        r2      1.11    1.05    0.9007      0.0993
        r1      1.07    1.03    0.9384      0.0616
       SPE      1.13    1.06    0.8833      0.1167
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Mean VIF      1.11
----------------------------------------------------
        r6      1.10    1.05    0.9107      0.0893
        r5      1.03    1.01    0.9733      0.0267
        r4      1.12    1.06    0.8950      0.1050
        r3      1.22    1.10    0.8198      0.1802
        r2      1.11    1.05    0.9008      0.0992
        r1      1.08    1.04    0.9273      0.0727
        ME      1.14    1.07    0.8791      0.1209
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
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Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared 
     Boardsize 1.45 1.21 0.6878 0.3122 
IndependentDirector 1.16 1.08 0.8647 0.1353 
Supervisor 1.33 1.15 0.7539 0.2461 
SeniorManager 1.27 1.12 0.7904 0.2096 
Duality_d 1.24 1.11 0.8057 0.1943 
WorkLocation_d 1.05 1.02 0.9552 0.0448 
StateShares 2.61 1.62 0.3833 0.6167 
SOE_d 2.06 1.44 0.4855 0.5145 
BoardShares 1.67 1.29 0.6004 0.3996 
SupervisorShares 1.22 1.1 0.8216 0.1784 
Top10Shares 1.53 1.24 0.6539 0.3461 
InstitutionShares 2.08 1.44 0.4799 0.5201 
AverageShares 2.09 1.44 0.479 0.521 
OtherListing_d 1.12 1.06 0.8926 0.1074 
CapitalChange_d 1.26 1.12 0.7959 0.2041 
ConnectedShareholder_d 1.09 1.04 0.9169 0.0831 
ManagementSalary 1.68 1.3 0.5944 0.4056 
DirectorSalary 1.4 1.18 0.7164 0.2836 
IndependentDirectorSalary 1.68 1.29 0.5966 0.4034 
SeniorSalary 1.62 1.27 0.6183 0.3817 
NonpaidSeniorStaff 1.96 1.4 0.51 0.49 
ChairAge 1.05 1.02 0.955 0.045 
ChairGender_d 1.27 1.12 0.7903 0.2097 
ChairCollege_d 1.91 1.38 0.5237 0.4763 
ChairUndergraduate_d 2.57 1.6 0.3885 0.6115 
ChairMasters_d 3 1.73 0.3335 0.6665 
ChairDoctorate_d 1.5 1.22 0.6674 0.3326 
ChairQualification_d 2.46 1.57 0.406 0.594 
ChairNationality_d 1.24 1.11 0.8096 0.1904 
ChairPaid_d 1.7 1.3 0.5898 0.4102 
ChairConpost_d 1.77 1.33 0.5658 0.4342 
CEOAge 1.05 1.03 0.9508 0.0492 
CEOGender_d 1.26 1.12 0.7935 0.2065 
CEOCollege_d 1.89 1.38 0.5289 0.4711 
CEOUndergraduate_d 2.62 1.62 0.3818 0.6182 
CEOMasters_d 2.97 1.72 0.3372 0.6628 
CEODoctorate_d 1.45 1.2 0.6915 0.3085 
CEOQualification_d 2.37 1.54 0.4216 0.5784 
CEONationality_d 1.24 1.12 0.8041 0.1959 
CEOPaid_d 1.07 1.03 0.9342 0.0658 
CEOConpost_d 1.48 1.22 0.6763 0.3237 
Ratio1 1.72 1.31 0.5806 0.4194 
Ratio2 1.31 1.15 0.7619 0.2381 
Ratio3 1.09 1.04 0.9212 0.0788 
Ratio4 1.32 1.15 0.7565 0.2435 
Ratio5 1.2 1.1 0.8326 0.1674 
Ratio6 1.34 1.16 0.7465 0.2535 
Macro1 17.5 4.18 0.0571 0.9429 
Macro2 3.17 1.78 0.3155 0.6845 
Macro3 10.79 3.29 0.0927 0.9073 
Macro4 11.46 3.39 0.0873 0.9127 
     Mean VIF 2.34 
       Mean VIF      2.34 
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